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ABSTRACT
Urban planners continue to explore various ways of influencing the
type, rate, location, quality and timing of urban development.

The need

for such influence is evidenced by the compounding of urban environmental and energy concerns with local government fiscal difficulties.
This study examines two of the tools frequently identified as being
useful in efforts to effectively manage urban development:

consolidated

urban government and the controlled extension of certain urban services,
especially water service, sewerage service, fire protection and police
protection.
These two tools are explored through a case study of the urban and
general services district concept as it has evolved in Metropolitan
Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee.

The decision, with the

establishment of consolidated government in 1963, to divide Metropolitan
Nashville-Davidson County into two service districts provides a setting
for the examination of past, present and potential impact of these
service arrangements upon Nashville's urban development.

The following

four research questions provide the focus of the study:
1.

Was the creation of the service districts based upon a planning
concern for the coordination of service provision with
development objectives?

2.

Has the existence of these districts permitted their use as
vehicles for coordinated service delivery consistent with
development objectives?
iii

iv
3.

Given the history of these districts, do they appear to have
potential in assisting Metro Nashville in meeting its future
development objectives?

4.

Does the Nashville experience with consolidated government and
the service district concept provide planners with evidence of
the validity of such arrangements for the imp1ementati'on of
development objectives in metropolitan areas?

Organized around these central questions, the study employs interviews
with past and present planning officials, reviews of planning documents,
and searches of literature on Metro Nashville to find its answers.
The principle findings of the study are:

~

1.

A continuing group of professional planners and Nashville
citizens were instrumental in the design and implementation of
consolidated government in Nashville and Davidson County.

2.

The creation of the Urban Services District and General
Services District concept was a response to service delivery,
political, fiscal and legal problems in Nashville; developmental
concerns were secondary.

3.

Since 1963, the continuing need to provide urban services to
a1\eadY-Urban~zed

areas has precluded active consideration of

~ng service policies to guide development; this fact has been

reinforced by the general Metro political environment which
supports the view that public planning for development should
be limited to the maintenance of "minimum standards" of public
health, safety and welfare.

v

4.

The potential for use of Urban Services District expansion
policies as developmental tools has been moderated by the
erosion of the distinction between the Urban Services District
and the General Services District.

5.

Although Metro is currently reviewing three "general plan"
alternatives, there

1s

little evidence to suggest that a

political climate is emerging which will support .the use of
service policies to influence urban development beyond the
"minimum standard" level.
The expansion of the Nashville metropolitan area beyond the
boundaries of Davidson County, the dominance of state and
federal decision-makers in transportation decision-making, and
the lack of consistent coordination between Metro agencies and
departments seriously inhibits any effort to use Urban Services
District extension to influence urban development.
The conclusions of the study are based upon these findings and are
phrased as messages to planners who are interested in the potential
impact consolidated government and the management or urban services
~might

have upon urban development.

The messages suggest caution in

listing the virtues of consolidated government, particularly where such
government is not truly metropolitan.

It is further suggested that the

use of urban service policies to influence development is dependent upon
both the political capacity and the political will to effectively
achieve development goals.

Planners are encouraged to seek the

development of each of these.
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CHAPTER I
URBAN DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND METROPOLITAN
NASHVILLE:

AN INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a case study of the evolution of the Urban and
General Services Districts from their conception prior to the birth of
Metropolitan Nashville until the present.

This evolution is discussed

with the view that management of urban service policies can be an
important component in the overall management of urban development.
Equally important is the examination of the role played by a consolidated form of urban government in furthering such management.

The

existence, since 1963, of consolidated government in Nashville-Davidson
County makes this unique inquiry possible.
Influencing the pattern of urban development continues to be at the
heart of most urban planning efforts.

Planners, in their attempt to

assist urban areas in meeting established development goals, continue to
explore various ways of channeling development pressures into actions
consistent with such goals.

Prominent among such methods are the

controlled extension of urban services, the programmed expansion of
urban boundaries, and the consolidation of government units throughout
the metropolitan area.

Although many other methods exist, these three

offer an interesting package of potential development management
strategies, particularly in a setting where some degree of metropolitan

1

2

government consolidation has occurred or is, likely to occur. 1
Commonly known as "growth management, II the process of managing
development through programs and policies "intended to influence the
rate, amount, type, location and/or quality of future development" has
captured the widespread interest of planners and other local officials. 2
Since the term

II

growth " implies a rather limited concern for the

accommodation of new urban residents and enterprises, the concept of
"development," rather than growth, management perhaps better reflects
the planner's concern for all forms of urban evolution, particularly
those leading to changes in the physical environment and those placing
new demands on the delivery of local government services.
One significant discussion of the management of development
suggests that the primary characteristics of such management include all
efforts to influence the types, rate, location and quality of urban
development. 3 The secondary characteristics of such efforts include the
impacts of resulting development patterns on the environmental, fiscal,
4
These secondary
societal, and regional traits of the urban area.

lThere are many reviews of the range of devices available for
implementing development objectives. A concise summary is presented in
Robert Einsweiler, Urban Growth Management: Summary Evaluation of
Research (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 1-10.
More extensive discussion is found in Randall W. Scott et al. (eds.)
Management and Control of Growth (Washington: The Urban Land Institute,
1975) .
2navid R. Godschalk et al. Constitutional Issues of Growth
Management (Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials Press, 1977),
p. 9.
3

Godschalk et al., p. 161.

3

characteristics underscore the dependence of any development management
effort upon a statement of development goals and objectives.

Although

the explicitness and sequence of such statements may vary, the
management of development, as an organized urban activity, is premised
upon some form of public expression of urban development goals and
objectives.
Various reasons are given by cities and towns for wishing to engage
in some form of development management.

The declining capacity of

cities to meet their fiscal needs, the growing concern for protection of
the urban environment, the increased need for energy conservation, the
raising of questions of equal opportunity in housing, and new patterns
of urban growth have all, in varying mixtures of

emphasis~

prompted some

local governments to move from a general posture of "following" to one
S
of "guiding" development.
Although the shift may seem subtle, the
change can be dramatic, particularly where a local government in the
past has only paid lip service to long-range development goals and
uncritically serviced the needs of development-oriented interests. 6
~

This is probably the case with a great number of American local
governments.

Only with" environmental crises, losses of inner-city

revenues, inadequate housing opportunities, costly service extensions
and other urban problems of major consequences has there been a growing

SGodschalk et al., pp. 187-9. See also the seminal study on many
of the benefits to be gained from such a shift: Anthony Downs, The Costs
of Sprawl (Washington: The Real Estate Corporation, 1974).
6A useful case study of one such change, Fairfax County, Virginia,
is: Grace Dawson, No Little Plans (Washington: The Urban Institute,
1977) .

\

4

interest in developing urban goals, policies and programs aimed at more
carefUlly managing urban development.

It is in the context of this·

growing interest in managing urban development and the resulting search
for effective management strategies that this study is prepared.
These management strategies must take into consideration both the
establishment of urban development goals and the selection of appropriate
implementation tools.

The former can range from absolute population

"caps" to a directing of high rates of growth into specified areas.
Implementation decisions involve choices made from a number of
regulatory, fiscal, cooperative and other devices geared toward the
.

management of development pressures.

7

Service policies, urban boundary

modifications and urban government consolidation are implementation
devices chosen for review in the case of Nashville.
I.

CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT

Although the consolidation of governments in the urban area has
been considered a type of urban reform for reasons extending far beyond
a concern for management of development, it is nevertheless important to
include consolidation as a possible means for implementing urban
development objectives.

Consolidated government, it has been argued,

permits a regional, or at least county-wide, approach to the problems of
metropolitan growth.

According to many theories of urban reform, the

"extremely atomized" urban areas suffer from governmental fragmentation
which is dysfunctional to:

7Einswei1er, pp. 10-31.

5

1.
2.
3.

the efficient and economical delivery of public goods and
services on an area-wide basis;
the elimination of social and economic disparities in the
urban area; and,
the development of regional community and citizenship.8

The consolidation of governments in an urban area theoretically leads
toward amelioration of these conditions by providing a structure for
unified long-range planning, "rational" provision of urban services,
coordinated capital investments, area-wide revenue mechanisms, singular
focus of political identity, and so on. 9 Ultimately, the proconsolidation argument includes the claim that by merging the many
governments in the metropolitan area into a single government, a vehicle
is created for coherently preparing and implementing policies designed
to encourage the development of the entire metropolitan area in a
planned, rather than random, fashion.

lO

Against this optimistic view of urban government consolidation,
found throughout urban reform literature, must be raised at least three
important questions.

Each challenges the capacity for consolidation to

be an effective means for implementing public development goals in the

8See : Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Regional
Decision-Making: New Strategies for Substate Districts (Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 2-11; Thomas P. Murphy and John
Rehfuss, Urban Politics In the Suburban Era (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey
Press, 1976), pp. 236-7; Thomas A. Flinn, Local Government and Politics
(Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman &Co.), pp. 143 ff.; Charles R. Adrian,
State and Local Governments, 4th Ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976),
pp. 203-209.
9

Murphy and Rehfuss, pp. 236-7.

10"Consolidation" is used here to include city-county merger and
absorption of city by county or vica versa; it does not include the
"urban federation" pattern of intergovernmental relations such as found
in Miami-Dade County, Florida, or Toronto, Ontario.

6

in the metropolitan area.

Each question must be asked in any review of

an existing consolidated government or in any consideration of potential
consolidation by a metropolitan area.

The questions deal with the

political feasibility of consolidation, the issue of metropolitan and
governmental boundaries, and the link between consolidation and
efficiency in providing urban services.
There are relatively few consolidated urban governments in the
United States.
occurred. II

Since 1947, only 15 successful consolidations have

About twice that number are estimated to have been under

some form of consideration in the early 1970's.12 There is a strong
argument that the infrequence of consolidation stems from the inverse
relationship between "political feasibility" and the potential
effectiveness of a proposed consolidated government in dealing with
13
area-wide problems.
Proposals for consolidation not only threaten
entrenched political interests, but also often run counter to citizen
preferences for the status quo, particularly in the suburban areas.
Reformers tend to forget that the symbols--efficiency, a
bigger and better Zilchville, and the like--that they respond
to with enthusiasm ring no bells for "hoi polloi." It is the
latter, of course, which dominate the decision when a
proposal is put to a popular referendum. Ordinary citizens
are characteristically apathetic. If water flows from the tap
and the toilet flushes today, they are not likely to ask
whether it will do so tomorrow. 14

llMurphy and Rehfuss, pp. 237-8.

l2 Ibid .

l3Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, pp. 11-15.
l4Adrian, pp. 220-1.

7

Although the number of such studies is limited, reviews of
consolidation successes and failures agree that voter opposition and/or
apathy is usually only overcome by "abnormal, unusual, or special"
circumstances which lend a "crisis atmosphere!' to the consolidation
issue. 15

Consolidation of urban governments has not been received by

the urban citizenry as the simple, rational, long-term solution to their
problems suggested by many reformers.
The second limitation of the consolidation solution to metropolitan
problems centers on the usual lack of coincidence of such a government's
boundaries with those of the metropolitan area.
Not only is city-county consolidation almost impossible
politically, but it does not guarantee that the city-county
will have sufficient powers to meet all metropolitan problems,
and it causes even greater political difficulties if the
metropolitan area expands beyond the county limits. 16
Whereas in 1960, over two-thirds of the Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas consisted of only one county, the 1980 census will
indicate that less than half of all SMSA's consist of a single county.

17

There is very little assurance that the boundaries of a consolidated
government will coincide with those of the metropolitan area, however
such an area is defined.

This is particularly true given the fact that

l5 See Thomas M. Scott, "Metropolitan Governmental Reorganization
Proposals," Western Political Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 2 (June, 1968),
and Walter Rosenbaum and Thomas Henderson, "Explaining Comprehensive
Governmental Consolidation: Toward a Preliminary Theory," Journal of
Politics, vol. 34, (May, 1972).
l6 Ad rlan,
.
p. 214 •
17prank I. Michelman and Terrance Sandalow, Materials on Government
in Urban Areas (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1970), p. 963.

8

consolidation involving more than one county is even less likely than
the traditional single county-city form.
This criticism of consolidation does not detract from the
advantages gained within the consolidated government's jurisdiction, it
simply points out that many problems of urban development are
metropolitan in nature and cannot be dealt with in a unified way when
significant independent local government units remain in the metropolitan fringe of an existing or proposed consolidated government.

The

strengthening of regional governments and growing interest in
"two-tiered" metropolitan federations are partial responses to this, as
well as the previous, limitation of consolidated government in coping
with metropolitan problems. 18
Perhaps the deepest questioning of the capacities of consolidated
government occurs when "the needed distinction is made between 'problems
which exist in metropolitan areas' and fproblems which exist by virtue
of the inadequacies of government structure in metropolitan areas lll and
the latter are deemed to be relatively few. 19 Two critiques of
consolidation can be extracted from this general view.

The first builds
20
on the descriptions of suburbia by Robert Wood, Thomas Dye and others.

l8The best example of the regional approach is the Metropolitan
Council in Minnesota. See Peggy A. Reichert, Growth Management In the
Twin Cities Metropolitan Areas (St. Paul: Metropolitan Council of the
Twin Cities Area, 1976).
19Morton Grodzins and Edward Banfield, Government and Housing in
Metropolitan Areas (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958), p. 156.
20 For a review of these classic theories see: Murphy and Rehfuss,
pp. 139-42, and, Brett W. Hawkins and Thomas R. Dye, f~etropo1itan
Fragmentation: A Research Note," Midwest Review of Public Administration
(Feb. 1970), pp. 17-24.

9

This view holds that the continued existence of many governments in the
urban area properly reflects existing patterns of urban social
integration.

In addition, these many governments meet the American

pub1ic's need for accessible, personal and localized government.

In

short, the "po1ycentric ll nature of urban government reflects the
polycentric nature of urban scciety.
Coupled with the challenge to the social validity of consolidated
urban government is the challenge to the economic validity of such
government.

Ostrom and others have argued that a host of local

governments and service districts are not necessarily less efficient in
providing many urban services than are consolidated governments. 21
Although this argument is conditioned by the type of service and the
setting studied, it should be seen as a warning against uncritical
acceptance of the conventional wisdom which suggests that in spite of
all its other shortcomings, consolidated government certainly is more
efficient and responsive in providing such urban services as sewers,
22
water supply and public safety.
A service-by-service analysis within
specific urban settings is required before any conclusions can be
reached on the lIefficiency" pillar of the reformists I argument in favor
23
of consolidated government.
Likewise, the "polycentristic"

2lSee: Elinor Ostrom, ed.
Hills: Sage Publications, 1976)
IISca1e and Monopoly Problems in
Affairs Quarterly (Sept. 1972),

The Delivery of Urban Services (Beverly
and Robert L. Bish and Robert Warren,
Urban Government Services," Urban
pp. 97-122.

22Robert B. Hawkins, Jr. "Special Districts and Urban Services,"
in Ostrom, The Delivery of Urban Services, pp. 171-88.
23 Ibid .
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alternative to consolidated government should not be discounted until
the results of such studies are in.
The metropolitan area, feudal and balkanized as it may be,
consti tutes a viable social and political system in which
interaction takes place among its parts and in which public
policy emerges in one fashion or another . . . a metropolitan
political system, functioning almost always within a
governmentally fragmented structure, does exist here and now.
Decisions do get made, local governments continue to operate,
services and goods are provided, problems are solved or
mitigated, expansion and development takes place, and the day
to day life of the residents goes on. The process may be
inefficient and costly and may rationally demand change to
maximize output and citizen satisfaction . . • . 24
Consolidated government, when established, may certainly provide a
vehicle for coherently preparing and implementing policies designed to
encourage the development of the metropolitan area in a planned, rather
than random, fashion.

Enthusiasm over such a prospect, however, should

be tempered first by consideration of the likelihood that such a
government can even be brought into being.

An

affirmative answer here

still leaves the serious questions regarding the extent to which
consolidated government would be truly "metropoli tan 11 and whether such a
government could more efficiently provide local government services than
the existing matrix of local government structures.

Any study of a

consolidated government structure as a contributor to effective
metropolitan management of development must consider each of these
issues.

24John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metropolis (New York:
Harper and Row, 1965), p. 184.
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II.

URBAN SERVICE POLICIES AND BOUNDARY EXTENSIONS

A significant fact of urban development is the dependence of nearly
all forms of development upon minimal levels of urban service provision.
Such dependence can form the cornerstone of a management strategy when
urban governments require substantial service levels as a prerequisite
for development to occur.

An example is the commitment to the policy of

"no sewers-no subdivisions."

Where such regulatory-service policies are

used to reinforce the commercial attractiveness of well-serviced land
consistent with area development goals, undeniable incentives for proper
development exist.
It has been widely accepted by planners that certain urban services
can have a primary shaping influence upon urban development.

The

provision of accessibility, water, waste disposal and energy supply
influence all forms of development.

School facilities, police and fire

protection, and other services have additional impacts upon specific
types of development.

Proper management of such services to implement

existing development goals requires that local governments at least
have:
1.

the technical competence to understand and manage the linkages
between services and urban development;

2.

the political will and capacity to employ this knowledge in
implementing development policies;

3.

the financial skills and resources necessary to fund the
appropriate service patterns; and

12

4.

a governmental-organizational framework capable of supporting
the resolution of these technical, political and financial
questions.

These requirements are obviously interrelated, but each makes up a
distinctive consideration in the evolution of a development management
strategy based on service provision policies.
requirements, if successfully met, represent

Taken together, the four

a definite

shift from

"accommodative" or "catch-up" planning to that of management and
guidance.
Although urban service management strategies can take many forms,
in general a distinction can be made between strategies including
accessibility variables and strategies limited to the common "municipal
service" package of water, sewerage, fire and police protection and so
on.

This distinction is required by the fact that transportation

decisions, particularly interstate highway, freeway, and primary
arterial location, are made and have been made by state and federal
officials, often with little consideration of local developmental
concerns. 25 The likelihood that education facility and energy supply
planning can be a part of either strategy depends as well upon local
decision-making arrangements.

Energy provision is often a private-

sector activity while school location is frequently determined by
autonomous school boards, many times under the guidelines established by
court rulings on racial balances. 26

,
25 Elnswel
'I er, pp. 12-13.

In the case study which follows,

26

Godschalk et al., p. 193.
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decisions on the location of major transportation corridors, schools and
energy services are not seen to be within the general authority of local
government.

Such a limitation upon the potential impact of even an

aggressive local strategy for managing development needs to be kept in
mind.
Within the limitations set forth above, the programming of both new
services and improvements to existing services is the critical link
between urban service policies and urban area development goals and
objectives.

The consistency of such programming with development

objectives is dependent on the technical, political, financial and
organizational resources mentioned earlier and can be quite instrumental
in making the difference between "simply planning to influence growth
and actually managing the characteristics of new development. II27
Closely tied to the question of using urban service policies to
assist in managing development is the issue of urban governmental
boundary determination.

This has already been somewhat addressed in the

discussion of consolidated government, but a broader consideration is in
order.

Traditionally, where expansion of urban governmental boundaries

has occurred, various annexation procedures have led to extension of
government 'boundaries into areas where substantial urbanization has
already taken place.

Important considerations in such expansion have

generally been the city's determination of the costs of service
extension and potential revenues in the annexed area.

27Godschalk et al., p. 195.

Where annexation

14
requires the concurrent approval of both annexor and annexee the
conclusions of those in the area to be annexed often conflict with those
of the annexing city.28

In such annexation disputes, the debate

generally centers on the relative "costs ll and "qualities" of services-be
they measured in terms of the city's "fiscal health" or the taxpayer's
perception of burdens on himself.
The possibility of the city extending extraterritorial service
controls beyond its boundaries provides one means for resolving some of
these issues without full annexation.

The extent to which such a policy

will meet development needs depends upon the package of services
included in extraterritorial arrangements and the degree to which the
city would have exclusive rights to provide such services in the
specified areas beyond the city's boundaries.
The present concern for the management of urban development places
a new light on this type of boundary dispute.

The territory over which

the city exercises control of service policies, if service policy
management is to be a part of an urban development strategy, must include
areas of potential as well as current urban development.

Both unified

planning and service authority need to exist throughout a metropolitan
area if service policies are to be an effective tool for guiding
development. 29 The inclusion within a city's jurisdiction of areas

28A review of these issues is found in Adjusting Municipal
Boundaries (Washington: National League of Cities, 1966).
29For a summary of this conclusion see Marion Clawson, Suburban
Land Conversion in the United States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1971), pp. 342-76.

IS
which might be limited in their capacity for urban development suggests
that service policy determination needs to include provision for "urban"
and "non-urban" service areas within the city's boundaries. 30 The basis
for boundary extension, therefore, must be broadened from the "service
to urbanized areas" of traditional annexation campaigns to include areas
of potential development throughout the metropolitan region. 31
The service distinctions between "urbanI! and "non-urban" service
areas and the manner in which the areas can be expanded or reduced in
size are important considerations in tying urban boundary procedures
with development management strategies.

The determination of what urban

services will be denied the IInon-urban" service area involves both
technical analysis of the impact of service denial on development and
the legal requirements for services to developments already in such
areas.

Hovering above such concerns are the additional issues of equal

protection (nondiscrimination) and the regional impact of metropolitan
development policies. 32

Obviously, the more the boundaries between the

two areas become blurred, the less significant are service policies in
limiting urban development.

The allocation of the types and quality of

services to these two areas is therefore an extremely important question.

30Elnswel
'I er, pp. 28 - 31 .
,
31This "traditional" view is typified by the similar treatment
given service extension studies and annexation studies in William
Goodman and Eric Freund. ed. Principles and Practices of Urban Planning
(Washington: International City Managers Association. 1968). pp. 398-9.
32The primary focus of Godscha1k et al. is on these issues.
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The scale of possible transition from "non-urban" to "urban"
service areas raises another issue of boundary modification.

Technical,

political, financial and organizational considerations have already been
suggested as being the basis for determining the link between service
policies and urban development objectives.

The flexibility to add very

small areas to the urban service area might very well minimize many of
the conflicts emerging from such considerations.

On the other hand,

technical considerations may suggest that addition of large areas is
required.

Although the distinction between "urban" and "non-urban"

services needs to be substantial, the scale of transition from one
category to the other needs to remain flexible, subject to technical,
political, financial and organizational consistency with development
ob j ecti ves.
The preceeding comments on urban service areas and urban boundaries
make it clear that questions of annexation and/or urban government
consolidation are important considerations in any effort to use service
policies to manage urban development.

Inherent in the argument favoring

the use of service policies as one tool to implement development goals
is the position that urban boundaries and governmental arrangements must
permit consistent and coordinated actions throughout the metropolitan
area.
III.

THE NASHVILLE CASE STUDY

The birth and growth of the Metropolitan Government of
Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee, provides an experience and

17
opportunity for examining many of the preceeding arguments about
consolidated government and the management of urban services.

Not only

has Metropolitan Nashville experienced nearly 15 years of consolidated
government, but it has also gone through a relatively recent period of
significant suburban growth.

Between 1940 and 1970, the population of

Nashville-Davidson County grew by some 75% (from 257,000 to 448,000).33
Nearly 75 % of all suburban housing stock in the county has been
constructed since 1950.

34

Current projections suggest that this growth

will continue, but primarily in the metropolitan counties surrounding
Davidson County.

35

Many of the problems of regional metropolitan

development continue to be experienced in the Nashville area.
Nashville offers an excellent opportunity to examine the issues
emerging from the expansion of metropolitan problems beyond the
boundaries of the consolidated government of Nashville-Davidson County.
Table 1.1 clearly shows the extent of metropolitan population growth
beyond Davidson County.
There is a more specific rationale for examining Metro Nashville's
experience.

The decision, with the establishment of consolidated

government, to divide Nashville-Davidson County into two service

33 Census data taken from Lester Salaman and Gary Wamsley, "The
Politics of Urban Land Policy: Zoning and Urban Land Development in
Nashville," in Blumstein and Walter, eds. Growing Metropolis, pp. 143-4.
34Analyzing Suburban Development (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning
Commission, 1973), p. 8.
35proposed General Plan For Nashville (Nashville: Metropolitan
Planning Commission, 1976), p. 4.

TABLE 1.1
POPULATION TRENDS, 1960-1970, MID-CUMBERLAND DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT

Number of
Persons

1960
Percent of
Region

Davidson County

399,743

58.6

Six Adjacent
Counties

178,283

Remaining Six
Counties
Region
Source:

Number of
Persons

1970
Percent of
Region

Percent Increase
1960-1970

24.2

447,877

56.4

12.0

26.2

10.7

229,435

28.9

28.7

103,554

15.2

10.1

116,585

14.7

12.6

681,580

100.0

18.2

793,897

100.0

16.5

Percent Increase
1950-1960

Metropolitan Planning Commission.

......
00
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districts (the Urban Services District and the General Services
District) addresses clearly the capacity for Metro Nashville to use
service provision as a development management device.

The formation of

these two districts permitted not only different levels of service
delivery within the metropolitan government's boundaries, but allowed
different tax and fee schedules as well.
The existence of these two service districts in the context of
consolidated government coupled with Nashville's recent and current
growth pressures lead to a series of research questions which form the
basis for this case study:
1.

Was the creation of these service districts based upon (to any
extent) a planning concern for the coordination of service
provision with development objectives?

2.

Has the existence of these districts permitted their use as a
vehicle for coordinated service delivery consistent with
development objectives?

3.

Given the history of these districts, do they appear to have
potential in assisting Metro Nashville in meeting its future
development objectives?

4.

Does the Nashville experience with consolidated government and
the service district concept provide planners with evidence of
the validity of such arrangements for the implementation of
development objectives in metropolitan areas?

The study of Metro Nashville which follows is a search for answers to
these questions.

Those answers will comment on the Nashville experience

20

in view of the general arguments just put forward which suggest that
consolidated government and urban service policy management can, under
certain conditions, become useful mechanisms for achieving metropolitan
development objectives.
The study casts a highly rational, idealized view of planning and
the management of development against the experiences of an American
city which is in many ways typical of other moderately-sized and growing
communities.

It might be said that the study is unfair in that it

probes Nashville's experience, or lack of experience, with the management
of development during a history which preceeded active consideration of
this issue by the planning profession.
are appropriate.

Several responses to this view

First, the study is not intended to be a criticism of

any city, regime, or individual.

It is an effort to compare a limited

part of city activities--service planning and management--with an
idealized planning and governing process.

Nashville may well provide

planners with many valuable lessons in these areas.
Secondly, the founders and early officials of Metro Nashville
should not be denied potential credit for linking service policies with
development objectives simply because significant professional attention
to this relationship did not develop until the mid-1960's.36

Finally,

even if it is found that the motives behind the establishment of Metro
Nashville's urban service framework were not directly tied to the

36An ~n~t~a
. . . 1 e ff ort was F. Stuart Chapin, "Taking Stock of
Techniques for Shaping Urban Growth,!! Journal of the American Institute
of Planners (May, 1963), pp. 76-87.
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management of future urban development, these arrangements may well form
the basis for such ties in the future.
The organization of the study follows both the historical
development of the service districts in Metro Nashville and the
relevence of this evolution to the theories of managed urban development.
Chapter II explores the origins of the service district concept during
the early thinking on consolidated government in Nashville and Davidson
County.

Commentary is offered on urban development objectives and

provisions for urban services during two phases of this thinking.

The

first centers on the formulation of proposals for consolidated
government (1951-1956) while the second deals with the two struggles for
public acceptance (1956-1962),

The chapter is developed as a response

to the first of the research questions stated above.
Chapters III and IV outline Metro Nashville's experience with the
service districts since the inception of consolidated government (1963).
Chapter III surveys Metro's development goals and objectives during this
period.

Chapter IV compares the use of the Urban and General Services

Districts with these objectives.

Of particular importance in this

chapter are service extensions which do not fit service district
boundaries and efforts to modify the boundaries themselves.

Both issues

relate closely to the connection between service policies and development objectives.

These two chapters combined respond to the second

research question and provide a basis for the responses to the third and
fourth questions.
The final chapter draws the Metro Nashville service district
experience together with the theories of the management of urban

22

development.

In responding to the final two research questions, the

chapter offers conclusions on Metro Nashville's past and potential
performance in using the service district structure, in the context of
consolidated government, to meet its development goals.

A very general

extension of these findings to other urban areas completes the study.
The early portions of the study are based upon both interviews with
several important actors during the evolution of Metro Nashville as well
as the many documents and commentaries cited in the notes.

Metropolitan

Planning Commission documents and studies form the basis for the data
presented in the latter part of the study.

The conclusions reflect the

interpretations of material from each of these sources in the light of
the theories and research questions presented in this introduction.

CHAPTER II
ORIGINS OF THE URBAN AND GENERAL SERVICES DISTRICTS
It is impossible to discuss the creation of the Urban and General
Services Districts without first reviewing the birth of consolidated
government in Nashville and Davidson County.

The origins of the urban

services district concept are deeply imbedded in the planning which led
to the establishment of Metro Nashville in 1963.

Although the history

of this planning and its ultimate impact have been told elsewhere, it is
important to recount significant events in the tale in order to explore
the forces behind the creation of the service districts. l As introduced
in the preceding chapter, this question emerges from the research
interest in the ties between development management strategies and the
evolution of the service districts.
As will be seen, the "service district concept" in Metro Nashville
gave birth to two important features of Metro government.

The first was

the organization of all metropolitan area services into two packages:
"general services" and "urban services.,,2

The second was the

incorporation of urban services into an expandable lIUrban Services
Districtlf and extension of general services into a countywide "General
Services District."

The initial boundary of the Urban Services District

I

A number of sources have been used to prepare the historical
material in this chapter. They will be cited where specifically used;
all are listed in the Bibliography.
2A full discussion of these districts follows later in the chapter.
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was the same as the old City of Nashville, at the time of the
3
consolidation.
The "service district concept," as outlined in the
following historical review therefore includes both the packaging of all
metro area services and the creation of two service districts, one
areawide and one expandable.
A number of trends can be traced through the decision and events
which ultimately came together to create Metro Nashville.

These trends

can be specifically tied in varying mixtures to specific features of the
new government. including the creation of two service districts.
these factors have been chosen for particular attention.

Six of

It is

suggested that creation of the service districts can be attributed to a
mixture of these factors, not necessarily a single one, thus permitting
an answer to the question regarding the relative significance of
development management concerns.

The six influences on the decision

leading to the service district features of consolidated government are:
1.

political considerations--concern for the acceptability of
consolidated government to those whose approval was required
for its implementation;

2.

administrative considerations--concern for the administrative
feasibility of the proposed plan for service delivery
governance;

3.

legal considerations--concern for the constitutionality of the
service districts, including the likelihood of drawn-out court
challenges;

3

See p. 36.
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4.

fiscal considerations--concern for the impact of service
districts on the new government's revenue, cost, and debt
structure;

5.

environmental-technical considerations--concern for the
consistency of proposed service-provision arrangements with
technical capacities for service provisions in the Davidson
County environment;

6.

developmental considerations-concern for the capacity of
service provision arrangements to guide urban development.

Obviously, it is the degree to which the sixth consideration can be
linked to the package of forces leading to the creation of the two
service districts that will determine the response to the research
interests underlying the study.
The interactions of these forces can be examined productively by
reviewing the birth of Metro Nashville through two particular periods.
The Itproposal" period ends with the publication of the "Plan for
Metropoli tan Government,,4 by the combined planning staff of the Davidson
county and City of

Nashvil~e

Planning Commissions in October 1956.

The

"acceptance" period ends with the final establishment of the Metropolitan
Government of Nashville-Davidson County on January 1, 1963.

Within each

period are found important contributions to the emerging service
district concept.

4Plan of Metropolitan Government for Nashville and Davidson County
(Nashville: Nashville and Davidson County Planning Commissions, 1956).
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I.

THE PROPOSAL PERIOD:

1950-1956

Nashville and Davidson County experienced an increased expansion of
suburban development after World War II, as did many other American
cities.

This growth accompanied the release of pent-up housing demand

accumulated during the war years and then was reinforced by the
expansion of the national economy and the impact of the increase in the
birthrate upon the continuing American preferences for single-family,
detached homes.

The availability of land for residential development

within the City of Nashville was limited.

Hence, in the early 1950's

city growth rates began to stabilize while county and regional rates
continued upward.

As county growth rates increased and city rates

stabilized, the accompanying problems of servicing new areas of growth
with limited county service capabilities grew in significance.

This

area of urban development beyond the city's boundaries grew in
significance due to the lack of any extension of the City of Nashville's
boundaries since 1927. 5 Additionally, Davidson County is characterized
by layers of limestone on or near the surface of the land.

This led to

a near absence of sanitary sewers and the resulting continuing problems
6
One estimate suggested that in 1950,
with septic tank performance.

5Nashvi11e's annexation problems are outlined in the opening
chapter of A Future For Nashville (Nashville: Community Services
Commission for Davidson County and the City of Nashville, 1952).
6Brett Hawkins, Nashville Metro: The Politics of City-County
Consolidation (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966), p. 23;
Daniel R. Grant, "Urban and Suburban Nashville: A Case Study in
Metropolitanism," Journal of Politics (February, 1955), p. 85.
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some 10% of all septic tanks in Davidson County had surface discharging
and another 15% exhibited some additional "danger to public health. ,,7
Both the lack of expansion of city boundaries and the sewerage problem
presented a unique environment of pressures faced by both the county and
city as the 1950's began.
Politically, the city and county engaged in the typical
"buckpassing" which effecti vely permitted the avoidance of many
responsibilities for dealing with such suburban growth problems.

Having

not been reapportioned since 1905, the Davidson County Quarterly Court
was not representative of the city's population.

According to one

study, the magistrates reflected "a 'rotten borough' system with a
vengeance. " 8 The absence of county or city home rule further compounded
problems of political responsibility.

Many local policy decisions

required favorable action by the county delegation to the state
legislature.
Administrative confusion was typified by the existence of dual
public health agencies, hospitals, and welfare systems. 9 Attempts to
clarify the proper health services due non-city and city residents and
then compute appropriate payment systems led to many complicated and
controversial arrangements.
confusing and inefficient.

The provision of other services was equally
Outside the City of Nashville, fire

protection was provided by eight private subscription companies and a

7Grant, p. 85.

8A Future For Nashville, p. 15.

9Grant, p. 90; A Future For Nashville, pp. 151-178.
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Where water lines were available in these

areas. they were generally two-inch and four-inch lines.

While the city

had a Class 3 fire rating, the non-city county had the lowest rating,
11
Class 10.
The mixture of utility districts and private companies
supplying water to the county areas was described as a system
"resembling scrambled eggs.,,12
The financial arrangements for such service patterns were just as
confusing.

Both city and county residents suffered from the various

inequities brought on by the existence of a growing area requiring urban
services but without an urban government.

These financial problems were

four primary types:
1.

City subsidization of services to non-city residents

2.

Inequitable city share of county and state tax revenues

3.

County expenditures primarily benefitting the city area

4.

Duplicate expenditures by city and county governments 13

Probably the greatest public outcry came from city residents who
saw their taxes supporting county residents.

The use of city streets

maintained by the city's Public Works Department, the use of city parks
(70% of the acreage was located outside the city with the county having
no parks of its own) and the use of a proposed city auditorium by county
residents particularly rankled city taxpayers. 14

10

A Future For Nashville, p. 86.

l2 Ibid .
l4Grant, pp. 93-95.

11

Grant, p. 90.
13 Based on Grant, Ibid.
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The city's share of state collected, locally shared taxes (beer,
' , 'h'lng. 15
alco h0 1 , sa 1es, stoc ks an d bon ds procee ds ) was actua 11 y dlmlnlS
The allocation formula was based on the census and the city had not
annexed any new areas in decades.

Additionally, there was continued

criticism of the formula whereby state aid-to-education funds
appropriated to the county were passed on to the city.16
From the county's view, there was the charge that county services
many times benefited only city residents.

Common arguments pointed to

the county's investment in the bridges over the Cumberland River and the
fact that two-thirds of the patients in the county hospital were city
reSl'dents. 17
There was little doubt that city and county governments duplicated
many services and functions.

Dual systems of tax assessment and

collection, funds investment, purchasing, training, personnel management,
and so on existed.

Problems of personnel duplication were particularly

evident in the operation of two school systems.

Although not the cause

of the same level of outcry as the issues of taxes and services, this
type of issue remained important.
Issues of land development patterns were made significant by the
rapid growth of the urban fringes within the county.

Although zoning,

subdivision regulations and building codes existed in both city and
county areas, lack of enforcement, ease of amendment and the absence of a

l5 A Future For Nashville, p. 180.
16Grant, p. 94.

l7 Ibid .
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countywide comprehensive plan for development led to a virtual absence
of planning and controlled urban growth. 18 Although the planning staffs
of city and county merged in 1939, there still existed City and County
Planning Commissions as well as the separate legislative bodies.

The

absence of any countywide planning policy entity was a serious
inhibition on any possibility for properly influencing the quality,
location and rate of new development.
Mention has already been made of Nashville's sewerage problem caused
by existence of extensive limestone deposits throughout the county.

This

environmental condition overshadowed other technical considerations
related to urban service delivery.

The very limestone deposits which made

septic tank performance questionable also made the potential cost of
sewer installation extremely high.

A solution to the sewer problem was

therefore seen as requiring the firmest of financial bases.

The city

was the only entity capable of such construction--and it would need
jurisdiction over an area broader than its 1950 boundaries both to
finance the project and to include all appropriate drainage areas.
The growing failure rate of septic tanks coupled with rapid
suburban development beyond the city's boundaries prompted a number of
city businessmen to approach the County legislative delegation about the
establishment of some type of commission to investigate the multitude of
problems associated with urban growth and service delivery in Davidson

18A Future For Nashville, pp. 27-37; Imogine Wright Bolin, IlPlanning
in Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee: Before and
After Consolidation" (unpublished Masters thesis, University of
Tennessee, 1968), pp. 42-50.
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County.
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Encouraged by the unified staff of both the county and city

planning commissions, the 1951 State legislature, at the request of the
Davidson County delegation, passed private legislation which established
the Community Services Commission. 20

The first section of the act made

a summary reference to the broad array of political, administrative,
financial, developmental and environmental problems facing the county
and city and just reviewed:
. it is hereby found and declared that the great
concentration of people and their homes, institutions and
enterprises occupying the central portion of Davidson County
constitute substantially one community and have a common need
for those services and facilities customarily sUpplied by a
local government formed for such purposes; that- less than
half of the area and less than two-thirds of the population
comprising this community are served by such a local government, the remaining area and population being dependent upon
the County Government which is not constituted nor intended
to render such services; that there are many proposals and
wide differences of opinion as to how a local government may
be formed as existing government changed so as to most
effectively, efficiently and economically provide for the
convenience, health and prosperity of the people; that, in
order to understand and solve these problems, the people are
in need of the facts, analyses, and proposals which can be
obtained only through specialized study; and that the creation
of the Commission and the carrying out of its purposes as
provided herein is in all respects for the benefit of the
people of Davidson County and municipalities located therein,
and is a public purpose, and the Commission will be performing
an essential governmental function in the exercise of the
power conferred upon it by this Act . . . . 21
The act went on to provide for 15 Commissioners, including a
permanent chairman.

In order to guarantee a "blUe ribbon" nature for

19Interview with Dr. Lee S. Greene, January, 1978.
20Tennessee, Private Acts of 1951, Chapter 241.
2l Ibid .
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the commission, 11 commissioners were specified by name with membership
evenly divided between city and county residents.
Nashville attorney, Edwin Hunt.

The chairman was a

Highly respected, both as a person and

a legal professional, Hunt's firm hand guided first the Commission and
22
later the legal work on the actual proposals for consolidation.
The
Commission itself was funded by equal contributions of $25,000 from the
city and county.
Recognizing the dominance of political, administrative and financial
factors contributing to the service problems of the county and city, the
Commissioners turned to two highly regarded experts in these areas for
staff leadership.

Dr. Lee S. Greene, political scientist and public

administration expert from University of Tennessee-Knoxville was asked
to become the Executive Director of the Commission.

He accepted the

position, took a leave from his university responsibilities, and arrived
for work in the fall of 1951. 23

Joining him as Assistant Director was

another political scientist, Dr. Daniel Grant, of Vanderbilt University.
With the, appointments of Greene and Grant, it was apparent that the
Commission, from the very outset saw governmental modification as the
heart of any strategy for dealing with host of problems it was under
mandate to investigate.
In June 1952, the Commission issued its final report.

24

Given the

ultimate impact which the report had in the formation of metropolitan

22G reene I nterv1ew.
.
24A Future For Nashville.

23 Ibid .
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government, it is useful to spell out first the major recommendations
made and then outline the research topics investigated during the course
..
of t h e CommlSSlon
stu d y. 25

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The prlnclp
. . 1 e recommen d atlons
.
were:

Annexation of approximately 69 square miles and 90,000
persons by the City of Nashville
Assumption of full County responsibility for the countywide
functions of public health, hospital care for indigents,
public education, and public welfare
Establishment of City and County horne rule
Redistricting of Davidson County to equalize representation
on Davidson County Quarterly Court.
Massive improvements in City services, once annexation
completed (i.e., Class 3 fire protection, uniform water
service and rates, sanitary sewer construction)
Unification of planning commission; requirement of
unanimous Councilor Court vote to override Planning
Commission rezone recommendation; completion of countywide
comprehensive plan; zoning of entire county

Study topics, upon which the recommendations were based, included
1.

populat1on patterns

2.

governmental structures

3.

urban planning

4.

the Nashville Electric Service

5.

water supply

6.

sewers

7.

refuge collection and disposal

8.

public transportation

9.

streets and roads

10.

schools

11.

police and fire protection

25 Ibid •
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12.

libraries

13.

public recreation

14.

public housing

15.

health services and hospitals

16.

public welfare

17.

local government finance

In many ways, the Commission's activities and report marked the
beginning of the move toward government consolidation and the birth of
Metro Nashville.

The study was comprehensive, competent and remarkably

free from political influence.

It represented a statement on city and

county problems by a group of planning-oriented citizens and academic
resource persons.

The Commission itself reflected a Nashville elite

with the time to commit to such activities.

According to the executive

director, the Commission worked well together, clearly perceived its
mission, and was productive to the point that the work was completed
before the deadline imposed by the legislature and without spending all
of the allocated funds. 26 The Commission's work was carefully and
positIvely reported in the Nashville press, particularly the Nashville
Banner.

County Judge Beverly Briley actively supported the work of the

Commission while Mayor West, although more "standoffish" than Briley,
.
de Comm~ss~on
..
ac t"~v~ t '~es. 27
d ~'d not ~mpe

The principle recommendation that the city should engage in a
massive annexation of county territory was recognition of the serious

26 Greene I nterv~ew.
.

27 Ibid .
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service deficiencies in the urban areas outside the city.

It was a

further testimony to the view that a solution to these problems lay only
in a consolidation of service functions under a single government
permitting efficient planning and administration as well as equitable
financing.

It should be noted that in recommending annexation the

Commission did not pursue consolidation of city and county governments.
At the time of the study there was no legal mechanism under Tennessee
law for such government.

In particular, the state constitution forbade

the establishment of separate tax rates under a single government.

28

This prohibition would have mandated a single tax-rate throughout a
consolidated city area, therefore raising serious issues of equity
should this area have included properties where service extension was a
short-term impossibility.29

This tax problem was compounded by the

absence of consolidation enabling legislation, therefore leaving the
Commission with annexation as the only practical way to consolidate
urban services under the City of Nashville.
The Commission's proposed annexation is presented in Figure 2.1.
The primary method used by the Commission in drawing the boundaries for
the proposed annexation was one of matching the need for providing urban
services to urbanized areas within reasonable city cost-revenue
guidelines.

A summary of the general technique used in this process is

outlined in Figure 2.2.

Greene and Grant drew up the basic annexation

28See David H. Grubbs, "Legal Aspects of City-County Consolidation
in Tennessee," Tennessee Law Review (Summer, 1963), pp. 499-516.
.
29 Greene I ntervlew.
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_

Annexation
Proposal

Figure 2.1.
Source:

Annexation Proposal, Community
Services Commission, 1952.

A Future For Nashville.
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Area Consideration

Data Required

Urbanized?

Population; Density; Growth Rate

Service Costs?

City-County Department Projections

Revenue Potential?

Property tax projections and
locally distributed state revenue
projection

Integrated with Evolving
Total Annexation
Proposal?

Contiguity; relationship to
existing municipalities; "blend"
with evolving "package"

Decision:

Include--Exclude

Figure 2.2.

Source:

Procedure for Decision to Include Area
in Annexation Proposal, Community
Services Commission, 1951-1952.

A Future For Nashville.
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boundaries, using this method relying heavily on the: cost-revenue
projections prepared by William Snodgrass of the Municipal Technical
.
S
'
30
erVl.ce.
Ad vl.sory
Accompanying this description of the proposed annexation boundary
was the recommendation that "upon the affirmative vote of a majority of
those voting in the entire area, consisting of the City of Nashville and
the suburban area taken together, the delegation should proceed to
extend the city limits of Nashville by special act of the 1953 General
31
Assembly."
This was obviously intended to stack the deck in favor of
annexation, taking the legislative delegation somewhat off the political
hook.

Annexation could only occur by act of the state legislature, the

present procedure of city initiative not being established until 1955,32
Under the legislative determination procedure, there was no requirement
for any guarantee of a schedule of city service provision to the annexed
area.

Although the Commission staff foresaw little tlfootdragging 11 by

the City in providing services, the joint referendum was seen as a way
to overcome suburban opinions which did not share such optimism,33
Table 2.1 indicates the Commission's estimates of the financial
impact of the annexation proposal, assuming their recommendations on
transferring health, school, hospital and welfare functions to the
county were followed.

The property tax consequences included a slight

30 Ibid .

3l A Future For Nashville, p. 3.

32 Tennessee, Public Acts of Tennessee, 1955, Chapter 113.
33Greene I nterVl.ew.
.
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TABLE 2.1
·FISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF ANNEXATION PROPOSAL AND SERVICE
REDISTRIBUTION, COMMUNITY SERVICES
COMMISSION, 1951-1952
County

City
Revenue Surplus
Revenue Deficit
Tax Rate Impact
($ per $100 assessed)

$1,550,000
$1,594,500
Reduce .41

Increase .68

Source: A Future For Nashville.

reduction for city residents (due to the transfer of four functions to a
countywide basis) and a slight increase for county residents.

Residents

of the annexed territory, of course, would have experienced a sharp
increase in taxes.

Assuming the Commission's estimates were correct,

the annexation would have paid its way, given the transfer of health,
hospital, school and welfare functions to the County.
Absent from the annexation proposal was any attempt to include
"non-urban" territory.

Both Greene and Grant would "like to have seen

the City reach out and take areas which were not developed" thus giving
34
better control over future development.
Politically, however, such a
recommendation would probably not have been accepted by the Commission
itself.

The Commission did not generally share the staff view that

annexation could move from "following" to a "leading" relationship with

34 Ibid .
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urban growth.

A legal obstacle was also present. in that the

requirement of a uniform city tax rate would have placed unreasonable
stress on the farmland which would have been included in such an
annexation strategy.

The staff wish to use the report of the Commission

as a means for better guiding urban development was therefore concentrated on the recommendation for a unified planning commission,
preparation of a comprehensive plan for the entire county. and tightened
contro I
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At the time the Commission's report was presented to the public.
t here were many warm wor ds
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recommendations. as did the Mayor and County Judge.

The key recornrnen-

dation of annexation, however, required the support of the county
legislative delegation.

The report was issued only two months prior to

the 1952 legislative elections.

The delegation finally elected that

fall was committed to all of the report's recommendations except that of
annexation.

Although supportive of the proposed annexation in principle.

the political risks were dominant when the proposal was blocked by at
least one senator's unwillingness to engage in "any annexation by state
37
legislation. 11
Even though the Commission had carefully and thoroughly
documented the case for annexation. there were few political incentives
to mount a campaign once the legislature failed to act. 38

35A Future For Nashville. pp. 27-37.
36

Grant. pp. 98-99.

37

Grant, p. 98.

38Interview with Charles Hawkins, Jr., December. 1977.

It's ironic
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that opposition to the principle of legislative annexation blocked
probably one of the most thoroughly prepared local annexation plans in
the State's history.
Several other recommendations made by the Commission did lead to
action.

The City and County Health Departments were merged into a

single County Department and certain welfare functions were transferred
to the County.

In general, however, Commission members and staff became
quite gloomy over lack of action following the report's pub1ication. 39
This feeling was enhanced by the lack of any serious criticism or
controversy over the data and conclusions upon which the recommendations
were based.

The Commission clearly had "told it like it was" and "like

it would be" if the recommendations were not followed.

As will be seen,

subsequent impacts of their work erased much of this early disappointment, clearly underscoring the accuracy and extent of their vision of
the future.

As the Assistant Director of the Commission wrote two years

later, "an opportunity still remains for a combination of vision and
action. ,,40 As a contribution to the "vision" portion of this mixture,
the Commission's report was a monument.

It was the first effort to

spell out Nashville's development objectives and a specific means for
achieving them.
It is important to keep in mind that the Community Service
Commission, directed by two political scientists, had seen inadequate

39Daniel R. Grant and Lee S. Greene, "Surveys, Dust, Action, If
National Civic Review (October, 1961).
40Grant, "Urban and Suburban Nashville: A Case Study in
Metropolitanism," p. 99.
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service delivery as a symptom of the deeper problem of inappropriate
governmental organization and boundaries in the Nashville area.

Unable

to deal significantly with-the organizational problem, the Commission
had placed its major emphasis on boundary adjustment.

The subsequent

failure to implement the annexation recommendation was perhaps a
blessing in disguise for Commission members who shared in the vision of
a need for some form of metropolitan consolidated government.

A year

after the report was published, a State Constitutional Convention was
held and a recommendation to amend the Constitution to permit consolidated government was placed before the voters and subsequently ratified.
This single event opened the doorway for a realistic consideration of
consolidated government.
There are various accounts of how the 1953 Constitutional
Convention came to recommend "Amendment 8" to the voters. 41

In general,

it is agreed that a prominent Nashville attorney, who had lost the
Convention presidency by a single vote, placed the substance of a
proposed article to permit consolidation before the body in its final
days. 42

With the significant amendment which required that any

consolidation must be approved by referendums in both the city and
county areas, Amendment B became Article XI, Sec. 9, of the Tennessee

41prank I. Michelman and Terrence Sandalow, Materials on Government
in Urban Areas (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1970), p. 966; Lee S.
Greene, David Grubbs and Victor Hobday, Government in Tennessee, 3rd ed.
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975), pp. 224-225; Grant and
Greene.
42G reene I ntervlew.
.
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State Constitution following its ratification by the voters on
November 3, 1953 .
. The General Assembly may provide for the consolidation
of any or all of the governmental and corporate functions now
or hereafter vested in municipal corporations with the
governmental and corporate functions, now or hereafter vested
in the Counties in which such municipal corporations are
located; provided such consolidations shall not become
effective until submitted to the qualified voters residing
within the municipal corporation and in the County outside
thereof, and approved by a majority of those voting within the
municipal corporation and by a majority of those voting in the
County outside the municipal corporation. (As amended:
Adopted in Convention--June 4, 1953; Approved at election
November 3, 1953; Proclaimed by Governor, November 19, 1953).
Although no direct reference is made in the Article to the question
of uniform taxation under consolidated government, most observers at the
time assumed that a dual level of services and taxes was implied. 43 In
a subsequent court case the validity of this assumption was upheld:
To hold that the local taxes must be equal and uniform
throughout Davidson County including the urban areas, would
have the practical effect of rendering inoperative the
consolidation of all city functions with county functions
provided by the Eighth Amendment. This interpretation must
necessarily have such crippling effect upon the "consolidation
of functions" as to render meaningl ess . . . this amendment. 44
This amendment made consolidated government legally possible and
financially feasible in Tennessee.
political hurdles.

At the same time it raised two

First, it required the General Assembly to pass the

appropriate enabling legislation.

Second, and moore significantly, it

mandated that any proposed consolidation be approved by separate

43Brett Hawkins, p. 37.
44Lewis Frazier et al. v. Joe C. Carr et al., as discussed in Brett
Hawkins, p. 143.
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majorities voting in the city and county

are~s.

This political

constraint was made a part of the Amendment to allay the fears of both
,

convention delegates and voters who saw threats to rural and suburban
areas in the consolidation option. 45
The first phase of proposing consolidated government ended with the
publication of the Community Services Commission report and the
ratification of Amendment 8.

As 1954 began, planning officials and

community business leaders interested in consolidated government had at
their disposal two important new resources:
1.

A careful documentation of the city and county's service
deficiencies, both present and future (Future of Nashville);
and

2.

A constitutional means for bringing consolidation about.

The continuing pressure to deal with the sewer problem coupled with
suburban growth beyond the City's boundaries led the joint staff of the
two planning commissions to propose the creation of an "Advanced
Planning and Research Division" early in 1954.

46

The division was

created with the explicit task of forging recommendations to deal with
the array of service and financial problems facing both the county and
city, as documented in the Community Service Commission report.

The

division's first-year work program included:

.
45 Greene I ntervlew.
46Brett Hawkins, p. 38; Planning Activities--1954 (Nashville: City
of Nashville and Davidson County Planning Commissions), p. 2.
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financial structure study; analysis of City and County
revenues and expenditures; outstanding debt; scope and cost of
services; capital improvements programmin§1 fiscal relationships with State and Federal Governments.
Priority was given to the financial studies in order to prepare a
recommendation for new governmental arrangements which would meet the
pressing service needs on an equitable and sound financial basis.

The

options first spelled out for such arrangements included for the first
time city-county consolidation, made possible by the recent constitutional amendment:

On the basis of that (financial study) information,
consideration will be given to the financial implication and
evaluation of each of the following and their possible
application in meeting present and future needs:
1. bring the area of the urban community under one urban
government by expanding the central city,
2. application of one metropolitan government within the
limits of Davidson County through City-County
consolidation,
3. transfer of specific governmental functions between the
City and County, resulting in a consolidation of a
particular function at one of the other level of
government,
4. metropolitan utility district for specific functions;
for example, water supply and distribution and sewage
collection and disposal.
A primary objective of this work also is the formulation and
application of an annual capital budget and long-range
financial program for public improvements. 48
The investigation of these options was undertaken by a rather
remarkable team on the joint planning commission staff.

Put together by

the Executive Director, Charles Hawkins, the team was headed by the new
director of the Division of Advance Planning and Research, Irving Hand.

47planning Activities--1954, pp. 13-34.
48Haw k'lns I ntervlew;
'
PI annlng
'
Actlvltles-' ,.
1954 , p. 20 .
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Brought in as a staff researcher was Robert Horton, who was completing
graduate work in economics and political science at Vanderbilt
University.

A political scientist at Vanderbilt, Professor Dan Grant,

was retained as a staff consultant.

This team, which was to remain

intact for the next nine years, quickly began to assemble material on
the various options for dealing with metropolitan service problems.
Hawkins arranged for federal planning grant funds to support the groupts
work and attempted to insulate the division from political pressures. 49
Hand directed the day-to-day work program while Horton undertook a
number of research projects, including reviews of governmental arrange'h
ments ~n
ot er metropo I'1tan areas. 50

Grant provided commentary and

advice throughout the entire range of discussions.
It is important to note that this group did not initiate any
substantial new technical analyses of service provision in the city and
county.

They relied heavily on the work of the Community Services

. .
f or suc h ~n
' format'10n, 51
Comm1SS1on

The pressing sewer problem, however,

did lead to a concurrent staff study of sewer extension into the
urbanized areas adjacent to the City of Nashville.

The extent of the

need for sewers and the failure to extend the City's boundaries can be

49HawkinsInterview; Planning Activities--1957-l960 (Nashville:
City of Nashville and Davidson County Planning Commissions, 1960),
pp. 40-42.
50Hawkins Interview; Interview with Robert Horton, January, 1978;
Correspondence with Irving Hand, January, 1978.
51Daniel R. Grant, "Metropolitics and Professional Political
Leadership: The Case of Nashville," Annals of American Academy of
Political and Social Science (May, 1964), pp. 73-74.
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seen in Table 2.2.

The study focused closely on the unsewered suburban

area adjacent to the city.

Just as the Community Services Commission

had done, the planners made early reference to the reform of governmental organization needed to implement the engineering-based
recommendations.
Courses of action available under existing laws and in terms
of existing levels of governmental organization indicate that
the two principle possibilities for dealing with this problem
are annexation and contractual arrangements between the City
of Nashville and Davidson County. 52
In their report, the planners recommended that a program of sewer
construction in the suburban area be undertaken by the county "in
cooperation with the city." The plan involved contracting for sewage
disposal with the City of Nashville and using both general obligation
an d revenue means

0f

·
.
53
f 1nanc1ng.

Keeping in mind that Hand's Division

was also investigating new forms of urban government, the sewer report
was significant for two reasons:
1.

It provided technical documentation of the sewer problem with a
proposed program of sewer construction prepared by engineers and
planners who were relatively free from political restraints; and

2.

The soundness of the technical recommendation contrasted
greatly with the complicated governmental arrangements required
.
54
to finance, construct and administer the plan.

52proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System for the Nashville
Metropolitan Area (Nashville: City of Nashville and Davidson County
Planning Commissions, 1956). p. 12
53

Proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System for the Metropolitan Area,

p. 13.

54Hawkins Interview.

TABLE 2.2
ESTIMATED POPULATION USING VARIOUS FACILITIES FOR DISPOSAL
OF SEWAGE--DAVIDSON COUNTY, 1955

Area
(S9' Miles)

Total

Using
Sewers

22.7

178,000

174,000

5.8

17,000

17,000

Unsewered Suburban
Area Adjacent to City

34.5

Unsewered Potentially
Suburban Area

Number of PeoE1e
Using
Septic
Tanks

Using
Outdoor
Privies

500

3,500

130,000

129,000

1,000

90.0

19,000

17,000

2,000

Rural Area

380.0

16,000

10,000

6,000

Total

533.0

360,000

156,000

12,500

City of Nashville
Sewered Area Outside
of Nashville

Source:

191,000

Proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System, p. 22.
.j:>.

00
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The engineer's response to this latter problem was the creation of a
special sewer district--a prospect which Hand's group saw as only
further complicating the problem of coordinated urban service
55
provisions.
The stage was therefore set for the publication of the
second major report from the Advance Planning and Research Division.
A Plan for Metropolitan Government.
In March 1956. after nearly two years of intensive staff
preparation. the preliminary draft of A Plan for Metropolitan Government
was presented to the two planning commissions for action.
product of Hawkins, Hand, Horton and Grant's

combin~d

As the

efforts, the draft

was the first formal outline of consolidated government for Nashville
and Davidson County. 56 The document began with a statement of "our
metropoli tan problems" which followed the general approach of the
earlier Community Services Commission:
1.

2.
3.

4.

A large part of the Nashville Metropolitan Area is
provided with none of the customary urban services, or, at
best. has an unsatisfactory makeshift arrangement for
partial service;
There is no existing government able to cope with area-wide
problems;
The existence of separate City and County governments is
not only wasteful to the extent that there is duplication
of government but it also tends to divide the loyalties of
community leadership and the authority of local government
at times when unity of action is urgently needed;
The dispersion and dissipation of citizens' control of
their government is perhaps the most serious result of the
existing governmental structure in the Nashville Metropoli tan Area.

The plan went on to point out that while these problems were common to
most urban areas of the United States, Nashville and Davidson County are

55Brett Hawkins, pp. 38-39.

56Haw k'lns I ntervlew.
.

so
now only in the "early stages of this metropolitan disease. IIS7 What
followed was a rejection of annexation, functional service consolidation,
special utility districts formation, municipal federation, extension of
extraterritorial municipal powers, expansion of county functions,
establishment of contractual agreements and city-county separation as .
S8
solution to the problem.
The research of Robert Horton had generally bolstered Hand and
Grant's view that city-county consolidation was the only workable
solution.

Annexation, even under Tennessee's recently enacted

procedure for annexation by ordinance, did not solve the problems of
governmental overlays and duplication.

In a more threatening way there

was the fear that the potential for unilateral annexation would force
the incorporation of many "unviable" towns around Nashville's periphery.
The other "less than comprehensive" alternatives were rejected on
the grounds that they would be stop-gap in nature and, in some cases,
might even impede future consolidation efforts.

Expansion of county

services in the suburban area, for instance, was seen as permanently
separating the government of the central city from that of the rest of
the urban area; the "federation" model (typified by Toronto) was
rejected due to the absence in Davidson County of any significant city
government other than that of Nashville.
Following the discussion of lithe metropolitan problem" and the
rejection of non-consolidation solutions, the Plan presented both a

S7 plan

of Metropolitan Government, p. i.

S8plan of Metropolitan Government, p. 13.
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detailed recommendation for consolidation of Nashville and Davidson
County as well as a proposed schedule for" bringing such a government
into existence.
realities.

This latter proposal reflected both legal and political

Legally, it was

sho~n

that nearly two years would be

required to implement consolidated government under the constitutionally
appropriate process.

The general schedule outlined was:

October 1956--Publication of Plan for Metropolitan Government;
Early 1957--passage of required enabling act by Tennessee General
Assembly;
May 1957--creation of Metropolitan Government Charter Commission,
as authorized by enabling act;
February 1958--completion of draft of consolidated government
charter;
May 1958--referendum on adoption of charter;
August 1958--election of officers for new Metropolitan Government;
September 1958--installation of new Metropolitan Government. 59
Politically, the planning staff recognized that active support by
both Mayor Ben West and County Judge Beverly Briley was required if
Metropolitan Government were to come into being.
closely tied to one of Nashville I s two

Each official was

newspapers--~Vest

Nashville Banner and Briley with the Tennessean.

with the

In order to accommo-

date West's assumed preferences for annexation (and to also allow
certain service extensions to get underway prior to 1958), the planners

59Plan of Metropolitan Government, pp. 68-69.
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devised the strategy of recommending that annexation of highly urbanized
areas take place first, to be fOflowed by the consolidation of county
and city as per schedule. 60 It was anticipated that this two-step
implementation of governmental reform would satisfy both the Mayor and
the Judge (each hoping, no doubt, that the "other half" of the plan
would never be carried outl),
The plan for consolidated government itself was highlighted by the
abolishment of both city and county governments and the creation of an
entirely new government-the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson Coun,ty.
remained.

Only several constitutionally-required county offices

The basic structure of the proposed new government was

briefly outlined in the plan.

It consisted of "a representative"

metropolitan council to serve as the single legislative body for the
entire area.

The issues of size and constituencies were left open with

the suggestion that some members represent wards and others be chosen
at-large.

A single "elective chief executive'· with "administrative

authority commonly possessed by a mayor" was recommended.

This person

would sit atop an executive structure of merged departments and agencies
with only a few "independent authorities, boards, commissions, and
committees. 1f61

The organization charts which accompanied the text

outlined a streamlined form of government, one which obviously would
have to be reviewed by the careful eyes of the proposed Charter

60Hawkins Interview; Brett Hawkins, pp. 39-40.
6l Plan of Metropolitan Government, pp. 29-30.
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Commission which would have to undertake the delicate task of merging
city and county functions, officials, and employees.
Following the overview of the structure of the proposed government,
the staff presented a critical feature of the new government;

the

creation of two "service districts." These districts would outline both
the provision and financing of public services throughout the county.
The entire county would comprise the "General Services District." This
district would receive "all of those general services which are required
on an area-wide basis . .

A second district "the Urban Services

District, I! was created to initially include the "urban areal! of the City
of Nashville at the time of the creation of consolidated government.
This district would receive additional services "normally required in
urban areas. 1I63 Tax levies in each district would reflect the unique
package of services delivered.

An important feature of the Urban

Services District proposal was the "expandable" nature of -the District:
As areas within the General Services District come to need
urban services and the new government becomes able to provide
such services in a reasonable period, the Urban Services
District would be expanded to include such areas. Such
expansion would be accomplished through action of the t<Ietropolitan Council, either by petition and referendum or on its
own initiative in accordance with specified criteria and
policies. 64
The plan proposed the following allocation of services between the
two districts:

62Plan of Metropolitan Government, p. 31.
63 Ibid .
64 Plan of Metropolitan Government, p. 33.
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General Services District (countywide)
General Administration
Police
Fire Protection
Courts
Jails
Assessment
Health
Welfare

Hospitals
Streets and Roads
Traffic
Schools
Parks and Recreation
Library
Auditorium
Fair Grounds

Airport
Public Housing
Urban Development
Planning
Zoning
Building Code
Plumbing Code
Electrical Code
Hbusing Code
Electricity
Transit

Urban Services District
Police (Class I)
Fire Protection (Class III)
Water
Sewers--Sanitary
Sewers --Storm

Street Lighting
Street Cleaning
Refuse Collection and Disposal
Wine and ~niskey·Supervision
Taxicab Regulation 65

Three important features of the proposed government were closely
tied to the method of delivering and financing urban services:

(1) the

creation of the two service districts, (2) the allocation of services
between the districts, and (3) the expandable character of the Urban
Services District.

Given the research interest outlined in the opening

chapter, the origins of each of these features require elaboration and
examination.
The Origin of the Service-District Concept Itself
The fact that the members of the Community Services Commission had
rejected a recommendation for consolidated government underscored their
view that since all public services could not be delivered countywide
and since the constitution required a countywide tax rate, annexation

65plan of Metropolitan Government, Appendix D.
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was the only way to preserve an urban service-and-tax area (the City of
Nashville).

As previously discussed, the 1953 Constitutional amendment

permitting consolidated government implied the legality of a dual
tax-rate under such a government.

After considerable discussion,

planning staff members, in 1955, also rejected any effort to extend all
"serV1ces
"
publ 1C
countyw1"d e. 66

The staff also rejected the possibility

of financing "high-density!! services purely through service charges and
user fees.

Such an alternative raised serious questions of long-term

financial stability.

Staff analysts had difficulty in predicting the

long-term consequences of such a fee system. 67

Instead, they decided to

take advantage of the apparent legality of a dual-tax rate in a
consolidated area and create an "urban service area" overlaid on a
portion of the county.

This area would provide a "service package of

all things which cannot be done with general, countywide taxes.,,68

It

was clear that such services would be those normally provided by cities
but not by counties, especially those containing a significant rural
area.

This view was primarily based upon the financial and administra-

tive considerations of providing urban services to urban areas.

The

creation of an urban services district, complete with its own tax rate,
permitted urban service planning and financing within consolidated
government.

It did not raise the problems of responsibility and

coordination associatied with "special service districts" which would
have remained autonomous from consolidated government control.

66Hawkins Interview.

68 Ibid •

It is
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significant to note that the planners specifically mentioned their
concerns with such service districts.

They addressed head-on the need

for an ultimate elimination of these districts, first in the Urban
Services District and then in the General Services District.
A second rationale was also used for the creation of the urban
services district.

The Constitutional amendment permitting conso1ida-

tion required a separate referendum on consolidation in both city and
county areas.

It took little imagination to see the political need for

a way of assuring voters in county areas that their taxes would not be
raised to pay for services they felt they would not receive in a short
period of time.

The recent (1955) passage of the annexation by

ordinance law tended to heighten these concerns.

Although they cite

financial consideration as the prime rationale, planning staff members
of the time readily concede that creation of two service districts with
two tax-rates had the potential for placating suburbanite and rural
reS1'dents. 69

In the four-page review of the Plan carried in the

Tennessean, the political attractiveness of the service-district concept
was highlighted.
1.

Question: How is it possible to avoid taxing parts of the
metropolitan area for urban services long before such
services are received?
Answer: By creating two service districts . • . . The tax
levy in the two service districts would be in direct
ratio of the cost of the urban services to the cost of
general services, taking into consideration all sources of
revenue and their application. 70

69Horton Interview; Hawkins Interview; Hand Correspondence.
70The Tennessean, October 30, 1956.
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Although reference to a "timetable" of Urban Services District
expansion in the Plan related to the proqlems of taxes paid and services
received, it also suggested a third rationale of the service district
concept.

As highlighted in the first chapter of this study, the

scheduled extension of urban services can be a mechanism for managing
urban development.

Interviews with several members of the planning

staff who developed the service district concept suggest that this
consideration was present in their discussions, but the issues it raised
were considered to be nearly moot given the vast service deficiencies in
7l
areas already urbanized.
The thought of managing new urban development with service extension policies was academic at best and irrelevant
at worst.

The Executive Director of the joint planning staff at the

time pointed out that subdivision controls were actively used to control
the quality of residential developments, but that any thought of tying
residential growth in the county to the provision of such urban services
as sanitary sewers was ridiculous when one considered the 130,000
suburban residents who were already dependent on potentially hazardous
72
septic tank sewage systems.
In a way analogous to Dr. Greene's
feelings four years earlier, the planners could dream of their service
district creation as a device for managing development, but, in practical
terms, it was devised to serve financial, administrative and political
ends within a framework of consolidated government.

7lHawkins Interview; Horton Interview.
72Hawkins Interview.
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The Allocation of Services
As previously stated, the primary function of the Urban Services
District was to provide and finance those services required in the more
densely populated urban area.

Staff studies, based mainly on the

earlier Community Services Commission report, were conducted to
determine those services which could be "reasonably financed and
administeredt! on a countywide basis.

The services remaining were then

allocated to the Urban Services District.

Certain services presented no

real problem once the assumption of a single metropolitan government was
made.

The obvious candidates for the General Services District were;

health, welfare, hospitals, courts, jails, streets and roads, schools,
parks and recreation, auditorium, planning and zoning, codes enforcement.
Likewise, there was little debate over the "urban services" nature of
street lighting, street cleaning, and storm sewer provision.

The issues

emerged over the allocation of police, fire, refuse collection, water
and sanitary sewers provision.

In the case of sanitary sewers, there

was Ii ttl e debate over the need for an lIurban service" classification.
The difficult issue became the means of financing their construction,
given the tremendous backlog of needs in the suburban areas.

The

existence of a maze of water systems in the suburban area raised a
similar issue for water service.

The combined response was to classify

each as an urban service and leave open the issue of financing for
future determination.

In the case of water service, it was anticipated

that water districts existing within the G.S.D. could contract with or
be taken over by the consolidated government.

59

Police and fire protection raised the more fundamental issue:
exactly what is meant by "urban service"?

The existence of an

over-extended sheriff's office and subscription security forces in the
county area had been often cited as a major deficiency of county
'
"d some f orm
government. 73 Conso I1' d
atlon
requlre
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protection, but staff studies by Robert Horton revealed that the cost of
countywide police protection equal to that required in the urban areas
would be prohibitive. 74 The staff finally recommended the splitting of
police protection into two levels- IIClass II! (U.S.D.) and "generalll
(General Services District).

Factors such as patrol intensity and

reaction time were used to make the distinction.
The fire protection issue also was reflected in a confused pattern
of private subscription companies and districts in the county area.

The

existence of few water lines greater than 2" in diameter throughout the
county compounded the issue and linked it to the consideration of water
supply.

The staff finally recommended that Class 3 fire protection be

considered in the Urban Services District while General Services
District fire protection be provided on a "rural" level (generally
Clas.s 10).
Refuse collection and disposal was made an urban services function.
Although there were extensive private garbage collection firms in the
county it was decided to maintain garbage disposal as an Urban Services

73See A Future For Nashville, pp. 97-108.
74Horton Interview; Hawkins Interview.
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!

District function, allowing the private collectors to use government
facilities on a fee basis.
It is important to note that the Plan, in allocating these services,

stressed the need to "package" all services ultimately deemed as
"urban."

Only in the case of water supply was there provision for

extension of anyone urban service beyond the U.S.D. boundary.

The

planners emphasized that the financial and administrative soundness of
the service district concept depended on the maintenance of two distinct
service levels the boundaries of which would be determined by the level
of urbanization. 75
U.S.D. Boundaries and Provision for Extension
The 1956 Plan stressed that the boundaries of the Urban Services
District should IIconsi{t of that part of the General Services District
that requires urban services.,,76

Although the planning staff

theoretically included in this area not only the City of Nashville but
also the urbanized area around the city, they realized the practicality
in defining the initial U.S.D. boundaries as being identical with those
of the city at the time of consolidation.

They anticipated that some

annexation would occur between the publication of the Plan and the
installation of consolidated government. 77

Further, they assumed that

75 Ibid .
76P1an of Metropolitan Government, p. 31.
77Brett Hawkins, pp. 39-40.
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extension of the Urban Services District would occur as rapidly as the
new government could provide the appropriate services. 78
Although the initial Plan left the actual method open, it suggested
that extension of U.S.D. boundaries would occur "through the action of
the Metropolitan Council either by petition and referendum or on its own
initiative in accordance with specified criteria and pOlicies. 1I79

As

has already been suggested, the rationale for expansion of the U.S.D.
was anticipated to be the need for servicing existing urban development.
Such services would be provided according t'o a "timetable" made clear at
the time of U.S.D. expansion.

Although legal requirement for the

implementation of such a "timetable" was later attached to the proposal
for consolidated government, the Plan followed the flavor of the new
Tennessee annexation law in remaining vague on the precise requirements
for tying urban service delivery schedules to expansion of the U.S.D.
Nevertheless, the authors of the Plan, in providing for an expandable
district receiving a distinctive package of urban services originated a
concept which "was rational, made sense, seemed fair and was expected to
be cost-effective. II8D

Their judgment seems correct in view of the fact

that during the seven years following the publication of the Plan, the
U.S.D.-G.S.D. scheme remained basically intact while consolidated
government was debated and finally implemented.

78Hawkins Interview; Horton Interview.
79Plan of Metropolitan Government, p. 33.
80

Hand Correspondence.
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II.
Most accounts of the

IMPLEMENTATION:
consolid~tion

1956-1963

of Nashville and Davidson County

place greatest emphasis on the period following the publication of the
Plan in 1956.

This study, in focusing on the service district concept,

deviates from that pattern.

After the publication of the Plan, the

service district idea remained at the heart of the proposed form of
government.

Although the questions of services and taxes were central

in the two referendum campaigns, the governmental mechanism for handling
them was repeated in both proposed Charters with little change.

The

dynamics of the two campaigns were provided by the behavior and
alignment of the Mayor, the County Judge, the two newspapers land various
voting groups.

The proposed structure of the new government remained

remarkably intact.
1957 Enabling Legislation

Some debate exists regarding the reactions of Mayor West and Judge
Briley to the 1956 Plan.

The Executive Director of the Joint Planning

Commission staff described the initial response of each as positive. 8l
He recalled that West, after his first exposure to the Plan, waited
until the publisher of the Banner indicated his support to give a
positive response.

At the same session, Briley and the Tennessean

expressed their long-standing commitment to consolidated government.
Dan Grant, in reviewing the same period, pointed out that although the

8l Haw k'1ns I nterv1ew.
.
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Mayor and Judge weren't exhuberant in their support for the Plan, they
d1. d not oppose 1. t . 82

He went on to suggest t hat e1t
. her Br1ley
.
or West,

at this point, could have blocked the move to consolidated government by
obstructing the process of obtaining and implementing the required
enabling legislation.

That they did not, he claimed, was

II

s omething of

a political miracle," proving the success of the planners r strategy for
including both annexation and consolidation in the Plan. 83

It should

also be noted that both Briley and West, at this time, had reason to
believe that they might become the Mayor of the new consolidated
government.
In order to secure the appropriate enabling legislation, the
planning staff retained the highly regarded attorney who had headed the
Community Services Commission, Edwin Hunt, to draft the required bill.
Hunt, together with Charles Hawkins and other planners then met with the
Davidson County delegation in November 1956.

The legislators presented

"good objective questions" but raised "no serious objections" to the
84
proposed legislation.
Since the enabling legislation had to be
general, not private, it was necessary to engage in some logrolling to
secure passage in the legislature.

This done, the 1957 Tennessee

General Assembly passed legislation implementing the 1953 Constitutional

82 Grant, "Professional Political Leadership: The Case of Nashville, If
p. 77.

83 Ibid •
84Hawkins Interview; Daniel J. Elazar, A Case Study of
Failure in Attempted Metropolitan Integration: Nashville and Davidson
County, Tennessee (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1961),
pp. 23-25; Brett Hawkins, p. 42.
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amendment provision permitting consolidated government. 85

The Act

specified a procedure for creating a charter commission through action
by the county and city legislative bodies in passing identical
resolutions.

The Act then went on to spell out certain features which

were required in any proposed charter, including the provision for two
service districts as first outlined in the 1956 Plan.

The Act provided:

(e) For two (2) service districts within the geographical
limits of the metropolitan government, to wit, a general
services district and an urban services district, as to both
of which districts the metropolitan government shall have
jurisdiction and authority. The general services district
shall consist of the total area of the county. The urban
services district shall consist originally of the total area
of the principal city at the time of the filing of the
proposed charter with the county commissioners of election •
(f) That the area of the urban services district may be
expanded and its territorial limits extended by annexation
whenever particular areas of the general services district
come to need urban services and the metropolitan government
becomes able to provide such service within a reasonable
period. Such annexation shall be under provisions and
limitations specified in the charter, consistent with those
provided by §§6-308--6-3l2.
(g) For the functions of the metropolitan government which
shall be performed throughout the entire general services
district and the government services which shall be rendered
in said district.
(h) That the tax levy for the general services district
shall be set so as to be sufficient, with other available
funds and grants, to defray the cost of all governmental
services which are provided generally throughout or on behalf
of said district.
(i) For the functions of the metropolitan government which
shall be performed within the urban services district and the
governmental services which shall be rendered in said district.
(j) That the tax levy for the urban services district
shall be set so as to be sufficient, with other available
funds and grants, to defray the cost of municipal-type
governmental services which are provided within said district.

85 Tennessee, Public Acts of Tennessee, 1957, Chapter 120.
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(k) For a metropolitan council. which shall be the
legislative body of the metropolitan government and shall be
given all the authority and functions of the governing bodies
of the county and cities being consolidated. with such
exceptions and with such additional authority as may be
specified elsewhere in this charter. 86
In drafting this enabling legislation. Hunt presented the General
Assembly a carefully prepared expression of the Plan's service district
concept which was consistent with existing state law and acceptable to
most legislators.

The creation of an "Urban Council." for instance.

retained the "municipal corporation" for purposes of establishing the
U.S.D. tax rate and insured that allocation of state-collected taxes.
such as the gasoline tax. would distinguish between" the urban and
non-urban areas of any consolidated metropolitan government.
1958 Charter Commission and Referendum
Both the County Quarterly Court and the City Council moved swiftly
to establish a Metropolitan Charter Commission. 87

It has generally

concluded that the Commission they created was representative of most
area interests. including blacks.

It has also been accepted that the

Commission was hardworking and attempted to avoid petty political
concern. S8 Staff assistance was provided to the Commission by the
Advance Planning and Research Division of the joint Planning Commissions
(the same staff who had prepared the 1956 Plan).

This support was

S6Miche1man and Sandalow, pp. 966-967.
87 From this point on in the text, "Metro" refers to either the
proposed or actual consolidated government of Nashville and Davidson
County.
88Brett Hawkins, p. 44.
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underwritten with federal urban planning assistance funds, as had been
the preparation of the 1956 Plan. 89

Edwin Hunt, who became legal

consultant to the Charter Commission, oversaw the drafting of the
pr.oposed charter itself.

He, along with the planners under Charles

Hawkins and Irving Hand and with the continuing advice of Dan Grant,
guided the Commission into the preparation of the proposed charter which
differed very little from the 1956 Plan.

Changes were in the nature of

refinement, not substantive revision.
One issue faced by the Commission and not dealt with in the Plan
was the size and districting of the proposed Metropolitan Council.

The

1958 Commission emphasized the need for a "workable size" and the
guarantee of black representation.

They proposed a Council of 21

members (6 at-large, 15 from districts) with district boundaries
guaranteeing at least two black seats.

90

The fact that the size of this

proposed Council was less than one-third that of the combined Quarterly
Court-City Council became an issue in subsequent events.

In addition,

a considerable amount of the Commission's time was devoted to the
tedious but critical question of civil service and pensions, reallocation of city and county bonded indebtedness, the merger of the city and
county school systems and so on.

As two close observers concluded, "the

Charter seemed to be free of flagrant pitfalls of the type that might
. .lssue
have d etracte d f rom th e baS1C

'
0 fCltY-COunty

.
,,91
canso l'd
1 atlon.

89Planning Activities--1957-1960, pp. 40-42.
90Brett Hawkins, p. 45.

91

Grant and Greene, p. 6.
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The proposed charter's provisions for two service districts
remained basically identical to those presented in the 1956 Plan.

An

important refinement included the requirement that expansion of the
U.S.D. not only be tied to the need of particular areas for urban
services, but also to the capability of Metro "to provide such service
within a reasonable period, which shall not be greater than one year after
ad valorem taxes in the annexed area became due"

92

(Sec. 1.04 Proposed

Metropolitan Government Charter).
With the exception of fire protection and solid waste services, the
allocation of services between the two service districts remained the
same as that presented in the 1956 Plan.

The Charter Commission

resolved the continuing dilemma over urban and rural fire service levels
by simply omitting fire protection as a G.S.D. function.

This, in

effect, left G.S.D. residents dependent on the private and fire-district
fire services already present in the area.

Similarly, refuse collection

was made a U.S.D. function while refuse disposal was made a G.S.D.
function.

Private garbage collectors were therefore left as the primary

means for refuse collection outside the U.S.D.

Table 2.3 indicates the

full allocation of functions and services described in Section 1.05 of
the Proposed Charter.

The Commission left open the possibility of

shifting this allocation:
Nothing in the section shall be deemed to limit the power of
Metropolitan Government to exercise other governmental
functions in either U.S.D. or the G.S.D., or to provide new

92"Proposed Metropolitan Government Charter," (unpublished document
prepared by Metropolitan Government Charter Commission, 1958).

/
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TABLE 2.3
PROPOSED SERVICE ALLOCATION, URBAN AND GENERAL
SERVICES DISTRICTS

General Services District
General Administration
Police
Courts
Jails
Assessment
Health
Welfare
Hospitals
Streets and Roads
Traffic

Schools
Parks and Recreation
Library
Auditorium
Fair Grounds
Airport
Public Housing
Urban Redevelopment
Urban Renewal
Planning

Electrical Code
Building Code
Plumbing Code
Housing Code
Electricity
Transit
Refuse Disposal
Beer Supervision
Taxicab Regulation

Urban Services District
Additional Police
Protection
Fire Protection
Water

Sanitary Sewers
Storm Sewers
Street Lighting

Street Cleaning
Refuse Collection
Wine and Whiskey
Supervision
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and additional governmental services in either the U.S.D. or
the G.S.D.93 (Proposed Charter, Sec. 1.05, p. 3)
The politics of the 1958 referendum on the proposed charter have
94
Following a campaign led by both Mayor West and
been told elsewhere.
Judge Briley together with business leaders, planners and other
community elites, the voters of the city voted in favor of Metro while
the county voters rejected it.

Although a number of theories have been

advanced to explain this outcome, it seems clear that the proponents of
Metro were not able to overcome the. fear of "higher taxes without better
•
II
serV1ces
among county reS1• d ents. 95

These fears were encouraged by

private service companies, county employees and others who perceived a
threat to their position by the proposed metropolitan government.
A review of all available accounts of the 1958 referendum finds no
evidence of substantial structural criticism of the proposed arrangement
for the two service districts.

Opponents simply ignored the protection

against inappropriate urban taxation provided by the service district
concept and preyed upon the fears of higher taxes imposed by a
"dictatorial city regime."

Although the plan for Metro nurtured by the

planning staff since its origin with the Community Services Commission
report was supported by a broad cross-section of city and county elites
and organizations, its promotion failed to overcome the typical fears of

93 Ibid .
94Brett Hawkins; Elazar; David Booth, Metropolitics: The Nashville
Consolidation (East Lansing: Michigan University, 1963).
95 Elazar, p. 100.

!
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residents outside the city.

The 1958 vote seemed consistent with the

fate of such proposals in other cities during the same period. 96 ·
The Annexation Period
The events of the four years following the 1958 referendum were
significant both in that they set the stage for .the success of the 1962
proposal for consolidated government and that during this period the
boundaries of the City of Nashville changed dramatically.

The former

relates to the politics of Metro's birth, while the latter is of
significance in that the size of the U.S.D. proposed in the 1962 Metro
Charter was much larger than that of 1958.
Immediately after the defeat of the Metro proposal in June 1958,
Mayor West and the City Council utilized Tennessee's 1955 annexation law
to bring into the city some seven square miles of primarily industrial
territory (with a population of 2,000).

Two years later the city

annexed another 42 square miles of primarily residential areas
containing 80,000 residents (see Figure 2.3).

The effect of these two

annexations was a tripling of the area of the city and an increase in
population from 173,000 to 254,000.

West's own comments on these two

annexations reflect the city's continuing concern for the failure to
expand city boundaries as urban growth occurred:
That question (proposed Metro Charter) had been submitted to
the people by vote in 1958 . . . and the people of the community turned it down . . . . Following that, this was the first
annexation, it being anticipated as part of the Metropolitan
Government Plan that the Urban Services District would be the

96Srett Hawkins, p. 57.
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1960

Figure 2.3.
Source:

Annexations, City of Nashville,
1958-1962.

Metropolitan Planning Commission.
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present City and that annexations would proceed immediately to
encompass in the U.S.D. all that is developed and urban. We
have a principle in municipal government, which we think has
been accepted generally, that everything that's urban should
be municipal. 97
In the same statement, West went on to outline and defend his annexation
scheme:
• it was thought by the Executive Branch of the Government
and members of the Legislative Branch, after the failure of the
Metropolitan Plan proposal, that the existence of this City,
future existence, its health and welfare depended on an orderly
program of annexation, and that the first . . . being commercial and industrial . . . should precede any residential
annexation. Furthermore, it was thought that in order to have
a properly balanced community, this should proceed without a
vote of the few residents who were in the industrial area,
because we didn't feel the future of the whole 'community
should depend upon the vote of a few who lived in the industrial area. It was also thought that subsequently the
residential area should be annexed and that is where the City
Council and I had a division of opinion as to the method of
procedure. It has been my opinion as to the people should,
and in my opinion, would have voted themselves in if the
matter had been explained to them. . . . The Council,
however, felt that the matter was so urgent that they proceeded on a second step of annexation and annexed 42 square
miles and 80,000 residents . . . essentially residential. 98
There has been much discussion of the depth of West's sincerity in
wanting a referendum in the residential area, but the outcome was clear:
82,000 persons, whether they liked it or not, were brought into the city.
Probably the most important consequence of these two annexations
was the reversal of suburban attitudes toward Metro--especially in the
areas annexed.

The anger at being brought into the city without any

vote contributed to significant "anti-West" sentiment.

Likewise, county

97Planned Progress Through Annexation (Nashville: Public Relations
Department, City of Nashville, n.d.), p. 6.
98Planned Progress Through Annexation, p. 15.
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residents feared that the city would "reach out again" and bring them
into the city without any guarantee of urban services.

Supported by the

continuing pro-Metro orientation of Judge Briley and The Tennessean,
this sentiment, many observers have argued, added county voices,
previously anti-Metro, to the pro-Metro cause.

It should also be noted

that Mayor West and the City Council had further angered suburban
residents through the strict implementation of a IIgreen sticker" law
which required all motor vehicles using Nashville's streets for thirty
days

Or more to pay what amounted to an auto tax. West again justified

the act on the basis of the city's expensive "subsidizing" of suburban
residents who commuted into the city.
Committed to annexation rather than consolidation, West, a majority
of the City Council, and the Nashville Banner therefore focused
primarily on the problem of extending city services to the urbanized
areas of the county.

Although planning staff members recognized the

validity of annexation as one means for dealing with the service needs
of these areas, they still were committed to a long-term policy of
consolidation which would not only better SSrve urbanized areas but also
deal with city-county friction, duplicate services and functions, complex
city-county financial relationships, control over potential growth areas,
and so on.

The planning staff was in an awkward position.

The Mayor

needed staff support to develop an annexation strategy while the staff.
along with Judge Briley and others, were still committed to the creation
of Metro.

The Executive Director was frequently placed in extremely

74
,
,
99
stress f u 1 s1tuat10ns.

In spite of the annexations, it was clear that

the Metro issue was not dead.
The second consequence of the annexation period was the dramatic
change in the boundaries of the City of Nashville.

Relying heavily on

planning staff data (much of which originated with the Community Service
Commission report of 1952) the Mayor himself helped draw the boundaries
lOO
included in the two annexation resolutions.
The 1958 resolution
brought in extremely valuable industrial territory, particularly on
Cockrill Bend, the current Metro-Center area, and the commercial areas
near Murfreesboro Pike and Spence Lane.

Each of these areas have

subsequently become well-developed, contributing significant urban
service taxes.

Not only did the Mayor claim that these areas were

already developed to the point that they should be included in the city,
but he also stressed the city's need to replace the tax losses created
by the conversion of over 6,000 parcels of land into the area's
interstate highway system, the extensive urban renewal program, and the
growth of governmental, religious and educational institutions in the
C1' t y. 101

Politically, it is obvious that annexation of the commercial

and industrial areas first was intended to ease the pain expected with
any residential annexation by ordinance.
The boundaries of the second annexation drew heavily on residential
density, service patterns and likelihood for immediate development.

99Hawkins Interview.
100Hawk'1ns I
'
H
'
n t
erv1ew;
orton I
nterv1ew.

101

Planned Progress Through Annexation, p. 7.
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Most of the area annexed had also been included in the earlier
annexation recommendation made in the Community Services Commission
report.

(It is important to note that the Tennessee State Supreme

Court. in upholding the validity of the City annexation. cited the 1952
.
SerV1ce
.
Comm1SS10n
. .
Commun1ty
report. 102)

With the exception of the

remainder of Cockrill Bend, the City Airport. the Radnor Railroad Yards,
Tennessee State University. and the Cornelia Fort Airport-East Nashville
areas, the second annexation drew in well-developed suburban neighborhoods, most without sanitary sewers.

In March 1961, the city extended

police, fire and garbage collection services to the entire annexed area.
During the same year. some $5.5 million worth of general obligation
· construct1on
.
bon ds were so ld to beg1n

0f

trun k sewer I'1nes. 103 Still •

there remained bitter issues of proper tax rates, school zoning. and
water system consolidation.

While Judge Briley, The Tennessean. and

other pro-Metro forces used these issues to point out the absence of a
"plan of services ll for the newly annexed areas. it remained that any new
attempt to install consolidated government would face a much-expanded
city with a commitment to provide urban services to an under-serviced
area of some 40 square miles and 80,000 people.
The 1962 Charter Commission and Referendum
The commitment of Mayor West and the city to a strategy of
annexation rather than consolidation altered drastically the alignment

102Michelman and Sandalow, pp. 967-969.
l03Brett Hawkins. p. 65.
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of forces in the second attempt to install Metro.

Court~

and most of the

community business leaders pressed for consolidation.

Blocked by the

Tennessean~

a majority of the County Quarterly

Judge Briley, The

refusal of the City Council to participate in the formation of a new
Charter

Commission~

pro-Metro forces were able to convince the County

Legislative Delegation to secure passage of a private act permitting the
formation of a charter commission by referendum in both the city and
county areas.

In August

1961~

voters in both areas easily approved the

formation of a new charter commission.
The 1962 charter commission consisted of almost the same membership
as the 1958 commission.

Staff assistance was again provided by the

Advance Planning and Research Division of the joint Planning Commissions.
Edwin Hunt again provided his valued legal leadership.

An

important

issue quickly addressed by the Commission was that of the proposed Metro
Council's size and districting.

There was strong feeling that the first

Metro proposal sharply limited the political opportunities of the many
members of the City Council and County Quarterly Court.

Sensitive to

the political implications, the second commission proposed a 41-member
Metropolitan Council, with six members being elected at-large.

104

This recommendation for a larger council coupled with the greatly
enlarged population and area of the city offered the commission an
opportunity to inhibit the development of a "we-they" U.S.D.-G.S.D.
schism on the proposed new Council.

l04 Horton I nterv1ew.
..

In preparing the proposed
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councilmanic districts, the staff not only again preserved black
representation but they also created a majority of districts to include
105
both U.S.D. and G.S.D. areas.
The proposal was also intended to give
a majority of councilmen a significant constituency of U.S.D. residents
in the newly annexed area--a move designed to prompt Council support for
rapid servicing of this area.

The enlargement of the city through the

West annexations made this arrangement quite feasible and necessary,
from the planners' perspective. l06
The Charter Commission made other minor changes, but none which
affected the urban services provisions or general planning arrangements.
Again, the soundness of the original conceptualization coupled with the
consistency of staff advice was significant.

Although the method for

expanding the U.S.D. provided in the 1962 Proposed Charter was the same
as that of 1958, the entire procedure received much more attention during
the second referendum campaign.

This was the obvious consequence of the
issues raised by the 1958 and 1960 annexations. l07 The commission felt
that the provision requiring service deliveries "within one year after
ad valorem taxes in the annexed area became due" was far more protective
of suburban interests than the current annexation law which, at that
time, did not require even a plan of services for the area to be
annexed. 108

It was common knowledge that the city had prepared no plan
l09
of services prior to the 1958 and 1960 annexations.

105Horton Interview; Hawkins Interview.
106 Ibid .

107Brett Hawkins, p. 75.

108Brett Hawkins, p. 63.

109 Ibid .; Hawkins Interview.
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The 1962 referendum campaign differed from the 1958 campaign in at
least three significant ways.

First, there existed some 82,000

residents brought into the city through annexation by ordinance.
Second. the Mayor and a major newspaper, the Nashville Banner, now
opposed consolidation.

Third, the pro-Metro forces, remembering the

failure of 1958, more carefully and intensively organized a grassroots
campaign in favor of the proposed charter.
The impact of the West annexations served to provide a new, active
group of Metro supporters within the city.

It also heightened the fears

in the county of future unilateral annexations.

The Metro proposal was

perceived by many as the only way to lfhave a voice lf in the extension of
both urban services and taxes to these areas.

The proponents' strategy,

developed by the Nashville Tennessean and a group of community leaders,
the Citizens for Better Government, stressed the fact that under Metro,
decisions on service extension and the accompanying urban service
district taxes would be made by the Metropolitan Council, representative
of 35 districts and an at-large constituency. lID
The

op~osition

of Mayor West prompted the proponents to charge that

he was indulging in politics due to the fact that he probably had little
chance of being elected Metro Mayor.

III This charge was given some

validity by virtue of the minor differences between the 1962 proposed
charter and that of 1958, which West had supported.

l10Brett Hawk'lns, pp. 78 - 80 .
IllIbid.: Hawkins Interview; Horton Interview.

West, in turn,
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focused his campaign on the city.

His alleged use of city employees in

this effort further contributed to charges of politics in the campaign.
Ultimately, the campaign boiled down to the West-dominated city
political machine supported by the Banner, versus the well-organized
pro-Metro forces, led by the Citizens for Better Government, community
elites, the Tennessean, supported by Judge Briley and the planning group
who originally designed the Metro proposal. 112
The outcome of both referenda is presented in Table 2.4.

The anger
113
over past and fears of future annexations carried the vote for Metro.

TABLE 2.4
VOTES IN 1958 AND 1962 REFERENDA ON METROPOLITAN
GOVERNMENT IN NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY
1958
City
County

1962

Yes

No

Yes

No

7,797
13,794

4,804
19,235

21,064
15,914

15,599
12,519

Although there have been various minor differences in interpreting the
outcome of the 1962 referendum, there is little doubt that Metro came
into existence because of fears of "taxation without representation" and
"services promised but not delivered.,,1l4

The irony is that these same

ll2See Daniel R. Grant, "Metropoli tics and Professional Political
Leadership: The Case of Nashville," pp. 72-83.
l13Brett Hawkins, pp. 78-80.
ll4Grant, "Metropolitics and Professional Political Leadership:" The
Case of Nash vi lle,!t pp. 80-8 L
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fears led to the defeat of Metro in 1958!

It seems clear that many

voters who had accepted the general arguments favoring Metro in 1958
continued to support Metro in 1962.

What the aUIhors and proponents of

Metro had failed to do in 1958--mobilize apathetic voters and moderate
votes of fear--was done in 1962, both by their own campaign and by the
reaction to the annexations of 1958 and 1960.
In Chapter I, reference was made to the general view that
sufficient votes in favor of consolidation could not be mustered through
appeals to the "rationality" of consolidation alone.

"Unusual

circumstances" were generally required to foster a posi ti ve vote. 115

In

the case of Nashville, it seems clear that the impact of anger and worry
over city taxes and urban services provided. the "unusual circumstance"
in 1962.

To the extent that this "reactive" vote supplemented the base

of those positively committed to Metro, the theory seems confirmed.
III.

CONCLUSIONS

The rationale for this retracing of Metro's birth was presented at
the outset of the chapter:

what led to the creation of the service

district concept, and more specifically, what were the developmental
dimensions of these origins?

The history just reviewed suggests several

responses to the questions.
1.

The service district concept originated not through political
or technical evolution but came from an early and consistent

ll5 See Walter Rosenbaum and Thomas Henderson, "Explaining
Comprehensive Governmental Consolidation: Toward a Preliminary Theory,"
Journal of PoU tics, (May, 1972).
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conceptualization held by a cohesive group of governmental
planners.
2.

The primary rationale for the service district concept was a
clustering of financial, administrative and legal considerations
bolstered by an absence of political ignorance.

Although

present in the hearts of most of these planners, long-term
deveiopmental concerns were of secondary significance.
Environmental-technical considerations likewise were supportive,
but not primary.
3.

Al though lip service was paid to "long-range management of
urban development," the prevailing development environment
throughout Metro birth was one of "catching up and keeping up"
with urban growth.

This orientation prompted the very idea of

a consolidated government and guided the implementation of the
urban services concept.
Any reading of the previous pages and accounts of the events they
describe makes it clear that the planning group associated with the
Advance Planning and Research Division of the joint planning staff
fathered the services district concept.

Building on the service patterns

outlined in the 1952 Community Services Commission report, Charles
Hawkins, Irving Hand, Robert Horton, Dan Grant and their legal

facili~

tator, Edwin Hunt, created the proposal for an expandable U.S.D. and a
countywide G.S.D.

This proposal, first appearing in the 1956 Plan,

remained intact through both charter commissions and was implemented
with the installation of Metro in 1963.

The positive ties between these
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planners and area elites facilitated the continued integrity of their
scheme.

The unity of their commitment was demonstrated by their loyalty

to consolidation during the 1958 and 1960 annexations when Mayor West
pressed for an alternative method of supplying and financing urban
services.
Interviews with several members of the planning team have drawn the
feeling that the service district scheme was just plain "comon sense."
TQ this group that was perhaps the case.

Under consolidated government,

however, there were other options including the continued use of special
purpose districts, a system of contracting with private service
providers, extension of all services countywide, creation of several
urban service areas, and so on.

Early staff studies focused on the best

way to finance and administer services under a consolidated government.
The early pages of this chapter point out the heavy reliance on the
financial and administrative findings in Future of Nashville.

Once the

legal hurdle of a required uniform tax rate was overcome, the logic of
financing a package of urban services with one revenue area (the U.S.D.)
and financing the remainder on a countywide basis (the G.S.D.) was
compelling.

It is significant that the director of the Advance Planning

and Research Division cited the "cost-efficiency" of the scheme as a
.

pr~mary

'd
'
116
erat~on.

cons~

An important part of this financial rationale

was reflected in the expandable nature of the U.S.D.

Although

administrative convenience suggested drawing the original U.S.D.

l16Hand Correspondence.
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boundaries consistent with the old City boundaries, there was the
expectation that these would expand quickly to encompass "the urban
area.,,117
The group of planners were well aware of the constitutional
requirement that any proposed consolidation be approved both in the city
and non-city county areas.

The service district scheme, with its

attachment--a package of services with an urban tax rate, made good
political sense.

This link between service improvement and tax increase

was seen as an attraction particularly to suburbanites who would fear
consolidation much as they would annexation by ordinance.

The history

reviewed here suggests that this political consideration was seen
primarily as a bonus flowing from the more important financial and
administrative rationale.
The environmental impediments to sanitary sewer construction and the
existence of steep slopes in much of the northwestern part of the county
supported the view that urban services be limited to an urban services
district.

The presence of a large, unsewered urban area reinforced the

significance of financial factors in planning for urban services.

The

growing failure rate of septic tank systems made it imperative that
planning for urban services give priority to sewer construction, no
matter how costly.

The service district concept. by avoiding

administrative confusion and unifying revenue sources, met this
requirement.

Likewise. the unified service district concept provided a

117Haw k'lns I ntervlew.
.
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way of preventing any obligation to provide urban services to areas
capable of supporting little urban growth.
Throughout the chapter mention has been made of the overriding
concern for allowing urban services to "catch up" with urban development.
In one sense, this view describes the general position taken by many
planners and other officials toward "the management of development."
This view held that growth and expansion of the Nashville urban area was
going to continue as in the recent past therefore requiring a planning
posture which would properly service new development while at the same
time attempting to meet the needs of existing areas not yet fully
serviced.

In a preliminary draft of the 1956 Plan, this view was

reflected in the listing of "standards for extension of urban services";
1.

areas of "urgent need"

2.

areas likely to be subdivided

3.

more densely populated areas

4.

incorporated suburbs, if they so wich

5.

taxable resources of areas of lesser significance

6.

administrative and engineering. and other technical planning
criteria.

1I8

This is clearly a IIcatch up and keep up" view of tying service policies
to developmental considerations.

It should also be pointed out that

throughout this entire period both the city and the county actively
sought economic growth through industrial and commercial expansion.

ll8 See "Preliminary Draft, Proposed Plan of Metropolitan
Government," (unpublished memorandum, City of Nashville and Davidson
County Planning Commissions, 1956), p. 32.
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As the service district concept emerged under the proposed Metro
Charters, the criteria suggested for expansion of the U.S.D. continued
to reflect the "keeping up" orientation.

The Metro Charter, as

installed in 1963, states that U.S.D. expansion:
As sections of the general services district come to need
urban services and the new government becomes able to provide
such services in a reasonable period, the urban services
district should be expanded to include such areas. Such
expansion should be accomplished through the action of the
metropolitan council, on its own initiative and in accordance
with specified criteria and policies, or by petition and
referendum. 119
To support the use of urban service district expansion to keep up
with urban growth, a strong metropblitan planning mechanism was
recommended along with the service district concept.

Although the

previous review of the history of Metro has focused on the two service
districts, it should be pointed out here that both proposed charters
included strong provisions for mandatory capital budgeting, mandatory
referral, zoning and subdivision control and long-range comprehensive
.

P1ann:mg.

120

Together with the power to expand the U.S.D., these

provisions tied the Planning Commission and the Council together in a
theoretically coherent arrangement to plan for future growth.

"Keeping

up," to put it another way, involved "pre-growth planning" which not
only would anticipate areas of urban growth, but also facilitate the
marshalling of public resources to guarantee that such growth would meet

119"Preliminary Draft, Proposed Plan of Metropolitan Government,"
pp. 20-21
120

.'

Bo11n, pp. 144ff.
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proper standards of "health, safety and public welfare .11 121

The tools,

as the Executive Director of the Planning Commission staff saw them,
were a good comprehensive plan and accompanying zoning ordinance, good
subdivision regulations and design standards, capital budgeting and a
relationship of trust between public officials and private developers.

122

Given the proper use of these tools, growth would occur which would then
become suitable for inclusion in the U.S.D.

Perhaps this view of the

developmental application of the service district concept can best be
described as "anticipatory keeping up."
The degree to which such "anticipatory" planning can actually
modify development pressures is the heart of the "management of
development" issue raised in the first chapter.

The preceding comments

are intended to suggest that in creating the service district portion of
Metro's design, the Advance Planning and Research team foresaw changes
in U.S.D. boundaries as a response to urban growth which had been
anticipated, monitored and regulated through such traditional planning
tools as zoning and subdivision controls.

That U.S.D.-G.S.D. policies

were not identified with guiding future development should not seem
surprising given that Metro faced a 30-year backlog on providing urban
services to urbanized areas.
Although more will be said on the subject in the following pages,
there was also an awareness that control of Metro's development, by
whatever means, could not deal with growth throughout the region.

12lH aw k'1ns I nterv1ew.
.

122 Ibid •

Dan
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Grant, in responding to his own questioning of Metro's development
objectives, wrote the following just after Metro came into existence:
The prediction of a Iftruly progressive" solution to the
perplexing problem of guiding urban growth in the suburban
and rural fringe is already being borne out in certain limited
respects under Metro, but the bulk of evidence pro or con
still lies well in the future . . . . There is one haunting
question which needs to be mentioned in any attempt to
evaluate the prediction . . . . What can Metro do if Nashville's six projected expressway spokes hurl much of the
City's new population growth out into the six adjoining
counties?123
Grant correctly anticipated the impact of interstate construction upon
urban growth in the Nashville area.

Later material will show the

tremendous growth which has occurred in the counties surrounding
Davidson, facilitated greatly by the easy access provided between
non-Davidson suburban residential areas and Davidson County employment
and retail centers.
The remainder of this study certainly does not ignore the extent to
which issues of development in Metro Nashville are imbedded in the
developmental pattern of the region.

However, in view of the fact that

Metro's political boundaries are not likely to be changed in the near
future, the study concentrates on the management of development within
the unquestioned jurisdiction of the government of Metro Nashville.
This historical review suggests that the origin of the two service
districts in Metro lay with a concern by Metro's founders for a workable

l23Grant, Daniel R., "A Comparison of Predictions and Experience
With Nashville and Davidson County If in Regional Governance: Promise and
Performance (Washington: Advisory Commission in Intergovernmental
Relations, 1973),pp. 43-44.
J
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way to provide urban services to already urbanized areas.

The extent to

which their design has succeeded and the degree to which their vision
might be expanded is taken up in the pages which follow.

Perhaps this

chapter can be best concluded by suggesting that, at its birth, Metro
was faced with a heirarchy of frameworks within which urban service
policies could be employed to guide future growth.

At the broadest

level existed the array of national, state and aforementioned regional
pressures which could influence both the extent and character or urban
growth.

Metro's impact on these forces was minimal.

A second-order

framework for managing development, however, had been provided by the
creation of consolidated government and gave Metro unquestioned
municipal authority throughout Davidson County.

Within this context the

new Metro charter not only provided for an expandable urban service
district, but also outlined significant Planning Commission authority
for capital budgeting, mandatory referral of city projects, comprehensive
l'
124
.
zonIng
an d 1ong-range pannIng.

Bot h t h e home-ru I e status

0f

t he new

government and the charter's attention to these planning mechanisms
make it clear that within Metro's jurisdiction a structure for managed
development existed.
For purposes of this study, the narrowest framework for development
provided Metro in 1963 was the provision for expanding the urban services
district.

Although evidence in previous pages suggests that Metro's

founders saw U.S.D. expansion as primarily a response to developmental

l24Bolin, pp. 144ff.
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pressures, they did not preclude that such expansion might ultimately be
used as one method to guide development.

Although it has been argued that

the initial decisions on service allocations between the G.S.D. and
U.S.D. were made primarily on financial and political criteria, the
resul ting significant distinction between the two districts left open
the following possible courses of action for the new Metro Government:
1.

The absence of U.S.D. services such as sewer, water and fire
protection could be used as means for limiting development in
G.S.D. areas.

2.

Capital budgeting in the G.S.D. could emphasize the
"preparation" of specified areas for inclusion in U.S.D.

3.

The maintenance of a significantly lower tax rate in the G.S.D.
would contribute to lessened holding costs of G.S.D. properties,
therefore minimizing pressures for development in G.S.D. areas.

Each of these possible strategies depended upon two important
prerequisites:
1.

That Metro executive and legislative decisionmakers saw U.S.D.
expansion policies as one means for guiding development, and

2.

That service (and tax rate) distinctions between the U.S.D. and
G.S.D. remained significant to developers and development
interests.

The degree to which these prerequisites existed and possibly led to the
Metro's use of such a framework for managing development (U.S.D.
expansion) is the subject of the next two chapters.

CHAPTER III
URBAN DEVELOPMENT GOAL FRAMEWORKS IN METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE
The frameworks for the consideration of the management of urban
development in Metro, referred to at the end of the preceding chapter,
require that some attention be given to the existence of development
goals themselves.

As outlined in the initial statement of this study's

research interests, it is important to determine whether and how goals
related to Nashville's development were related to service policies.
Accordingly, this chapter is a broad survey of urban development goals
present within Metro from its inception through the middle 1970's.

The

following chapter proceeds to consider service district policies in
light of this survey.
A simple but useful method for analysis of Metro's development
goal-setting framework is provided by conceptualizing the broad
"ideal-type" conditions under which urban development goals might be
determined.

For purposes of such a typology (and for this study) it is

assumed that "urban development goals" refer to those goals related to
the physical dimensions or urban development.

In this sense "urban

development" includes patterns of land use, transportation, urban
service delivery, housing patterns and so on.

As mentioned previously,

urban "development" is considered to be a broader concept than urban
"growth."

1

Growth is a significant component of development, but

1

See Chapter I, pp. 1-3.
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development implies change, but without an assumption of the direction
of change.
Probably the easiest two "ideal-type" urban development goal-setting
scenarios to visualize are those where, on the one hand, there is
practically

~public

(i.e., governmental) involvement whatsoever.

The

development "marketplace" operates without significant public
intervention.

This might be called a pure "laissez faire" setting for

urban development decision-making.

At the opposite extreme is a

condition where public (i.e., government) intervention is extensive and
continuing.

In such a setting, public officials

ll

manage" urban

development with private interests operating within publically
established development criteria.
In between these extreme types can be located a "minimum standard 11
framework, somewhat near the laissez-faire type and a llpartnership"
framework, closer to the management framework.

Although the distinctions

between the framework-types may be subtle, they provide a basis for
describing the origination of development goals in Nashville during
particular periods.
Three dimensions of the current status of any system of urban
development goals have been considered in the development of this
typology:

time-orientation, private-public orientation, and

comprehensive-functional scope.
Table 3.1.

These dimensions are summarized in

Time-orientation considers the extent to which short-,

medium- and long-range development concerns are addressed.

Short-range

goal concerns generally include present to two or three year scenarios.

TABLE 3.1
URBAN DEVELOPMENT GOAL FRAMEWORKS
Framework
Attribute
Categories

"Laissezfaire"

Possible Frameworks for Urban Development Goal Formulation
"Minimum
Standard"
"Partnership". "Management"

1.

Time-Orientation

Present and
Short-Range

Present and ShortSome Medium-Range

Short-. Mediumand Some LongRange

Medium- and
Long-Range

2.

Public vs. Private
Sources

Private

Pri vate and Some
Public

Private and
Public

Public

3.

Comprehensiveness
of Issues

Functional

Functional

Comprehensive
and Functional

Comprehensive

1,0
N

r~

f
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Medium-range moves from three to 10 or 15 year scenarios.

Long-range

goals refer to those with scenarios further in the future.

The

rationale for such categories is based upon observations of the
time-periods generally important to the individuals, firms, or agencies
who traditionally formulate urban development goals.

Private investors

in urban development have short-range concerns for cash flow,
tax-oriented depreciation credits and deductions, market opportunities,
and so on.

Government agencies generally exist within budget-cycle

constraints which emphasize short-range considerations.

Capital

budgeting and project planning and review, however, push such agencies
to medium-range time period considerations.

Homeowners, as well as

other private investors, consider medium-range factors of investment
return along with short-term considerations of convenience and cash
availability.

Long-range goals moving beyond 15 years generally are the

domain of sellers and investors in long-term securities, especially
municipal bonds, along with planners, environmentalists and others
either trained or conditioned to think with such a focus.
The private-public orientation of an urban development goal
structure reflects the origins of the goals judged to be most significant
in influencing developmental patterns.

Although a determination of

significance may be arbitrary, it is fairly easy to determine the source
of goal articulation:

public agencies or private interest groups.

The

fact that many public agency goal statements are simply aggregations of
certain private interests does not deny the significance, for this
typology, that public, not private, sources may have authored certain
urban development goals.
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The final characteristic accommodated by the typology is the
comprehensive versus functional nature of articulated urban goals.

Such

a distinction departs little from the planner's normal use of these
terms:

comprehensive goals contain considerations of the interrelated

facets of urban development while functional goals are concerned with
specific elements of urban development.

Implied in the distinction is

the assumption that comprehensive goal statements are based upon a
comprehensive view of urban development while functional goals are
composed from a specialized, limited vision of urban development.
As mentioned, the typology extracted from these attributes is one
of generalized ideal-types.
exclusive.

The arbitrary types are not mutually

In a broad sense they should be seen as a continuum.

The

"laissez faire" setting for urban development goals is the least
conducive to a management of development orientation while the "minimum
standard," "partnership" and "management" settings are progressively
more oriented in this direction.

The "laissez faire" setting suggests a

goal-setting scenario where urban development policies emerge from the
political struggles among private interests over present-day and
short-term concerns for specific municipal projects.

Laissez faire

urban development "goals lf are simply the summation of daily struggles
over private, short-term interests.

Government officials are, at best,

frustrated referees or, at worst, proxies for private interests actively
involved in the fray.
The "minimum standard" setting suggests a modest public intrusion
into the urban development policy process under the shield of protection
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of "public health, safety and welfare."

The consequences of "laissez

faire" development policies many times include direct threats to public
health and safety, easily perceived and experienced by an urban
population.

Legislatures, courts and executives traditionally have

responded with laws, judgments and standards influencing the broad
limits within which urban development can occur.

The original rationale

for zoning, building codes, public health standards, highway construction standards and so on reflect this orientation.

Public intervention

in the decisions leading to urban development policies is guided by
enforcement of such standards--primarily a reactive posture.

Policies

are functional and, although short- and middle-range considerations
obviously underlie the establishment of development standards, remain
the present and short-range-oriented products of private interest.
Whereas laissez faire urban goal-setting is rare in American communities,
especially due to the involvement of federal and many state agencies in
defining the "public heal th, safety and welfare," minimum standard goal
determination is quite common.
An additional expansion of the public role in protecting "public
health, safety, and welfare tl has given rise to the third scenario, that
of "partnership. ,,2

This expansion not only reflects new legal

interpretations of the "public interest" but also growing technical
comprehension of the interconnected nature of urban social and physical

2The op1n10n of Justice Douglas in the case of Berman v. Parker is
illustrative of the origins of this shift. See Charles M. Haar, Land
Use Planning, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976),
pp. 636-648.
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environments.

Along with legislative and judicial pressures for greater

public involvement in urban development policies have come the
recognition of urban systems and sub-systems.

Comprehensive urban

development planning, in such a setting. becomes a means of overcoming
the many conflicts and costs caused by dissonant and non-reinforcing
functional plans.
~iddle-

Likewise. the goal-setting process becomes more

and even long-range than the the previous two settings.

The "management" setting for urban development goals represents the
fullest expression of public participation in the goal formation process.
Although private interests are certainly not excluded from the process.
public officials. responding to comprehensive and long-range interpretations of the public interest. dominate the goal-setting process.

In

so far as goal-setting is considered. the maximum form of "management of
developmen til occurs in this setting.
Without further expanding the discussions of the four scenarios the
typology remains rough and suggestive.

Not discussed, far example. are

the v.arious forms and structures for public and private decision-making.
Missing is a classification of urban development policy issues.
is a breakdown of functional planning areas.

Absent

To fill out the presenta-

tion of the typology in these ways would, however. move beyond the
utility of the typology for this study:

a means of analysis of the

development goal-setting structure in Metro after consolidation.

For

this purpose, the discussion thus far is most useful.
Table 3.2 depicts an application of the typology to the framework
for development goal formulation in Nashville prior to 1963.

The

TABLE 3.2
PLACEMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY ALONG URBAN DEVELOPMENT
GOAL FRAMEWORK CONTINUUM
"Laissezfaire"
Nashville and
Davidson County

*

(Pre-1950)

"Minimum Standard"

*

*

(1950-1954)

(1954-1963)

"Partnership~"~.

'\

"Management"

1.0
-...l
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application is based only on the general historical review presented in
the preceding chapter.

• to the establishment of the Community
Prior

Services Commission, Nashville and Davidson County each fit the general
laissez faire framework for urban goal development.

Although a unified

planning staff was created in 1939 and some functional plans were
produced particularly for streets and highways, development of the
Nashville urban area was consistent with the priorities and resources of
private investors. 3 For purposes of this study's interest in urban
service policies, the critical movement toward the minimum standard
framework occurred with the emergence of the forces which led to the
.

creat~on

.
0 fh
t C
e ommun~ty

S
'
C
"
4 The conversion of
erv~ces
omm~ss~on.

private interests into public action to respond to the functional issue
of sewerage service provision and ultimately the full range of urban
service provision was reflective of the recognition that medium- and
even long-range goals were required to develop the solutions to
present-day and short-range problems.

Although the significance of the

Commission's early work has generally heen recognized as its analysis of
government structure and boundaries, it should not be overlooked that
its technical analyses helped secure broader acceptance for public

3Imogine Wright Bolin, "Planning in Metropolitan Nashville and
Davidson County, Tennessee: Before and After Consolidation," (unpublished
Masters Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1968).
40thers might argue that the Capitol Hill Urban Renewal Project,
early thoroughfare planning, or other functional planning efforts were
earlier indications of this shift; the focus here, however, is upon
broad urban service and development planning.
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participation in setting development goals for Nashville and Davidson
County, albeit at the minimum standard level.
The creation of the Advance Planning and Research Division in 1954
provided another indication of Nashville's shift away from the "laissez
fairel! period.

Although their hearts may have felt otherwise, the

planners who designed Metro operated from the perspective that private
present-day and short-term interests would continue to dominate
development goal setting in Nashville.

Their process of governmental

design was in many ways an effort to guarantee that minimum development
standards would be present throughout the urban area.

Their concern for

providing and financing adequate urban services to urbanized areas or
"areas likely to be urbanized" clearly dominated their work.

The

attention given in the proposed charters to such planning tools as
capital budgeting, mandatory referral and land-use regulations reflect
more their attempt to establish sound methods for servicing rather than
managing development.

The Executive Director of the Planning Commission

staff clearly summarized the planners' dilemma:

"we never lost sight of

the need to guide development, but the burden of catching up was so
grea t • . . . ,,5
I.

DEVELOPMENT GOALS, 1963-1970

The need to address the problems of future development as well as
remedy the deficiencies of the past was expressed by the joint planning

SInterview with Charles Hawkins, Jr., December, 1977.
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commission staff just prior to the second referendum on governmental
consolidation.

In March 1961, the Advance Planning Division published

its "Preliminary Land Use Plan for Davidson County, Tennessee.,,6 The
final paragraphs of that document pointed to the absence of clearly
articulated development goals for Nashville:
The Nashville-Davidson County Metropolitan Area needs a
Metropolitan Policies Plan to guide and coordinate its growth
and development. This Policies Plan should express the
intended general goals and objectives of the total community.
Specific plans and functional programs should be examined
against a background of a general policy for urban growth and
change.
The Policies Plan would involve the bringing together, in
one place, of the physical plans and schedules, coordinating
time relationships, financial relationship and 'proposed
activity programs of each governmental unit within the
community. Maps, schedules and texts also would set forth
the physical, economic and social facts, assumptions and goals
underlying proposed governmental policies within the total
community.
The very act of gathering the materials for this
Metropolitan Policies Plan would identify.~nintended inconsistencies, inadequacies and interferences among the various
plans. A process of mutual adjustment of unnecessary conflict
in goals could then be found.
Decisions about land use, development and control,.as
well as the design and location of community facilities, must
relate these environmental aspects to the local government's
programs of public services and to their operating and
capital budget. 7
Contained between the lines of this statement is the obvious hope that
the probability of such a plan coming into being would be enhanced with
the adoption of metropolitan government.

The coordinative strengths of

6preliminary Land Use Plan (Nashville: Nashville and Davidson
County Planning Commissions, 1961).
7preliminary Land Use Plan, p. 37.

•

101
such a government were seen as crucial in uniting the various flplans and
schedules" already in existence.
The "plans and schedules already in existence" upon Metro's birth
consisted of functional plans in areas such as transportation, sewerage
and the aforementioned preliminary land use plan.

As suggested earlier,

Metro inherited the ''minimum standard" goal framework which placed the
preponderance of development goal-setting in the hands of private
investment and development interests.

As one account has stated, in

Nashville "while the general public's interest in land-use policy is
ad hoc and ephemeral, however, that of financiers, developers, realtors
and builders is constant and pervasive. fl8

F.rom this po li tical

perspective, the coming of Metro brought very little change.

Although

the charter established a prominant role for the Planning Commission in
capital budgeting, mandatory referral of public projects, zoning,
"coordination of urban services" and "long-range planning," Commission
priorities were diverted elsewhere.
First, technical staff energies were employed

t~

assist the new

administration of Metro Mayor Briley literally set up a new government.

9

The Advance Planning and Research Division was called upon to give
continuous administrative advice.

Illustrative of this priority was

8Lester M. Salamon and Gary L. Wamsley, '7he Politics of Urban Land
Policy: Zoning and Development in Nashville," in James Blumstein and
Benjamin Walter, ed., Growing Metropolis (Nashville: Vanderbilt
University Press, 1975), p. 154.
9"Executive Order #1," (unpublished memorandum from Mayor Beverly
Briley to Director, Advance Planning and Research Division, Metropolitan
Planning Commission, April, 1963).
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Mayor Briley's very first Executive Memorandum-written to the Director
of the Division-asking for detailed assistance in organizing the
day-to-day procedures of Metro Government. 10
A second limit on the Planning Commission's capacity to respond to
long-term development goal-setting needs was the staff attention
required to meet the service needs of the already urbanized area,
particularly ,the Urban Services District.

Table 3.3 broadly summarizes

the key service deficiencies. particularly those in the portion of the
U.S .D. annexed following the defeat of the first referendum on
consolidation.

Mayor Briley, in commenting on these

~eficiencies,

stressed that "need and engineering feasibilitylt must override any other
planning consideration when such large urban areas were so poorly
serviced. 11

The Executive Director of the Metropolitan Planning

Commission reinforced this priority when he established staff responsibilities in functional areas in order to "catch-up and then keep-up" '
" d eman ds. 12
. h serVlce
Wlt

(The following chapter will discuss these

service problems in more detail.)

Even if the Metropolitan Planning

Commission staff had been able to concentrate on long-term developmental
issues, no matter how related they might have been to current service
problems. their recommendations would have been bypassed in favor of the
more expedient task of servicing residents guaranteed services they

lOIbid.
IlThomas P. Murphy and John Rehfuss, Urban Politics in the Suburban
Era (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1976). p. 247.
12Hawk
" 'lntervlew.
.
lns

TABLE 3.3
RELATIVE CONDITION OF CERTAIN URBAN SERVICE DELIVERY,
METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE, 1963
Services
Sanitary
Sewer

Water

---Storm
Sewer

Solid Waste

Area

Fire

Police

Urban Services District,
City of Nashville
Prior to 1958

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory
Poor;
Construction
Underway

Poor;
Mix with
Sanitary
Sewers

Satisfactory

Urban Services District,
Newly Annexed Areas

Poor;
Water Supply
Problems

Satisfactory

Poor
Critical;
Construction
Needed

Poor

Satisfactory

General Services District,
Outside U.S.D.

No Metro
Obligation

Poor;
New Patrols
Established

No Metro
Obligation

No Metro
No Metro
Obligation Obligation

No Metro
Obligation

I-'

o

Vol
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weren't yet receiving from the government they had voted into existence.
Both Mayor Briley and the new members of the Metro Council had
13
substantial constituencies thinking in these terms.
A final limit on Metropolitan Planning Commission's capacity to
articulate Metro development goals early in Metro's life has already
been suggested:
process.

private interests dominated the urban development

Although the "minimum standard" framework for development

planning had included the implementation of city and county zoning
ordinances, subdivision regulations and building codes, most observers,
if honest, would probably agree with the essence of the statement that
"there's probably not an area in the United States where the developers,
real estate men, and bankers have had greater opportunities than in
Nashvi lIe. ,,14

Officially, the Mayor spoke of "economic growth and

development in order to assist Metro in meeting existing service
needs." 15 Little was said about meeting the service needs created by
growth of the urban area.

As will be discussed in the following chapter,

maintenance of minimum development standards, particularly sewer
policies, forced acceptance of some future-oriented planning recommendations.

In 1964, far more restrictive sewer requirements were made a

part of the subdivision regulations.

As one might expect, however, the

l3 In drawing up Councilmanic Districts, it should be recalled,
members of the Charter Commission had intended to place just such
pressure on Metro by including in a majority of districts some territory
from the 1958-1960 annexations; see Chapter II.
l4Salamon and Wamsley, p. 141
l5Murphy and Rehfuss, p. 247.
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"minimum standard" scenario gave birth to ways of circumventing the
rules.

Exceptions to the rules were permitted and, more crucial to the

argument of this study, the power of Metro to control service extension
was diluted when special utility districts were allowed to expand within
' D '1S tr1ct.
'
16
th e Genera 1 SerV1ces
Although it is being argued that a framework for the preparation of
urban development goals in Metro existed only at the "minimum standard"
level, fldevelopment fl was certainly taking place.

From 1960 to 1970, the

population of Davidson County grew from 399,743 to 447,877. 17 More
important, this growth took the form of dispersed urban development.
Figure 3.1, taken from an MPC study, compares the "urbanized" areas of
the county in 1950 and 1970.

If urban development is narrowly limited

to the process of converting raw land to residential, industrial,
commercial and community uses, then development in Metro during this
period (and the following seven-year period as well) was relatively
unrestrained by public policies.

The availability of relatively cheap

land, suited for development, in the outer fringes of the county (with
the exception of the northwestern portion) attracted private investment
interests.

The expansion of the interstate highway network within the

county guaranteed access to the central business district along several
radial corridors.

Where private investors saw fit to maximize these

l6Analyzing Suburban Development (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning
Commission, 1973), p. 12.
l7proposed General Plan for Nashville (Nashville: Metropolitan
Planning Commission, 1976), p. 4.
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Urbanized,
Urbanized, 1970

Figure 3.1.
Source:

Urbanization of Nashville-Davidson
County, 1950 and 1970.

Analyzing Suburban Development.
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conditions, political interests were supportive of construction of
public facilities to service such development at -f. Hminimum standard. H18
Such services in many cases were easier to acquire along Metro's fringe
where utility districts were operating.

The developmental "skip" over

the areas where service districts did not operate and where Metro's
Urban Services District was not extended was a common occurrence. 19
(This will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.)
Partial documentation of the absence of articulated developmental
goals during this period can be obtained by reviewing the principles
adhered to in the preparation of various planning studies and procedures
by the Metropolitan Planning Commission.

Of special significance are

zoning practices, subdivision regulations, capital budgeting and
functional planning studies.
Zoning during this early part of Metro's history has been described
20
as"primitive Euclidean!! in nature.
Although the description was
primarily aimed at the existence of traditional zoning heirarchy of uses
found in both the city and county zoning ordinances (each being
continued after consolidation), the description also applies to the
development goals underlying the ordinances.

These assumed goals dealt

with general concerns for incompatible uses, not staging or timing of
growth. 21

As is to be expected in the "minimum standard fl environment,

18Analping Suburban DeveloEment, pp. 55-63.
.
19Ana 1pmg:
Suburban DeveloEment, pp. 12-13 .
20Salamon and Wamsley, pp. 157-158.
21Ana 1z:zmg
.
Suburban Develo:ement , pp. 12-13.
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the impact of the ordinances was to open for development far more land
22
. than was required in the market place.
The breadth of development patterns allowed by the zoning
ordinances was further extended by the way in which the ordinances were
implemented.

Even the requirement that successful challenges to

Planning Commission decisions on zoning matters required a two-thirds
vote of the Metropolitan Council was sidestepped through the emergence
)
23
of "councilmanic courtesy" in such matters.
The very composition of
the Council, Board of Zoning Appeals, and Planning Commission suggested
that development-investment interests would prevail in most zoning
24
matters.
At the risk of belaboring the point, the concluding
statement of a thorough study· of zoning and urban development during
Metro's early years is illustrative:
What this all adds up to so far as the impact of public policy
on urban development, therefore is inevitably mixed. Urban
land policy in Nashville, at least as reflected in zoning,
operates within a relatively narrow range of discretion.
Private business and household decisions clearly retain the
initiative in the development process. But within a limited
range of discretion, public policy does have a tangible effect
. . . . More than anything else, therefore, land-use policy
in Nashville resembles a ship with numerous leaks moving
generally in the right direction, but slowly. When the winds
and atmospheric conditions are right, everything seems to
work according to plan. But when severe headwinds and
turbulence interfere, the vessel has no reserve engines or
fuel to help hold its course. For the rest, the crew spends
its time valiantly fending off potential disaster while the
passengers frolic unawares up on the deck. Until something
interferes,with their revelry, this pattern is likely to
persist. 25

22 Ibid .

23Salamon and Wamsley, p. 177.

24 Ibid •

25Salamon and Wamsley, p. 190.
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Equally significant is the statement in the Land Use Policy Plan,
published in 1970:
As early as the 1940's, separate Zoning O~dina~ces were
adopted for the City of Nashville and Davidson County. These
Ordinances remain in effect today despite the consolidation of
the two governmental entities. Even more significant is the
fact that new problems and issues confronting current
community development have generated the need for developing
more comprehensive land use policies to resolve these issues.
Consequently. this Land Use Policy Plan cites specific
policies which were not applicable in 1940. Therefore,
adaptation of the current Zoning Ordinance to policies stated
herein is not entirely possible. 26
In commenting on the inadequacies of the zoning ordinances in
facilitating the implementation of even broad development goals,
officials and observers also point to the "problem" of the seven
incorporated municipalities within Davidson County recognized by the
Metropolitan Charter (see Figure 3.2).

The continued existence of these

"shell-ci ties" was the consequence of compromises made to insure
favorable support for consolidation from residents of these primarily
. 1 areas. 27 Each city is a part of the General Services
reSl. dentla
District but has the option of contracting for provision of urban
services.

Of importance is the prerogative given these municipalities

to establish their own zoning ordinances along with other policies with
potential developmental consequences.

fl • • •

The municipalities have

not generally utilized in-depth analytical studies as a basis for
formulating public policies • . . consequently, issues arise concerning

26 Land Use Policy Plan (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission,
1970), p. 54.
27Interview with Robert Horton, January, 1978; Hawkins Interview.
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Figure 3.2.

Source:

Incorporated Municipalities in
Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson
County.

Metropolitan Planning Commission.
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the impact of adopted municipal policies on the overall development of.
28
the metropolitan area,II
The fact that five of these cities are
primarily residential in nature (excepting GoodlettsvIlle and Berry Hill)
I

and have been interested in limiting nonresidential growth coupled with
the absence of significant Metro development objectives makes the issue of
freestanding cities within Metro nearly moot. Few problems were created
.
29
by the fact that "MPC tended to ignore them,!!
Such a comment would
not be accurate had urban development goals and objectives been a
serious Metro priority.
Mention has already been made of the 1964 revision of the
subdivision regulations.

The requirement that subdivision developments

include sanitary sewer services was an expression of "minimum standard!!
concerns by the planning staff. 30

The fact that the provision has been

regularly bypassed or that non-Metro service districts have been allowed
to expand underscores the absence within the regulations of development
controls based upon anything other than broad minimum design
standards. 31 ,32

Dan Grant, in his discussion of predictions regarding

Metro, noted that continued approval of subdivisions without adequate
sanitary sewers and with water service through mains less than 6-inches

28 Land Use Policy Plan, p. 12.

29Horton Interview.

30Hawkins Interview.
3l Ana I yZlng
.
Subur ban Deve 1opmen t ) p. 48 •
32An "Urban Planning Area" was made a part of the Subdivision
Regulations adopted in 1964, including all but the western reaches of the
county. It is in this area where, technically, the sewerage requirements
apply.
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in diameter would prove to be obstacles in any future effort to guide
urban growth in the suburban and urban fringe. 33
Capital budgeting during Metro 1 s first years, as with zoning and
subdivision regulation. provided little if any evidence of the existence
of development goals.

Although the potential for a capital budgeting

process to be useful in tlpreparing for and directing urban growth"
certainly exists in the theories of modern planning, the failure to make
such use of it in Metro can be attributed to two factors. 34

First, the

capital budgeting process was frequently circumvented by operating
departments. 35 The acceptance of capital budgeting procedures, let
alone principles, was minimal throughout Metro.

Second, and perhaps

most important, the resources for capital investments were almost
entirely committed to projects that either were servicing existing
development or matching federal funds, such as thoroughfare construction
grants, which made no provisions for controlling the sequencing and
timing of development.

The capital budgets of the period, as indeed the

operating budgets, reflected the political priorities of the time--and
these included servicing developed areas and capturing federal dollars.
Th e management

0f

d eve 1opment was not a part

0f

. her conSl. deratlon.
.
36
elt

330an Grant, !tA Comparison of Predictions and Experience With
Nashville and Davidson County," Urban Affairs Quarterly (September,
1965), pp. 34-54.
34See David R. Godschalk et al., Constitutional Issues of Growth
Management (Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials, 1977), p. 213.
35Bolin. pp. 143 ff.
36Gary L. Wamsley and Lester M. Salamon, liThe Operating Budget as a
Steering Device," in Blumstein and Walter, Growing Metropolis.

113
"-

It has been previously pointed out that the planning activities of
the Metropolitan Planning Commission during this period consisted almost
entirely of functional planning efforts.

Reasons have already been

given for the agency's priorities in areas other than comprehensive
planning for urban development.

Both the Preliminary Land Use Plan of

1961 and the Land Use Policy Plan of 1970 contained pleas for action in
preparing comprehensive development pOlicies. 37 , The planners' concern
for such policies was also expressed in the 1965 document, Handbook of
Standards for Urban Development:
The growth of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County
obviously will continue with or without greater- citizen awareness of desirable environmental qualities. However, increased
awareness and subsequent community choices concerning development patterns could allow more meaningful participation in
development efforts by citizens, developers, designers, public
officials and other involved persons. Development efforts
based on more knowledgeable participation might further the
optimum use of land for a range of urban activities, and a
greater inclusion of appropriate community services and
facilities, and promote greater citizen identification and
pride in community appearance. Urban development in less
appropriate forms may create additional costs to the community
in terms of uneven use of land resources, greater costs in the
provision of services and facilities, increasing traffic
congestion, and decreased amenities. Overcoming costs such as
those could consume a great part of the resources of the
community. 38
The planning staff response to the outdated zoning ordinances and
absence of urban development policies was to slowly begin building the
base for some future time when perhaps the minimum standard framework

37preliminary Land Use Plan, p. 37; Land Use Policy Plan, pp. 1-5.
38Handbook of Standards for Urban Development (Nashville:
Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1965), p. 3.
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could be transcended .

Initially, this effort consisted of describing

physical development principles which not only represented the "best
minimum standards!! but also pointed out the economic and social benefits
to be gained from better planned urban development.

The revised

subdivision regulations t the Handbook of Standards for Urban Development t
and the 1970 Land Use Policy Plan each dealt with desirable physical
. t'lCS. 39
d eve 1 opment c h aracterlS

Issues such as density patterns, lot

development requirements, amenities and land use compatibilities were
addressed.

It is beyond the scope of this study to assess the specific

stress given each development issue, but it is significant to note that
the staging and timing of urban development was not addressed from a
recommended policy perspective during this period.

Although earlier

quotes from planning staff studies clearly show a concern for some
orchestration of development, staff energies were concentrated on
improving the physical qualities of developments insofar as that could
be accomplished without any real control over whether the development
would actually take place--or when it would take place. 40
As Metro's first seven years came to an end t it seemed clear that
urban development was taking place with a minimum of guidance from Metro
itself.

Preoccupied with providing services in already urbanized areas

and responsive to a political climate dominated by investment and
development interests t planners took their stand by holding out for
better minimum standards and filling the prefaces and conclusions of

39 Ibid .

40

Salamon and Wamsley, pp. 159-165.

115

their studies with pleas to view Metro's development in a more
comprehensive, goal-oriented fashion.
II.

DEVELOPMENT GOALS, 1970-1977

Nothing dramatic occurred in 1970 to change the environment in
which urban development decisions were reached in Metro.

Symbolically,

the publication of the 1970 Land Use Policy Plan represented an escape
from the restraints of the principles prominent in the two existing
zoning ordinances.

The policy plan was prepared as a part of a

staff-citizen effort to create a new Comprehensive Metropolitan Zoning
Ordinance (COMZO).

Practically, the plan was prepared not only to

provide a land use policy basis for zoning, but also to meet growing
federal pressures on Metro to adopt a single comprehensive plan.

Urban

planning funds, transportation funds and other forms of federal income
required a comprehensive planning effort greater than the sum of Metro's
functional plans and the planners' wishful thinking of the 1960's.
Metro had been receiving Section 701 urban planning funds from the
....
41
Although the Plan for
f e dera 1 government S1nce 1tS 1ncept1on.
Metropolitan Government itself was prepared with 701 money, comprehensive
planning since 1963 had produced little in the way of the published
plans expected by federal officials.

By 1970, therefore, comprehensive

planning within Metro was receiving a boost both from the need to
implement a Metro-wide zoning ordinance and a federal incentive to
produce some type of comprehensive plan.

4lHawkins Interview.

)
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After lengthy discussions and much controversy, the Comprehensive
Metropolitan Zoning Ordinance (COMZO) was adopted in 1973. 42 The
regulations and the accompanying map established in law some of the
broader physical development principles discussed in the 1970 Land Use
Policy Plan.

Particularly significant were the addition of flexibility

in zoning matters, the encouragement of higher residential densities,
and environmentally-based restrictions on development, especially in
43
floodplains.
Performance standards were also introduced as a partial
replacement for the pure-districting concept underlying the previous
ordinances.

As a regulatory device, COMZO reflected a move toward

establishing higher standards of development.

The fact that earlier

comments on limited enforcement of zoning principles applied as well to
the period after COMZO was adopted suggest, however, the COMZO was not a
vehicle whereby Metro could move beyond the "minimum standard" framework
for managing urban development.

This condition was, and is, reinforced

by the fact that COMZO, like most current zoning ordinances, is not
useful in influencing significantly the timing and staging of
44
development.
Toward the end of this period MPC staff began a review of existing
45
subdivision regulations.
While most of the conclusions of the review

42Bill Number 73-650, June, 1973 (Metropolitan Council); Zoning
Regulations of Metropolitan Government (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning
Commission, 1976). It required nearly ten years to draft and enact
COMZO.
43 Ibid .

44Salamon and Wamsley. pp. 159-165.

45A Preliminary Report on Problems and Issues of Land Subdivision
in Davidson County J (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1977),
pp. 5-6.
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dealt with procedural issues and upgraded design standards, some
attention was given to a new role for the subdivision regulation process
in influencing the timing of urban development in the suburban and rural
fringe.
Premature approval of ~ subdivision causes problems such as
inadequate access to the subdivision; lack of and pressure for
public services which will be expensive to provide to remote
development, and inconsistent with adopted budgets and
programs; inadequate essential services such as sewers and
fire protection; and possibly the precedent of an unplanned
type of development that may be inconsistent with the development recommended for the area in the general plan . . . . The
present Subdivision Regulations do not contain any specific
criteria against which subdivision proposals can be judged to
determine whether the timing of development is appropriate or
premature. The lack of such criteria leaves the. door open
for arbitrary decisionmaking which may lead to developments
that are contrary to the interests of taxpayers, consumers.
and the local government. At issue is whether criteria
regarding timing of develoEment should be provided and what
those criteria should be. 4
The issue was left open, with the interesting comment that the Public
Works Department favored the inclusion of some type of timing criteria.
Although new subdivision regulations may not reflect such criteria, it
is important, given the concerns of this study. that at least two Metro
agencies raised the issue of extending the normal minimum standard
framework for subdivision regulation to include the more long-term and
comprehensive concerns for the timing of particular developments.

By

1978, MPC staff had developed an initial draft of new subdivision

regulations for Metro which were intended to upgrade subdivision
standards to include issues of compatibility with succeeding and adjacent

46 Ibid .
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development.

There is little evidence, however, that the subdivision

regulations are being revised with a view toward their potential use in
guiding or managing urban development.

Tougher sewer and water

requirements, for example, are not undergirded by a philosophy of
manipulating service locations to manipulate development.

The tougher

standards may very well have that impact--but only if service policies
are based upon such developmental considerations.

Also open to question

is the extent to which new subdivision regulations will be forcefully
implemented, should they be adopted.
A review of Metro's capital budgeting process since 1970 suggests
that, even though modest, some increased attention has been given to the
fiscal framework for planning urban development.

As has been pointed

out previously, the Charter's requirement for capital budgeting had not
-led to achievement of the coordinative and developmental objectives
usually associated with theories of capital improvements budgeting.
Such objectives, as spelled out in the 1969-1970 capital budget
document were:
1.

2.

3.

4.

To consolidate and coordinate all the various departmental
requests with the purpose of reducing delays and coordinating individual improvements programs;
To establish a system of procedures and priorities by
which each proposal can be evaluated in terms of the
public need, the comprehensive plan of the metropolitan
area, and the interrelationship of projects and cost
requirements;
To schedule the proposals over a six-year period according
to their priority evaluation; and,
To set forth a financing program for the six-year period
whereby the Capital Improvements Program-and be achieved. 47

47Capital Improvements Budget and Program, 1969-70 to 1975-76
(Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1969), p. 6.
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Achievement of these objectives required both departmental adherence to
the capital improvements budgeting procedures and a commitment by Metro
Council and the Mayor to reply on the Capital Improvements Budget and
Program in making capital investment decisions.

During the early 1970's
some growth in meeting the first requirement took place. 48 MPC staff

efforts concentrated on the "consolidating and coordinating" of
departmental requests, leaving each department somewhat free to assign
its own priorities to proj ects. 49

The absence of a "comprehensive plan

of the metropolitan area," both in the sense of a planning document and
in the minds of Metro executives and legislators, continued to
contribute to the weakness of the Capital Improvements Budget and
Program to be an accurate statement of Metro development priorities.

It

remained a departmental and planning staff "wish list."
Although Metro's capital improvements budgeting process failed to
transcend the policy-impact threshold, better coordination of
departmental priorities at least allowed MPC staff to project various
fiscal scenarios given various capital investment options.

While

poli tics in the Council and the Mayor's office tended to often override
such evaluations, MPC staff gained greater ability to analyze Metro's
long-term revenue-capacity to finance various capital investment
packages.

This ability was significant in the discussion of the

various service extension proposals outlined in the next chapter.

48 Th 1S
,

. .1S
0 b servat10n

b ase d upon 1n
. f orma1 comments by MPC sta.
ff

49Instructions Manual for the Capital Improvements Budget and
Program, 1977 (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1977),
entire volume.
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Perhaps the strongest indication of a subtle shift toward an urban
development goal orientation beyond the "minimum standard" framework is
found in MPC staff writing after 1970.

Staff studies and reports

reflect the decision reached at the end of the 1960's to develop a
comprehensive plan for Metro.

The publication of the Land Use Policy

Plan in 1970 was followed by documents on developmental problems and
50
issues found both in the inner city and on the suburban fringe.
These
inquiries represented the first stage of a planning process designed to
produce Metro's first formal Itcomprehensive plan." 51 In essence, this
planning effort was recognition of the existing "minimum standard" basis
for Metro's view of future development since its inception.

In

beginning a process of analysis of problems and issues associated with
urban development in Metro, the MPC staff consciously addressed the
possibility that more comprehensive and long-term considerations could
provide the basis for a development-goal framework closer to the
"partnership" rather than "minimum standard" type.

The preface to one

of the more significant initial studies in the effort is indicative of
this:
For the last several years a major objective of the
Metropolitan Planning Commission has been the development of
a unified long-range comprehensive plan for Nashville-Davidson
County, rather than separate functional plans limited to land
use or community facilities alone. Because of the nature of
previous Commission activities and commitments this objective

50Analyzing Suburban Development; Inner City Blight (Nashville:
Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1973).
5lproposed General Plan for Nashville, pp. 10-12.
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has not been fulfilled . . . . The study attempts to identify
and analyze the broader social, economic, and physical
problems and issues associated with suburban development.
These considerations are frequently overlooked in making
specific short-range decisions. The report will have fulfilled
its purpose if it provides some understanding of suburban
development and presents a useful array of suburban problems
and issues which may serve as a point of departure for
generating optimal developmental policies in the future. 52
A new tension between advocates of "development as usual" and those
seeking a framework of goals and policies to guide development was
emerging in Metro.
Briefly, two somewhat separate efforts to develop the basis for
more managed development can be identified.
MPC staff already referred to.

The first was that of the

Although federal pressures for

comprehensive planning were significant, especially during the period
discussed, the Director of Planning and many of his staff were trained
in and professionally committed to a comprehensive planning thrust,
albeit a physically-oriented one.

The Director of the Comprehensive

Planning Division, appointed in 1970, was a recent graduate of a
planning school with a strong comprehensive planning emphasis.

The

scope of their concern for comprehensive planning included the
environmental, fiscal, social and economic costs of continued development
without increased public guidance based upon well-established goals.
Running throughout their studies of this period are discussions of the
environmental consequences of unrestrained suburban development, the
fiscal costs of service demands made by land conversion in rural areas,

.
52Ana 1yz~ng
Suburban Deve 1opment, p. ii.

I

\.
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social inequities inherent in certain patterns of suburban housing, and
the consequences for the Metro and regional economies of continued
patterns of deve1opment. 53
A second, more specific thrust toward management of development was
provided by a Ford Foundation-funded project to " . . . introduce into
Metro a task-focused, interdisciplinary, interfunctiona1, interinstitutiona1 management process to develop the capacity to manage growth and
arrest pollution. u54

The primary objective of the project was to create

an "environmental management team" from officials of the MPC, the
Department of Water and Sewerage Services, the Health Department and the
Department of Public Works.
management.

A special focus was placed on solid waste

Although growth management was included as an objective in

this effort, the primary thrust became a functionally-oriented study of
solid-waste issues in the environmental setting of Davidson County.55
The longer-term connections between the Environmental Planning and
Management Project and development management in Metro have yet to be
.realized.

S3Natura1 Environmental Analysis (Nashville, Metropolitan Planning
Commission, 1973); Expanding Urban Services (Nashville, Metropolitan
Planning Commission, 1972); Social Types in Nashville-Davidson County
(Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1976); Future Economic
Development in Nashville: Alternative Approaches (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1976).
S4James C. Coomer and Charlie B. Tyer, Nashville Metropolitan
Government: The First Decade (Knoxville: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Tennessee, 1974), p. 77.
SSIbid.

I

,

!
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III.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter opened with presentation of a general scheme for
classifying the frameworks within which urban development goals might be
generated.

It was argued that urban development objectives in Nashville

and Davidspn County up to the time of Metro's birth were produced in an
environment dominated by private development interests, with public
officials providing only minimal standards for such development.
Although only one of several goals, increased public involvement in
urban development was seen by the founders of Metro as an important
consequence of consolidated government.

The thrust of this chapter,

therefore, has been to review the general evolution of the framework for
urban development goal-setting since Metro's birth.

The conclusion ,

reached suggests that a subtle shift in this emphasis has occurred at
the staff-level in Metro, particularly within the Metropolitan Planning
Commission.

No evidence, however, has been given to suggest that

planning documents which argue for a shift to "partnership" development
goal~setting

will find a receptive audience elsewhere within Metro or in

the private sector.

A fuller discussion of the likelihood of a shift in

this orientation occurs in Chapter V, where additional discussion of
MPC's work to develop a comprehensive plan will be offered.
The purpose of this chapter was to respond to an initial research
question:

was there a framework of Metro development goals toward which

the urban services district provisions of consolidated government could
be employed?

The response developed in the preceeding pages is:

The existence of a "minimum standard lf orientation toward public

no.
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involvement in Nashville's development ruled out such use of service
policies just as it did use other developmental guidance mechanisms.
The political sense of Metro's designers emerges even more significant.
In rejecting their hearts' desire for guided metropolitan growth, they
settled for a government more capable of coping with growth and
development as it occurred.

It is with this view, rather than that of

managed development, that the following chapter examines in more detail
the service district concept and the delivery of urban services since
Metro's birth.

CHAPTER IV
URBAN SERVICE DELIVERY AND URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT EXPANSION
The backdrop of the previous two chapters places the discussion of
urban services delivery under Metro in a context of relatively
unrestrained urban development.

The answers to the first two of the

study's four research questions suggest that the services district
arrangement for delivery of urban services in Metro was not created
primarily to manage development, nor did a general framework for even
partially managing development evolve during Metro's 15 years of
existence.

This chapter, therefore, reviews the delivery of Metro

services through the services district structure in view of the "minimum
standard--catch-up and keep-upll service objectives present during this
time.

Such a review permits both evaluation of service delivery

policies vis-a-vis Metro's limited development goals and consideration
of service policy potential for serving broader, more comprehensive
development goals should a new development goal framework be established.
The evaluation of service extension and the services district concept
during the first 15 years of Metro centers therefore on the questions of
service coordination and fiscal benefit with developmental concerns left
to the speculation contained in the final pages of the study.
Following a conceptual review of the General Services District
(G.S.D.) and the Urban Services District (U.S.D.). a summary of Metro
service delivery since 1963 will be presented.

The second half of the

chapter will then contrast proposed and actual modification of the
125
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U.S.D. boundaries and comment upon the patterns observed.

The

concluding discussion considers the potential development impact U.S.D.
and G.S.D. policies are likely to have in the future.
I.

METRO SERVICES AND THE TWO SERVICE DISTRICTS

As will be recalled from Chapter II, the Metro Charter established
two service districts and allocated Metro service delivery and tax
collection functions among them. l

A critical feature of this division

was the creation of separate budgets and funds to accompany separate
2
service and revenue-raising responsibilities.
Provided for in the
Charter were five funds:
1.

G.S.D. General Fund

2.

G.S.D. Debt Service Fund

3.

U.S.D. General Fund

4.

U.S.D. Debt Service Fund

5.

School Fund

An equitable sharing of the financial burden in providing Metro services

was the prime reason for the creation of these distinct funds, each
being tied both to specific service provisions and revenue sources.
Specifically allocated U.S.D. service functions were:
1.

water and sewerage

2.

fire protection

1

See Table 2.3, p. 68.

2James C. Coomer and Charlie B. Tyer, Nashville Metropolitan
Government: The First Decade (Knoxville: Bureau of Public Administration,
University of Tennessee, 1974), pp. 48-51.
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S.

"increased" police protection

4.

garbage collection and refuse control

S.

storm water control

6.

certain alcoholic beverage regulation and licensing

7.

taxicab regulations and licensing

The remainder of Metro's service functions were allocated to the G.S.D.
For both political and administrative reasons, the School Fund was
created, although public education was a G.S.D. function. S
The designers of Metro had clearly intended to maintain a
significant distinction between the G.S.D. and the U.S.D. as long as
there remained both urbanized and non-urbanized portions of the county.
As previously suggested, they foresaw extension of U.S.D. boundaries as
a way to accommodate "both the development of the county" and "Metro's
capacity to finance and supply the U.S.D. service package.,,4

In April

1965, therefore, the U.S.D. consisted of an overlay on the county (the
G.S.D.) with boundaries the same as the City of Nashville at the time of
consolidation (see Figure 4.1).

Within the first year of Metro. plans

were prepared and adopted to provide the full range of U.S.D. services
S
throughout the U.S.D., with the exception of storm sewers.
These plans

SThe politics of school consolidation were complex; the existence of
capital investments coupled with public concern over the school budget
led to special treatment of school matters in the creation of Metro.
including establishment of the School fund.
4Interview with Charles Hawkins, Jr., December, 1977; Interview with
Robert Horton. January, 1978; Correspondence from Irving Hand, January,
1978.
S

Coomer and Tyer, pp. 68-69.
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Figure 4.1.
Source:

Urban Services District, 1963.

Metropo 1i tan P1anning Commi ss ion.
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were developed individually by the Metro government departments
responsible for the particular service.

(The significant departments

were Water and Sewerage Services, Public Works, Fire and Police.)

In

the case of the sewer plan, a large engineering consulting firm was
engaged.
Problems of consolidating county and city services were pronounced
throughout the G.S.D.

There is general agreement, however, that Mayor

Briley, with the help of many officials (including the Planning
Commission staff as noted in the preceding chapter) was not wrong when
he stated that, during its first year, the consolidation of G.S.D.
services had:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Saved $1,000,000 in school construction costs;
Permitted establishment of competitive bidding;
Permitted establishment of land acquisition and disposal
policies;
Permitted the establishment of a motor pool and fleet
purchasing;
Permitted the establishment of uniform personnel policies;
and
Permitted the establishment of a central data processing
unit. 6

Each of these accomplishments, of course, contains a story unto itself.
For purposes of this study, it is important to keep in mind that many of
the service provision benefits claimed to be possible under consolidated
government did, in fact, occur even though they are not discussed in the
following review of the extension of U.S.D. services under Metro.
The stated goal of the founders of Metro that consolidated
government would bring about a more equitable financing of urban

6Coomer and Tyer, p. 39; T. Scott Fillebrown, "The Nashville Story,"
National Civic Review (May, 1969), pp. 197-200.
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services can be evaluated in light of the information in Tables 4.1 and
4.2.

Table 4.1 compares the property tax burdens of city and county

residents before and after Metro.
rates through 1977.

Table 4.2 extends the data on tax

From the perspective of the property tax alone, it

can be seen that all Metro residents (i.e., G.S.D.) assumed a greater
burden in financing the G.S.D. service package.

As will be discussed,

it should be noted that a major U.S.D. service package, water and
sewerage, was placed upon a user charge rather than property-tax
financial basis.
Table 4.3 presents the growth of expenditures for the G.S.D.
service package since Metro's inception.

Although the service

"packages" remained unchanged throughout the period, the cost of G.S.D.
services grew, both as a function of population growth outside the
U.S.D. and the cost increases of G.S.D. services.

Police protection,

initially "more intensive" within the U.S.D., virtually became a G.S.D.
7
.
f unctlon.

The difficulty in distinguishing between police protection

requirements in U.S.D. and G.S.D. areas led, by 1972, to nearly 98% of
the police department local fund requirements being allocated from
G.S.D. sources.
the G.S.D.

8

In 1963-1964, only 59% of local police funds came from

The police department was the only Metro department, however,

which was given the task of performing a similar service at different
levels of intensity for the areas within and beyond the U.S.D.
Since the emphasis of this study is upon the extension of urban
services as related to urban development issues in Metro, attention must

7Horton Interview

8

Coomer and Tyer, pp. 55-56.
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TABLE 4.1
COMPARISON OF RATES OF TAX LEVIES, 1962-1963 AND 1963-1964,
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY

1962-1963

1963-1964

City .Tax Rate

County Tax Rate

Combined

$3.00

$2.32

$5.32

U.S.D. Tax Rate

G.S.D. Tax Rate

Combined

$2.00

$3.70

$5.70

(Tax rates are $100 of assessed valuation.)
Source: Annual Financial Report of Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County, 1963-1964.

TABLE 4.2
COMPOSITION OF RATES OF TAX LEVIES, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT
OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY

Fiscal Period

Total
G.S.D.
Rate

General Services District
G.S.D.
General
School
G.S.D. Debt
Fund
Fund
Service Fund

Total
U.S.D.
Rate

1963-1964
1964-1965
1965-1966
1966-1967
1967-1968
1968-1969
1969-1970
1970-1971
1971-1972
1972-1973
1973-1974
1974-1975
1975-1976
1976-1977

$3.70
3.70
3.50
3.50
3.50
3.50
3.50
3.50
4.11
4.11
4.11
4.11
4.11
4.11

$1.36
1. 36
1. 36
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.40
1.71
1.63
1.63
1.63
1.63
1.63

$2.00
2.00
1.80
1.80
1.80
1.80
1.80
1.80
1.89
1.89
1.89
1.89
1.89
1.89

$1.78
1. 78
1. 78
1. 78
1. 78
1. 78
1. 78
1. 78
2.08
2.08
2.02
2.02
2.02
2.02

$ .56
.56
.36
.32
.32
.32
.32
.32
.32
.40
.46
.46
.46
.46

Urban Services District
U.S.D.
General
U.S.D. Debt
Service Fund
Fund
$1.55
1.60
1.66
1.68
1.60
1.60
1.60
1.60
1.60
1.57
1.55
1.55
1.59
1.59

$ .45
.40
.14
.12
.20
.20
.20
.20
.29
.32
.34
.34
.30
.30

(Tax rates are per $100 of assessed valuation.)
Sources: Annual Financial Reports of Metropo1Han Goverr1.ment of Ntishvi11e
June 30, 1973, p. 117; and June 30, 1977, p. 201.
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TABLE 4.3
COMPARISON OF EXPENDITURES IN U.S.D. AND G.S.D. FOR GENERAL FUND AND GENERAL
OBLIGATION BOND DEBT SERVICES: 1963-1964 THROUGH 1976-1977,
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY
Fiscal Period
1963-1964
1964-1965
1965-1966
1966-1967
1967-1968
1968-1969
1969-1970
1970-1971
1971-1972
1972-1973
1973-1974
1974-1975
1975-1976
1976-1977

General Services District
$30,073,129
32,256,977
38,863,788
37,753,508
39,146,600
43,630,483
42,908,700
47,318,561
57,048,217
64,344,839
71,341,449
81,573,736
87,639,850
97,707,949

(71%)
(71%)
(74%)
(74%)
(74%)
(75%)
(74%)
(74%)
(77%)
(78%)
(79%)
(79%)
(77%)
(78%)

Urban Services District
$12,111,008
12,597,125
13,131,044
13,297,791
13,382,455
14,286,741
14,831,946
15,977,993
16,893,433
17,668,691
18,912,650
22,042,908
26,083,372
28,090,458

(29%)
(29%)
(26%)
(26%)
(26%)
(25%)
(26%)
(26%)
(23%)
(22%)
(21%)
(21%)
(23%)
(22%)

Total
$ 42,184,137
44,854,102
51,994,832
51,051,299
52,529,055
57,917,224
57,740,646
63,296,554
73,941,650
82,013,530
90,254,099
103,616,644
113,723,222
125,800,407

(100%)
(100%),
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)

Sources: Annual Financial Reports of Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County, 1963-1964 through 1976-1977.
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be placed upon those services provided in the U.S.D. and available in
the remainder of Metro either through expansion of the U.S.D. or through
extra-U.S.D. arrangements.

Much could be said about the evolution of

G.S.D. services, particularly schools, streets, health care and welfare,
but this would direct attention away from the main thrust:
evolution of the U.S.D.-G.S.D. distinction.

the

It can be noted, though,

that two traditional "priming services," schools and streets, although
as developmentally significant in Metro as in other urban areas, have
been strongly impacted by forces beyond Metro.

The Federal District

Court-supervised school zoning and construction since 1970 has
effectively removed much basic school facility planning flexibility from
Metro's hands. 9 Maj or arterial, -freeway and interstate highway planning
has been a joint state-Metro enterprise, with the state playing a
predominant role.

Additionally, the pattern of Metro's thoroughfare
IO
system was cast well in advance of Metro's birth.
As suggested in
each of the preceding chapters, the developmental consequences of these
decisions have been felt as much beyond Metro's boundaries as within.

The same can be said about the court order to integrate Metro's schools.
To pursue these issues, however, would expand the study to a regional
focus, an expansion for which there is regretfully not enough time or .
space.

9

The court ordered plan was vastly different than the existing
school plan, Schools for 1980 (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning
Commission, 1964).
10See Interstate Controlled-Access Highway System for Nashville
(Nashville: City of Nashville and Davidson County Planning Commissions,
1955) •
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II.

SERVICE PATTERNS

Water and Sewerage Services
It has been pointed out that Nashville and Davidson County's
greatest urban service deficiency has been sanitary sewerage.

The

existence of limestone layers near the surface of the land in the
otherwise ideal urbanization setting along the Cumberland River has
plagued both septic tank performance and the efforts to install sanitary
sewer systems.

This problem was instrumental in the organization of the

Community Services Commission in 1951 and led to the preparation of the
major sanitary sewer plan by the Advance Planning and Research Division
of the Planning Commission in 1955. 11

Figure 4.2 represents the

existing city sewer system in 1955 and the Itproposed system" under the
"immediate program" recommended in the 1955 report.

It can be seen that

the study identified the need to properly sewer areas within the
existing city limits and in those areas "urbanized and adj acent to the
city."

Recalling that this recommendation was prepared along with the

plan for metropolitan government, it should be noted that the staff
concentrated on the engineering requirements for sewering existing
development.

Governmental and financial arrangements were sketched out

with the stated hope that Ita single metropolitan government" would
ultimately implement the sewer plan.

12

It was recommended that

llproposed Public Sanitary Sewer System for the Nashville
Metropolitan Area (Nashville: City of Nashville and Davidson County
Planning Commissions, 1956).
l2proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System, p. 92.
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Existing City
Proposed Sanitary
Sewer Expansion
Figure 4.2.
Source:

Sewered Areas, Existing and
Proposed, 1955.

Proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System.
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financing of trunk construction be by general obligation bonds and
b e by serVlce
.
f ees. 13
·
co 11 ector cons t ruc t lon
Implementation of the sewer plan was immediately caught up in the
conflicts between city and county.

Not only were sewer needs in the

urban area not met adequately by either government, but several
counter-productive facilities were nearly constructed, including a
county prfPosal to construct a sewerage treatment plant just upstream
\
14
from the Cumberland River intake for the city water system.
By 1963, not only had sewer construction lagged within the old
city, but Metro was faced with the need to sewer the 49 square miles
added to the city, comprising the initial U.S.D., during the annexations
prompted by Mayor West (see Figure 2.3, page 71).
sewering these areas other than the 1955 plan.

No plan existed for

The Metro Council, in

its first year, therefore, authorized both the preparation of a U.S.D.
sewer construction plan and subsequently established a water and
sewerage fee-basis for financing sewer extension into the planning area.
In a remarkable effort, sewer extension throughout the U.S.D. was nearly
completed by 1970, as shown in Figure 4.3.
This effort to extend sewerage throughout the U.S.D. was planned
and executed according to engineering and financial considerations
related almost entirely to the goal of servicing the existing U.S.D. as

l3proposed Public Sanitary Sewer System, p. 93.
l4Coomer and Tyer, p. 68.
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(i)'Metro Sewers
~

Other Sewer Systems

Figure 4.3.
Source:

Sewered Areas, 1970.

Analyzing Suburban Development.

139
determined by the Department of Water and Sewerage Services. IS
Although consideration was allowed for treatment capacity to service
future development within drainage areas already undergoing urban growth,
sewer planning considerations during the entire period since 1963 did
not include a concern for influencing the staging and timing of
development . . Where growth was underway, particularly subidivision
development, and where drainage and other engineering considerations
were more suited to sewer construction than other areas of the suburban
fringe, there was a greater likelihood that sewer construction would
16
occur earlier.
Where expansions of the U.S.D. had not occurred, such
construction was undertaken by either sewer districts or by developers
under arrangements whereby facilities were deeded to Metro when Metro
17
trunks became accessib1e.
With the exception of the modest efforts to
use subdivision regulations to require sewer facility installation
within the "urban planning area," these arrangements for providing
sewers beyond U.S.D. boundaries resulted from decisions to develop based
on criteria viewed as important by private developers, not any
consideration of comprehensive planned development.

This situation

contributed heavily to the fact that in 1972, 72% of the developed,

15patrick Healy and Raymond Bancroft, "Three Mayors Review Their
Governments," Nations Cities (November, 1969), p. 26.
16"The Process of Urbanization and Timing of the Provision of a full
range of Municipal Services," (unpublished memorandum, Metropolitan
Planning Commission, May, 1978).
17See A Preliminary Report on Problems and Issues of Land
Subdivision in Davidson County (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning
Commission, 1977).
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non-U.S.D. land was not served by sanitary sewers.

18

The public cost of

this ordering of priorities included large-scale, low density suburban
development in areas where ultimate provision of sewer services would
prove to be very costly; development in areas where other services, such
as transportation, would be less than adequate; and development which
would be crisscrossed in succeeding years with construction projects
providing services to newer developments for which service capacity had
not been provided.
A sweet and sour ingredient in sewer service within Metro has been
the provision for the existence of public and private service districts
within the G.S.D. to provide "special services" where they are "needed"
and cannot be provided as a package of "substantial urban services
C].' . e . , U•S•D. expans].·on) .,,19

The revision of the original Metro

enabling legislation to permit such districts proved beneficial in that
it provided a means for constructing sewer lines and self-contained
treatment facilities in rapidly growing and well-established suburban
fringe areas where immediate U.S.D. extension was not feasible.
Figure 4.3 indicates the location of these districts circa 1972, prior
to extensions of the U.S.D.
At least three significant problems can be related to these
non-Metro service districts.

First, the existence of the districts

l8Ana1yzing Suburban Development (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning
Commission, 1973).
19Frank I. Michelman and Terrance Sandalow, 1972 Supplement To
Government in Urban Areas (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1972),
p. 237.
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reduced the impact of any attempt to manage Metro development in the
suburban fringe through subdivision regulations requiring extensive
service provisions, especially sewer connections.

Second, the standards

used during the installation and maintenance of service facilities
provided by the districts may well have been below those of Metro,
requiring Metro, in future years, to undertake large-scale upgrading and
renovation of services in areas ultimately brought into the U.S.D.
Finally, U.S.D,. expansion into areas served by such districts raises
tedious and costly legal issues.

Acquisition of assets and liabilities

of such districts plagues U.S.D. expansion in the same way it does any
20
city annexing an area including such districts.
In summary, the
existence of these service districts within the G.S.D. provided
short-range benefits and long-range problems.

From the developmental

perspective of this study, the latter were more significant than the
former.
Much of what has just been said is also true of water service
throughout Metro since its beginning.

Although water service was

available throughout far more of the G.S.D. than was sewer service,
much of it was provided through 2-inch mains, which limited both
fire-protection potential and the capacity for system growth to meet
new demands.

2l

Following consolidation, some 569,340 feet of 2-inch

20See The Tennessean, March 1, 1978, for a statement by Farris A.
Deep, Executive Director, Metropolitan Planning Commission, making this
point.
2lAnalyzing Suburban Development, pp. 28ff.
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water line had to be replaced with larger mains within the Iinew ll U.S.D.
for fire protection reasons alone. 22

Figure 4.4 indicates the extent of

water service as well as the location on non-Metro water systems.

The

expansion of water service by the private districts raises the same
developmental issues pointed out in the case of non-Metro sewer systems.
With the exception of some increased expense in laying water line
through areas of near-surface limestone, water supply throughout Metro
has not been plagued with difficult engineering or source problems.
Shortages in supply have been related to treatment facility capacities,
not the Cumberland River source.
As has already been stated, water and sewer services throughout
Metro have been financed by revenue-bond issues sustained by user
charges.

The service charge system of finance not only separated the

massive construction effort from Metro's general obligation bond
structure but it also dealt with the question of equity--particularly
since such a large portion of the U.S.D. required servicing and
obviously could not receive services within "reasonable" time had
ad valorem taxation been used. 23 Politically, the user charge method
was acceptable as long as'sewer and water service extension was rapid,
extensive, and generally in moderately dense areas with little
skip-development.

This certainly was the case in the lO-year, 150

million dollar effort to service the U.S.D. with sewers after
.
24
conso l 1'dat1on.

As trunk lines were extended into lower density areas,

22Coomer and Tyer, p. 69.
24Coomer and Tyer, pp. 68-71.

23Hawk'1ns I nterv1ew.
.
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U.S.D.
_

Metro Water

~ Other Water Systems

Figure 4.4.
Source:

Water Services, 1970.

Analyzing Suburban Development.
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particularly as a consequence of the U.S.D. expansions after 1972,
residents already receiving U.S.D. sewer services began to resist the
increased water and sewer charges necessary to fund expansion into areas
with less revenue potential.
increased connection fees.

Among the solutions promoted were greatly
As so many times

occurs~

a plan to avoid one

set of political problems eventually opened the way for another set of
public concerns.
The existence of a user-charge financial base for water and sewer
construction reinforced the potential for such services to be extended
with little coordination with other developmental considerations.
Concern for this potential is clear in a letter written by Irving Hand
and included in one of the first studies of the impact of water and
sewer services upon urban development:
With the establishment of Metropolitan Government last
April (4/1/63), immediate steps were taken to examine the
entire policy framework and rate structure concerning the
provision of water and sewer service. This study is presently
under way, under the auspices of the Water and Sewerage
Services Department. A third party contract was entered into
with the Chester Engineering Company, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
for this work. The Planning Commission is serving in an
advisory capacity.
It is important that the policy framework within which the
Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Services Department operates
be coordinated with the planning considerations of the overall
community. Even in Nashville, this requires constant
attention and consideration. We are using the Capital
Improvements Budget and Program as an additional vehicle to
effect this coordination. However, this relationship could be
considerably tighter.
Water and sewer services are key elements in land
development in this community. A "bullish" operating department can play hell with the urban form. By using revenue
bonds and service charges, the illusion is rendered that these
facilities become self-supporting. Perhaps so. But the
impact on the community can be in terms of other costs of
significant proportion.
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We generally require the approval of the Metropolitan
Health Department as to individual water supply facilities •..
Lot areas of 40,000 square feet or less, to be served by
private sewage disposal facilities, similarly require the
approval of the Metropolitan Health Department. This worked
for awhile, but developers soon learned to go over that
minimum for land that did not percolate. As a result, we have
mile after mile of low density residential development for
which other community services must be made available. This
is confronting Metropolitan Government with some very varying
levels of service to be formulated in relation to varying
densities of development. Street lights, sidewalks, storm
drainage, schools and their service areas and parks and
recreation areas are among those involved.
I feel that water and sewer extension policies are crucial
to decisions concerning land development and the urban form.
I feel that this approach has met with limited success. This
result is not necessarily the fault of limited use of such
policies alone but rather the extent to which planning as such
has not received meaningful application. A strong planning
program, in all of its aspects, will provide an atmosphere
within which appropriate water and sewer service policies may
be formulated and applied. 25
Each clause in Hand's final sentence emphasized the concerns for
coordinated and planned service extension shared by planners in the
1950's as well as those of the 1960's, and later in the 1970's, as will
be seen throughout the pages of this study.
Other U.S.D. Services
Most Metro observers would probably agree that provision of storm
sewers throughout the U.S.D. has been the Metro service goal most
seriously neglected.

Even with the construction of new sanitary sewers

throughout the "new l! portion of the U.S.D., some 340 miles of combined

25Kenneth B. Kenney, "Public Policy Alternatives Affecting Water
and Sewer Service Growth in Urban Growth Areas," (unpublished Masters
thesis, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1964), pp. 198-199.
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.
26
sanitary and storm sewers remained in the "old" U.S.D.

Planning

studies of U.S.D. expansion conceded that storm sewer objectives in new
U.S.D. areas would have to be limited to "major stream improvements" and
correction of problems were "major nuisances" and/or "major damage"
. 1 eX1ste.
.
d 27 Th e f act that storm sewer provisions
. would have to
potent1a
have been financed by property tax revenues coupled with the high cost
estimates of providing storm sewers throughout the U.S.D. supported the
consensus that the U.S.D. could not afford a massive extension of storm
sewers.

Attention to storm drainage, therefore, was limited to thpse

areas where serious flooding problems existed or to locations where
outside funding was avilable, such as urban renewal and urban
28
redevelopment areas.
During the same period that sewer and water services were being
extended throughout the initial U.S.D., fire protection at a Class III
level of service existed.

While 2-inch mains were being upgraded.

tanker service was available.

By 1971. one study pointed out that full

fire protection services were available throughout the U.S.D. with an
average !.response time of 3.2 minutes. 29

The extension of Metro fire

protection into areas of potential U.S.D. expansion. however, was

26

How Well Is Metro Doing? (Nashville: Metropolitan Government of
Nashville-Davidson County, Department of Finance, 1976), p. 30.
t 27Urban Services District Expansion Study (Nashville: Metropolitan
Planning Commission, 1967), pp. 8 and 13.

28 Ibid .
29How Well is Metro Doing? p. 24.
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limited by the availability of water.

Figure 4.5, based upon a 1972

Metropolitan Planning Commission study, indicates fire protection
provided by non-Metro services as well as areas of deficient water
·
f'19ht1ng
.
nee d s. 30
supp 1y f or f 1re

Th e 1na
. dequacy 0 f f'1re protect10n
.

outside the U.S.D. became a growing political issue, particularly as
U.S.D. services became complete toward the end of Mayor Briley's second
term (1971).

The perception in urbanized, non-U.S.D. areas ,that Metro's

service "catch-up" period in the U.S.D. was ending, coupled with
periodic fires in the G.S.D.

wher~

it was felt that, had Metro responded,

damage would have been less, gave rise to growing pressure for Metro
fire protection extension.

The tempting political response was to

promise Metro fire protection throughout the G.S.D., but without U.S.D.
expansion.

This modification in the U.S.D.-G.S.D. service package was

initially resisted successfullY by Metropolitan Planning Commission and
others who pointed first to the deficiencies in water supply throughout
much of the G.S.D. and second to the fact that less than full fire
protection in the non-U.S.D. areas might threaten the existing Class III
rating in the U.S.D. 31

Although not publicly discussed, planners also

were concerned that transfer of fire protection to the G.S.D. service
package would lessen the distinction between the U.S.D. and G.S.D.,
therefore limiting any future efforts to manage urban development

30Plans for Fire Protection Service (Nashville: Metropolitan
Planning Commission, 1972).
3l Ibid .
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U.S.D.
Metro Fire Facility
Private Fire Facility

Figure 4.5.
Source:

Fire Services, 1972.
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through control of U.S.D. expansion.

32

Metropolitan Planning

Commission's major recommendation linked the expansion of Metro fire
protection to expansion of the U.S.D.

The 1972 study of fire protection

emphasized engine company expansion tied to U.S.D. expansion priorities
published about the same time. 33
The political pressures for Metro fire protection throughout the
G.S.D. grew, however, and when Richard Fulton ran to succeed the
retiring Briley as Mayor in 1975, he grasped the issue and promised the
extension of Metro fire protection throughout Metro.

Although

significant expansion of fire protection service was already mandated
due to expansions of the U.S.D., as noted below, there remained difficult
fire service planning issues in providing Metro service in areas with
inadequate water supply.

Nevertheless, on July 1, 1978, Metro

implemented G.S.D. fire protection with a mixture of new fire stations,
temporary fire stations, tankers and equipment purchased from previously
..
.
. f'1re serV1ce
.
d'1str1cts.
.
34
eX1st1ng
pr1vate
an d pub 11C

This action

represented the only formal shift in the allocation of Metro services
between the G.S.D. and U.S.D. since Metro's inception.
Although trmore intensive" police protection was allocated to the
U.S.D. in the Metro Charter, it has already been pointed out that both

32Interview with Robert Paslay, Planning Director, Metropolitan
Planning Commission, September, 1977.
33Plans for Fire Protection Service; Expanding Urban Services
(Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1972).
34
The Tennessean, July 1, 1978.
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service-wise and budget-wise. Metro police protection has become a
35
G.S.D. function.
Initial attempts to define U.S.D. police protection
as including "more intensive traffic patrols, walking patrols and crime
prevention efforts" were recognized by city officials as less than
accurate. 36

By the mid-1970's. Metro police protection had become a

"de facto" G.S.D. service with additional U.S.D. service existing only
in a "de jure" sense.
Solid waste collection was quickly extended throughout the U.S.D.
upon Metro's birth.

Both regular garbage collection and residential

"chipper truck ll (yard refuse disposal) services have been provided
throughout the entire U.S.D.

Financed by U.S.D. property taxes. the

services have been performed with relatively little controversy. 37
U.S.D. expansion proposals, however, have raised the issue of garbage
pick up in several ways.

The inadequacy of many private garbage

services has been a rallying point for many non-U.S.D. residents to
demand U.S.D. services.

Second, the legal problems of acquisition of

private garbage collection investments, upon U.S.D. expansion, have
posed intricate issues for Metro.

U.S.D. expansion in 1975 and 1976

resulted in at least one lawsuit, finally settled when Metro agreed to
purchase the assets of eight private garbage haulers. 38 Third,

35Horton Interview; Urban Services District Expansion Study, p. 7;
Expanding Urban Services. p. 7.
36Horton I nterv1ew;
Pas 1ay I nterv1ew.
.
.
37 How Well Is Metro Doing? pp. 34-35.
38The Tennessean, January 21, 1978.
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increasing costs of solid waste disposal, a G.S.D. function, have
caused sometimes controversial increases in fees charged to private
garbage haulers for dumping privileges at Metro land-fill sites as well
as the Thermal Transfer Corporation facility, a Metro-based solidwaste-energy production operation.
The remaining U.S.D. services. such as street lighting and various
regulatory functions, have posed few problems during Metro's evolution.
The low relative cost of such services coupled with the speed with which
they have been extended throughout the U.S.D. minimize their significance in the developmental considerations surrounding U.S.D. expansion.
III.

U.S.D. EXPANSION:

PLANNING PROPOSALS

The cumulative impact ,of the preceding comments on the condition of
U.S.D. services during the first few years following Metro's birth
reinforces the view that Metro was preoccupied with the !1catch-up"
service requirements within the U.S.D.

Toward the end of the 1960's, a

condition quite similar to that of the 1950's began to emerge:

a

relatively well-serviced urban area (the U.S.D.) was surrounded by an
increasingly urbanized area with significant service deficiencies,
particularly sewer and fire protection.

In recognition of these

deficiencies. MPC, in 1967, published the first formal proposal to
expand the U.S.D.

Prompted by both political pressures to service

unbanized G.S.D. areas and planning staff recommendations to press on
with actions to consolidate and centralize service delivery throughout
the urbanized area (first articulated in the Community Services
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Commission report in 1952), Mayor Briley initiated the planning study
in 1966.
In their first study of U.S.D. extension. MPC staff operated within
the following U.S.D. expansion framework:
1.

"Most of the urban services now provided in the present Urban·
Services District are at a sufficient level to permit
expansion" (with the exception of storm drainage and assuming a
1970 completion of sanitary sewer expansion);39

2.

Urban Services will continue to follow. not lead development;
"one of the primary objectives of local government is to
provide appropriate services to the urbanized sections of the
community . . . unfortunately, areas become urbanized and have
need of services well before government is able to supply
them

3.

,

II.

A continuing issue of U.S.D. expansion will be service and
revenue equity--both within the expansion area and between the
expansion area and the existing U.S.D.; and

4.

Some reasonable variation in the level of U.S.D. service
delivery can be related to the type and extent of development
.
serve d •40
b e~ng

The same planning issue-areas thus faced MPC in 1966 as faced the
framers of the original U.S.D. concept:

financial, legal. administrative.

39Urban Services District Expansion Study, p. 2.
40Urban Services District Expansion Study, p. 14.
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political and engineering priorities had to be ranked and distilled into
a recommended plan of action.

As concluded in the second chapter of

this study, the U.S.D. concept was conceived from a mixture of financial
and engineering considerations accompanied by administrative reorganization (consolidation) and adequate doses of legal and political savvy.
The first attempt to implement U.S.D. extension carefully dealt with the
financial, engineering, administrative and legal details contained
within the four-point framework, but fell short in consideration of the
political details.
The first point of the expansion framework was the conclusion that,
at least by 1970, and with the exception of storm sewers, the existing
U.S.D. was to have been adequately serviced.
summarized the basis for this conclusion.

The preceding pages have

One implication of this

conclusion was that financially, the U.S.D. could be expanded within a
context of predictable debt service.

Administratively, Metro had

consolidated service delivery throughout the U.S.D. into the appropriate
agencies, such as the Department of Water and Sewerage Services.

From

an engineering perspective, provision of services throughout the U.S.D.
had partially raised Metro's capacity to expand services.

Although not

fully adequate, sewerage treatment and water supply capacities had
increased significantly between 1963 and 1967. 41

Legally, the issue of

equity between existing and proposed U.S.D. areas was diminished.
Finally, it appeared logical to assume that political opposition from

41U r b an SerVlces
.
D'lstrlct
.
Expanslon
.
S tu d y, pp. 18 - 19 .
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existing U.S.D. areas would be minimal, given the relative high levels
42
of satisfaction with Metro services that were continually reported.
Not fully entered into the political calculus, however, was the
potential impact of U.S.D. expansion upon tax rates and user charges.
Several planners and engineers would certainly liked to have
reversed the second expansion assumption, but recognized the futility of
pursuing the notion that

~U.S.D.

expansion policies might significantly

influence future development patterns.

There was certainly no political

mileage in this perspective, and there were strong fiscal and legal
arguments to support the "foHowingll strategy.
The final two issues, those of equity and service variation
received much attention.

The legal consequences of U.S.D. expansion

based fiscal and physical service provision criteria was a continuing
..
concern. 43 Th e t1m1ng

0f

new taxes was of concern.

.
...
serV1ce
prov1s1on
W1t h t he f'1rst due date

0f

Although less pressing, the timing of

user-free financed water and sewer services was also significant.
Although it might be said that legal concerns for service and tax
inequities would also involve political and administrative considerations, such is not necessarily the case.

MPC's general methods in its

first attempt to plan U.S.D. extension made this quite clear.

42See Robert E. McArthur, The Impact of Metropolitan Government on
the Rural-Urban Fringe: The Nashville-Davidson County Experience
(Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, 1971); Dan
Grant, "Opinions Surveyed on Nashville Metro." National Civic Review
(July, 1965), pp. 375-377.
43Urban Services District Expansion Study, pp. 16-17.
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The method used by MPC in the 1967 U.S.D. expansion study can be
roughly outlined as follows:
1.

Identification of urban service need by documenting stage of
urbanization and service provision in relatively large planning
units adjacent to existing U.S.D.;

2.

Combining of areas in need of urban services according to
drainage area and fire service (engine company) criteria; and

3.

Recommended sequencing and timing for inclusion of areas into
U.S.D. according to fiscal, administrative and legal criteria.

Phases one and two resulted in a list of 11 areas recommended for
inclusion in the U.S.D. (see Figure 4.6).44

Phase three led to an

outline of a "fast schedule ll (four year) and a "slow schedule" (eight
year) of expansion.

Following a review of the fiscal impacts of each

schedule, the study concluded that the three (3¢) cent increase in the
U.S.D. property tax rate projected from the IIfast schedule" was a small
price to pay for the more rapid servicing of the existing development
adjacent to the U.S.D. at that time.

45

Table 4.4 summarizes the 11

proposed expansion districts according to the characteristics developed
during each phase of the expansion study.
It is important to underscore the point that in this first U.S.D.
expansion study the MPC staff was not responding to some hidden political
agenda.

They simply explored the various U.S.D. expansion alternatives

44Urban Services District Expansion Study. p. 25.
4SUrban Services District Expansion Study. pp. 37-38.
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Figure 4.6.
Source:

Recommended Annexation Areas,
1967 Study.

U.S.D. Expansion Study.

TABLE 4.4

I

URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT EXPANSION AREA CHARACTERISTICS, 1967 PROPOSAL,
METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE-DAVIDSON COUNTY

~p

Area
Bordeaux
Haynes
Parkwood
Madison
Inglewood
Donelson-West
Donelson-East
Tusculum
Crieve Hall
West Meade
Brookmeade
Source:

Code
1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
10
11

Dwelling Units
Eer Gross Acre

D.U. per Gross
Acre on
Sel2tic Tanks

Proposed Year
of Inclusion
(Fast Schedule~

Cost/Revenue
ImEact

Proposed Year
of Inclusion
(Slow Schedu1e~

Cost/Revenue
ImEact

.34
.38
.72
.68
2.11
.74
.94
.70
1.33
.66
.71

.67
.63
.94
.98
2.00
1. 20
1.35
1.07
1.05
.51
.71

1970
1970
1970
1969
1967
1968
1968
1969
1969
1969
1968

$-241,600
-154,900
-204,300
-183,250
-215,350
- 90,200
-171,800
-149,800
- 54,750
-225,550
+ 42,600

1974
1974
1973
1971
1967
1969
1969
1972
1972
1970
1968

$-238,700
-129,100
-204,300
-179,850
-215,350
- 64 ,800
-169,000
-137,900
54,750
-225,550
+ 42,600

Urban Services District Expansion Study, Metropolitan Planning Commission, March, 1967.
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within the existing service and development framework-that of servicing
already urbanized areas.

In this context, the staff only loosely held

to the "packaging" of their recommendation implied by the sequencing of
expansion according to a Itfast" or "slow" program.
was not received with the same flexibility.46

The study, however,

The Metropolitan Council

member from the Inglewood area opposed the expansion and was able to
block the proposed Inglewood inclusion into the U.S.D.

His action, in

response to his constituents' concerns over the potential U.S.D.-caused
tax increase, was generally interpreted as blocking further action on
the remainder of the proposed extensions.

As one planner involved in

the issue stated, "there was no organized force actively pushing
extension, tl so the misperception of the "packaged" nature of the
proposal was allowed to block any further action once the initial
obstacle had been encountered.

47

. With no real force in the Council to

bolster the MPC recommendations, the plan died with the defeat of the
ordinance tied to the Inglewood expansion.

The Mayor, whose general

interest in extension of urban services had prompted the initial study,
was unwilling to spend any specific political capital to press for
particular extensions once the Council had defeated the first proposal.
Thus, because of the political forces (or lack of them) which surfaced
in the first attempt to extend the U.S.D., the boundaries were not
changed.

46Interview with Joseph R. Haas, Director, Research Division,
Metropolitan Planning Commission, June, 1978; Paslay Interview.
47Haas I nterv1ew.
.
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In 1971, several things did change.

The need for urban services,

especially sewer and fire protection, in the belt around the existing
U.S.D., emerged as issues in Council and Mayoral elections.

Acting on

general campaign promises, the reelected Briley again requested MPC to
prepare an expansion study of the U.S.D.

In March 1972, MPC produced

its second such study, Expanding Urban Services.

In conveying the study

to the Council, Briley was forceful:
. . A similar expansion program was prepared five years ago,
and an ordinance putting that program into effect was unsuccessful. The fact that no appreciable expansion of urban
services has occurred since the inception of Metropolitan
Government is most disappointing. The backlog of need for
urban services continues to grow, making the delay in Urban
Services District expansion less tolerable. 48
In preparing the 1972 study recommendations, MPC both relied on updated
census and land use data and altered its strategy of presentation. 49
The more recent data increased MPC's perception of the extent of service
need in the urban belt around the U.S.D., leading to enlarged expansion
areas, particularly Bordeaux, Parkwood, Old Hickory and Hermitage.
Figure 4.7 presents the 1972 expansion study recommendation.
describes the areas recommended for U.S.D. expansion.

Table 4.5

It should be

noted that the "percent developed'! refers to gross land development.
consideration is given to the "developable" portion of each area.

No

It is

diffioult to determine the extent to which undeveloped but developable
land was to be included in these extensions.

48

Letter, Mayor Briley to Vice-Mayor David Scobey, March 27, 1972.

49Expanding Urban Services, pp. 1-2.
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Figure 4.7.
Source:

Recommended Annexation Areas,
1972 Study.

Expanding Urban Services.

TABLE 4.5
URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT EXPANSION AREA CHARACTERISTICS, 1972 PROPOSAL,
METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE-DAVIDSON COUNTY

Area

Code

Bordeaux
Parkwood
Pages Branch
Inglewood
Madison
Old Hickory
Hermitage
Donelson West
Donelson East
Crieve Hall-Tusculum
West Meade-Brookmeade

1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
10
11

Percent
Developed
36.3
39.2
54.0
72 .6
63.4
. 49.2
22.8
61.1
49.6
55.5
77.2

Percent
Residential Acres/
Develo12ed Acres
29.8
34.0
39.8
66.7
50.5
24.3
16.9
47.2
41.9
49.7
60.3

Gross
Residential
P012ulation
11 ,905
11,745
5,478
18,967
20,943
4,554
9,592
16,192
6,174
29,653
12,368

Densit~

Total Annual
012erating Costs*

1. 33
1.41
2.94
7.96
3.24
1. 73
1.11
2.64
2.21
2.65
1.89

$ 682,000
518,100
284,600
392,200
1,080,900
286,600
488,400
734,900
459,800
1,114,800
608,700

*Fire Protection; Refuse Collection; Street Lights; Storm Drainage.
Source:

Expanding Urban Services, Metropolitan Planning Commission, March, 1972.
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MPC's altered strategy of presenting its recommendations is
partially reflected in Table 4.5.

No attempt was made to "package" the

sequence and timing of extension.

Further, revenue projections from

increased U.S.D. tax collections were not explicitly included in the
report.

The staff view was that a large area of urban, primarily

residential, development existed, and was growing without adequate urban
,

serv~ces,

'd
1'
50
par t'~cu 1ar 1y sewerage, f'1re protect1on
an gar bage co1ect10n.

They wanted the 1972 report to simply be a breakdown of this area by
sewer drainage and fire service criteria with no overt suggestion of
sequence of expansion.

liThe differences in need were not as great as
51
the need to get started."
They, in effect, gave the Council a
"shopping list," hoping that political realities might produce a buyer
(or two).

In fact, pressures in Bordeaux, particularly, had been
52
building for solutions to septic tank failures.
It is perhaps more
than ironic that the map makers started their numbering of the expansion
areas with Bordeaux.

After receiving assurances that U.S.D. tax

supported services could be extended within one year after the first
taxes fell due, as required in the Charter, and being exposed to the
Water and Sewerage Services Department I s need to expand into new
revenue areas, the Council backed the Bordeaux representative's request
for inclusion and, on December 24, 1972, "Bordeaux-Haynes" became the
first major addition to the U.S.D. (see Figure 4.8).53

SOH aas I nterv1ew
.
52
Paslay Interview.

5l Ibid .
53Metropolitan Ordinance 72-308.
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Figure 4.8.

Urban Services District Expansions,
1972-1978.

Source:

Metropolitan Planning Commission.
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As a proposal for extension of the U.S.D., the 1972 study in many
ways was an ongoing extension of the urban services reports going back
to the Community Services Report of 1952.

It

was a "minimum standard'!

document outlining already developed areas, primarily residential, where
urban services were deficient.

Politically, the planners had to wait

for the proper mixture of public concern for service problems and
willingness to pay both additional property taxes (the U.S.D. rate) and
water and sewer charges.

The mixture was influenced by the residents'

perceived offsets from these taxes and charges caused by previous
private and service-district charges, higher fire insurance rates and so
on.

From the Council's perspective, Council members with substantial

U.S.D. constituencies had to be certain that political, as well as legal,
equity in service delivery would exist after expansion.

This was

particularly important since few, if any, of the proposed expansions
would pay their own way.54

In the case of Bordeaux-Haynes, the critical

mixture was finally reached.
IV.

U.S.D. EXPANSION:

ACTUAL

Figure 4.8 and Table 4.6 present the growth of the U.S.D. in the
five years following the publication of the 1972 study and the first
significant expansion of the boundaries since Metro's birth.

Ultimately,

the expansion doubled the area of the U.S.D. and increased the
population by some 50%.
it had in Bordeaux.

Pressure for expansion emerged in much the way

The second extension, Crieve Hall-Tusculum,

54Horton Interview.
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TABLE 4.6
URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT EXPANSIONS, METROPOLITAN
NASHVILLE-DAVIDSON COUNTY

Name

Map
Code

ExEansion Date

Population
(1970 Census)

Bordeaux-Haynes
Crieve Ha11-Tuscu1um
Golden Valley
Beacon Square
North of Bordeaux
Madison-Inglewood
Donelson
Hillwood
Opry1and

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Dec. 24, 1972
Nov. 21, 1973
Aug. 20, 1975
May 7, 1976
June 24, 1976
Jan. 1, 1977
Jan. 1, 1977
Jan. 1, 1977
Dec. 29, 1977

14,551
37,260
15
311
1,322
28,743
24,981
13,898
27

Summary of U.S.D. Growth
U.S.D. Area Prior to 1972
Area Added by U.S.D. Expansion
U.S.D. Area, Jan. 1, 1978

72.0 square miles
78.7 square miles
150.7 square miles

U.S.D. Population Prior to 1972 (1970 Census)
Population Added by U.S.D. Expansion
U.S.D. Population Including U.S.D. Expansion Areas

231,649
121,408
353,057
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resulted from particular concerns over fire service in the area.

The

area was also the location of rather active subdivision development
along with apartment complex construction.

Existing and potential

health and safety problems were perceived by a significant segment of
the residents to create pressure for U.S.D. extension.

The near absence

of fire protection and the continuing performance problems of the First
Suburban Utility District (water and sewer) were of greatest concern.

55

As with the Bordeaux addition, the Department of Public Works and the
Fire Department provided guarantees of services within a year after the
first U.S.D. tax payments were due (which worked out to be 1975).

The

Department of Water and Sewerage Services was still in a search for
revenue and indicated a capacity to upgrade and expand the limited
sewerage service provided by the First Suburban District.
The remaining U.S.D. extensions can be lumped into three categories.
First, there were three relatively "little extensions" after the Crieve
Hall-Tusculum addition.

The Golden Valley and Beacon Square additions

resulted from developer requests for urban services to serve proposed
apartment complexes in each area.

Given the likelihood that U.S.D.

extension would ultimately occur, the developers saw fit to press for
the timing of services with development to permit high density housing
for which there were no existing sanitary sewers or fire protection.
Subdivision development in the North of Brodeaux area provided similar
pressures for U.S.D. extension there.

It is interesting to note that in

55 An a 1yZ1ng
.
Su burb an 0eve 1 opment, p. 31 .
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all three cases, absence of critical services at even a "minimum
standard" level for high density development forced the developers to
seek Urban Services District boundary modification before proceeding
with their plans.

The potential revenue impact of such extension was

appealing to the Council, especially given the fact that adjacent low
density residential areas either had or would soon have U.S.D. services.
If there were any concerns for "managing" such development, they
certainly didn't surface before the Council. 56
The second group was typical of the type of annexation recommended
in the 1972 study and was begun in the case of Bordeaux:

relatively

well-developed residential areas with varying overlays of relatively
poor urban services.

The ultimate boundaries of each of the three

expansions were determined by the general boundaries

~n

the corresponding

1972 recommended areas modified by the "normal political zig-zagging and
line-drawing" by Council members as they responded to various constit57
uent interests.
The Madison-Inglewood area did not extend as far
north as initially projected in 1972, but the Donelson and Hil1wood
(West Meade-Brookmeade) additions generally did conform.

Some Metro

sewer services already existed but septic tanks were predominant in each
area.

Metro water supply existed in most of the areas, with the

exception of that portion of Madison-Inglewood supplied by the Madison
Suburban Utility District.

Private fire services were scattered

throughout the areas.

56Haas I ntervlew.
.

57 Ibid .
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Positive

Co~ci1

action on the three extensions was facilitated by

the continuing view that service extension into these areas was needed
and, perhaps more significantly, could be provided by Metro without
negatively impacting the existing U.S.D.

Indeed, as Table 4.2 (page 132)

outlines, U.S.D. tax rates were not increased as a consequence of these
annexations.

(This should not be taken to mean that the extensions were

self-supporting; the previously-mentioned shift to increased G.S.D.
expenditures combined with new non-tax U.S.D. revenues from fees,
federal funds and state tax allocations contributed to the stability of
58
the U.S.D. rate.
Although precise data has not .been found, i t is
generally accepted that only the midd1e-to-upper inc·ome area of Hillwood
provided a net increase in U.S.D. property tax revenues, as first
suggested in the 1967 U.S.D. expansion study.)
The third, and most recent, U.S.D. expansion category is occupied
solely by the Opryland extension.
this became the most controversial.

Of all the U.S.D. extension proposals,
Beginning in the late 1960's the

northwestern portion of Pennington Bend had been undergoing development
as a theme park-tourist complex, primarily by the National Life and
Accident Insurance Company in the Opryland Complex.

Claiming that it

had been assured that the area would remain only in the G.S.D., National
Life provided its own internal fire protection, sewerage and solid waste
59
disposal systems.
(Opryland was excluded from the 1972 West Donelson

58Horton Interview.
59Interview with staff attorney, National Life and Accident
Insurance Company, March, 1978.
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U.S.D. extension area.)

By 1975, however, the revenue potential of

including Opryland in the U.S.D. combined with a desire not to have a
non-U.S.D. island should the Donelson area be brought into the U.S.D.,
placed pressure on both planners and Council members to include Opryland
60
in the U.S.D.
Opryland was therefore included in the package to be
brought into the U.S.D. on January 1, 1977.

Upon favorable Council

action, National Life attorneys filed suit, claiming that the
"annexation" was "unreasonable," in that Opryland already provided the
services that were a part of the U.S.D. service package. 6l

The suit was

filed pursuant to Tennessee's annexation law, which, as will be recalled
from Chapter I I, governs the basic ,procedure for expansion of the U.S.D.
The Tennessee law is very much oriented toward the municipality (in this
case, the U.S.D.), and any doubt over "reasonableness" is decided in
favor of the annexing city or town.

It was not at all surprising, then,

when the court ruled in favor of Metro and Opryland was ordered to
62
become a part of the U.S.D. on December 29, 1977.
The same law which
extends the city an advantage in annexation, however, also declares that
while an annexation case is undergoing adjudication, any taxes
associated with annexation cannot become due, nor can they become due
until one year following judicial settlement of the issue, as required

60Haas I nterv1ew.
.
6lNational Life and Accident Insurance Company Interview.
62The Tennessean, December 30, 1977.
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in the normal arrangement for a schedule of services.

63

In the case of

Opry1and, as with the other U.S.D. extensions, this schedule of services
was actually an amendment to the six-year capital budget document
listing and scheduling the appropriate capital investments required to
service the area.

It seems fairly clear that National Life's suit was

filed primarily to save at least one year of U.S.D. tax payments, not to
attempt to remain outside the U.S.D.6 4
V.

CONCWSIONS

This chapter has reviewed the evolution in Metro of the delivery of
those services contained in the initial U.S.D. service package.

The

approach taken has included both an examination of specific services and
a discussion of proposed and actual extensions of the U.S.D. boundaries.
Two conclusions drawn from the former form the basis for the conclusions
made from the latter.

The first is not surprising, given the contents

of the preceding two chapters:

delivery of urban services in Metro has

been a continual case of following and trying to catch-up with
development in the urban-rural border area.

Even the review of the

U.S.D. service most widely available prior to or concommitant with
development, water, suggests that (1) little or no coordination between
water line location and other planning concerns existed, and (2) the

63Victor C. Hobday and Eugene Puett, Annexation Handbook for Cities
and Towns in Tennessee (Knoxville: Municipal Technical Advisory Service,
1975), pp. 25-26.
64This conclusion has been drawn by the author from the interviews
cited above.
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bulk of the water mains put down beyond city or U.S.D. boundaries were
inadequate for fire protection services.

For other U.S.D. services. the

time lag between development and service delivery was significant.
The second conclusion to be drawn from the review of services is
that only modest coordination of service planning and delivery has
existed within Metro.

Using Irving Hand's terms. the capital budgeting

process has "tightened up" only a little and the primary planning for
water and sewer extension has been carried out almost entirely by the
Department of Water and Sewerage Services with the assistance of
engineering-oriented, third-party consultants.

Even where MPC had been

active in attempting to relate service extension to a range of urban
development issues, political considerations intervened.

Such was the

case with the recent decision to extend Metro fire protection countywide.
The pattern of relatively non-coordinated service extension
following urbanization logically meshes with the way in which U.S.D.
boundary extension issues have evolved.

A "rationally-prepared" plan

for U.S.D. expansion failed for lack of significant political interest.
Only when a second version of the plan was incrementally relevant to
political interests of both residents and service-supplying departments
did extension take place.

As one of Metro's designers stated, "I was

disappointed that U.S.D. expansion was not handled in a more positive
65
way."
His view was shared by another participant in Metro's birth,
"the biggest failure of Metro has been the failure to expand the U. S. D.

65Hawkins Interview.·
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until just recently. 66

In both cases, the views expressed were not

based on an idealized vision of "growth management" in Metro.

They were,

rather, built on the initial hope that "U.S.O. expansion be used to time
and coordinate the extension of urban services in order to save money
and raise the standard of urban development."

67

What appears as a

rather simple statement contains within it all the issues which have
been struggled with by Metro-oriented planners since 1952 and which
reflect the tension between a planning dream of seriously influencing
the shape and efficiency of Metro's physical development and yet working
within an environment where few political resources for such a
perspective exist.

66Interview with Dr. Lee S. Greene, January, 1978.
67Hawk'1ns I nterv1ew.
.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE
EXPERIENCE:

MESSAGES FOR PLANNERS

As is often true in drawing conclusions from a case study. two
levels of summary are in order.

The first. and more obvious. considers

the interplay of consolidated government. the Urban and General Services
District distinction, and the evolving framework for urban development
in Metropolitan Nashville.

The second. and more difficult, relates the

conclusions drawn from the Metro study to the broader interests of
planners in the management of urban development with which the study
opened.

The planning issues raised in this context include the possible

ways in which consolidated government, urban service delivery and urban
boundary adjustment might be a part of efforts to influence the type,
rate, location, timing and quality of urban development.

The final

pages of this chapter and study will search for possible messages for
the planners and others who share such interests.

The first part of the

chapter. however. will address the need to summarize and speculate on
the Nashville story.
Four research questions were initially provided to give focus to
the study of urban service delivery in the Metro setting:
1.

Was the creation of these service districts based upon (to any
extent) a planning concern for the coordination of service
provision with development objectives?
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2.

Has the existence of these districts permitted their use as a
vehicle for coordinated service delivery consistent with
development objectives?

3.

Given the history of these districts, do they appear to have
potential in assisting Metro Nashville in meeting its future
development objectives?

4.

Does the Nashville experience with consolidated government and
the service district concept provide planners with evidence of
the validity of such arrangements for the implementation of
development objectives in the metropolitan area?

The summary of the study of Metro is organized as a response to the
first three of these questions, with the fourth providing a transition
to the broader final comments.
I.

THE URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT CONCEPT

In the final pages of Chapter II, it was argued that the
the U.S.D.-G.S.D. concept was created essentially as a financially,
administratively and politically sound way to assist consolidated
government in meeting Davidson County's massive backlog in providing
urban services to urbanized areas, particularly sanitary sewers and fire
protection.

To'argue that Metro's service district concept was born

from some embryonic scheme to use urban services provision to guide
urban development would simply deny the historical circumstances
encountered first, by those who convened the Community Services
Commission and, later, by the many forces active in bringing about
consolidated government.
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The first research question also makes reference to the existence
of "development objectives" toward which service delivery arrangements
might have been directed during the designing of Metro.

As conceptually

developed in the pages following the historical review, such "objectives l l
were found to exist almost entirely within the private development
sector, dominated by developers, investors, home buyers and so on.

When

translated into public demands, these objectives became rapidly
increasing needs to service urbanized areas which, in many cases,
received little more than two-inch water lines in the way of commonly
accepted urban services.

In a way quite typical of their sense of

realism, the early planners of Metro invented the U.S.D. and G.S.D. as
servicing and political, much more than as planning, tools.

Servicing

rather than shaping urban development was an important distinction.
Their recognition that the existing service needs of urbanized areas
effectively prevented the allocation of near-future Metro fiscal and
political resources towards any effort to manage new development was
fortified by their knowledge that the extension of the transportation
system and other shaping factors would heavily influence metropolitan
growth in and beyond Davidson County.

Nevertheless, the context of

consolidated government coupled with the hope that the service backlogs
could eventually be reduced at least allowed some anticipation that the
U.S.D.-G.S.D. distinction together with the expandable nature of the
U.S.D. boundaries might become useful in some future setting where the
management of development would receive some level of community support.

176
II.

URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT PERFORMANCE

The implementation of Metro's service district concept has been
reviewed both from the perspective of the general frameworks for
development which have existed in Metro since 1963 (Chapter III) and the
accounts of actual U.S.D. service and boundary extensions.

The first

perspective was required by the study's research interests in the
developmental consequences of public policies, including those
influencing the distribution of the services allocated to the U.S.D.
package.

The presentation of a typology for classifying the varying

impacts of public policy-making upon urban development was used to
suggest that during Metro's first years, few public decisions were made
to consciously influence the character, direction, staging or timing of
Metro development.

Where such decisions were made, they generally fit

the "minimum standard" pattern and experienced varying degrees of
successful implementation.

It is not unexpected, then, that any

conclusion regarding the impact of U.S.D. service policies and boundary
extensions is preempted by the absence of any significant public effort
to influence development beyond the "minimum standard" level of action.
Within the setting just presented, the discussions in Chapter IV
shifted to a more specific review of the evolution of U.S.D. service
delivery and U.S.D. boundary extensions.

Delivery of the package of

U.S.D. services was undertaken by functional Metro departments with
relatively little coordination.

This was seen as a function of both the

aggressive strength of such departments, especially Water and Sewerage
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Services, and the absence of an early and persuasive comprehensive
planning effort receiving strong political support.
Recent studies continue to illuminate the consequences of the
absence of planned, coherent U.S.D. service extension.

One study, which

sampled several developed areas with initial development dates ranging
from 1953 to 1972, concluded that minimal water was generally present at
the time of development but that average time between initial development
and supply of other U.S.D. services was 11 years for sewers and 19.5
'
,1
years f or f 1re
protect1on.
Another report mentions that development in

Metro continues to absorb far more land per capita than the median for
cities of the same size (231 acres per 1,000 persons for Metro as
compared with 67 acres for cities over 250,000).

2

Service problems are

not diminished through such land-intensive development.

In its recent,

and first, effort to develop a comprehensive plan, the Metropolitan
Planning Commission cited "disruptive and inefficient development
processes" and "the inability of local government to provide adequate
services" as two of the seven major problem areas facing Metro. 3
From 1960 to 1970, 37,397 acres of land were developed for
residential purposes outside the inner city portion of
Davidson County. The low level of existing public services

l"The Process of Urbanization and Timing of the Provision of a full
range of Municipal Services, If (unpublished memorandum, Metropolitan
Planning Commission, May, 1978).
2Untitled Staff Draft Memo (Metropolitan Planning Commission, July,
1978).
3proposed General Plan For Nashville (Nashville: Metropolitan
Planning Commission, 1977), p. 12.
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in outlying areas together with the high cost of improved
services placed constraints upon the intensity of suburban
development. As a result, a dispersed and sporadic pattern of
suburban development has prevailed in the county with a
resultant detrimental effect on the efficient and timely
provision of public services. However, when services, particularly sanitary sewers, are finally provided in suburban areas,
a significant demand for higher density development occurs.
Subsequent higher density development proposals submitted
after suburban areas are serviced by community facilities
frequently generate significant conflict among long established neighborhood residents desiring to preserve low
densities and land developers desiring more intensive development . . . . a major problem facing Metropolitan Government
regarding the provision of community facilities and services
is the lack of adequate fiscal capacity to meet even current
needs . . . . There are currently several areas throughout
the county where extension of urban services has not kept pace
with the level of development. As a result local government
has not realized the savings in public expenditures possible
with the installation of public utilities during the initial
stages of the urban development process. It now will become
necessary to disrupt relatively mature areas in order to
provide public facilities long after these facilities were
originally needed. Furthermore, other areas have reached the
development stage that makes urban services feasible and would
create effective long-term costs savings, in addition to
promoting further development. 4
Although perhaps lengthy for a concluding chapter, these recent
'observations have been included to stress the point that many of the
developmental issues faced by Metro in 1963 remain in the late 1970's.
Urban Services District services are still being extended into urbanized
areas and significant urbanized areas remain outside the existing U.S.D.
boundaries.
The existing U.S.D. boundaries themselves only came into existence
after awareness of the previous failures to expand reached political
proportions~

Although the mechanisms for U.S.D. expansion and the

4proposed General Plan For Nashville, pp. 12-13, 21-22.
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maintenance of a U.S.D. package of services existed within the Metro
Charter, previous discussion has shown that political support within the
Metro Council for expansion was late in emerging and that the "package"
was diluted, first with the placement of sewer and water services on a
user charge basis, then with the allowance of continued non-Metro
service districts, and, finally, the extension of Metro fire protection
throughout the G.S.D.
Lest the opinion remain that, even within the context of limited
public participation in development decision-making, the failure of
U.S.D. service policies to impact development patterns be attributed to
inadequate management of U.S.D. potential, several additional concluding
points need to be made.
U.S~D.-.G.S.D.

First, it seems obvious that one goal of the

concept has been achieved-to the possible detriment of

objectives associated with managed development.

The goal achieved has

been the relatively even distribution of G.S.D. services throughout the
county.

Much of the unevenness in schoOl, road, police, parks and

recreation, health and welfare services common prior to consolidation
have nearly disappeared.
gro~n

Although fiscal burdens upon the G.S.D. have

accordingly. the developmental consequence has been to make

urbanization beyond the U.S.D. more attractive relative to urbanization
in the county prior to 1963.

The erosion of the U.S.D.-G.S.D. distinc-

tion combined with accessibility improvements in the county fringes will
continue to lessen the incentives for development in the existing U.S.D.
Also contributing to some lessened impact of development control
has been the continuing existence of the seven satellite cities.
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Conventional wisdom regarding the presence of incorporated municipalities
within a consolidated form of government tempts one to overestimate
their role in Metro.

With the exception of Goodlettsville and the

semi-commercial island of Berry Hill, these cities are low-density,
residential areas whose primary objective is to capitalize on the
political bargain which created them and use zoning controls to keep
nonresidential development out.

As parts of the G.S.D. and able to

contract with Metro for U.S.D. services, the cities provided a strong
attraction for development beyond the U.S.D. boundaries.

Presently,

however, little undeveloped developable land remains in these areas--and
where it does, its zoning is generally compatible with approaching Metro
policies (especially Belle Meade, Oak Hill and Forest Hills).

The only

existing issue of consequence between the satellite cities and Metro
development is the refusal of Goodlettsville and Berry Hill to allocate
the discretionary half of their state sales tax allocation to the
Metropolitan Board of Education.

As a matter of policy, Metro and the

other five satellite cities commit all of their state sales tax
allocation to education.
A final caveat in discussing the impact of U.S.D. policies on Metro
development concerns the impact of the transportation network, both
within Metro and regionally.

There is little doubt that the pattern and

sequence of suburban-residential as well as industrial and commercial
development has been influenced by the extensions of the seven radial
transportation corridors out from the center of Metro.

Although a full

discussion of this influence is beyond the scope of this study, it is
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certainly recognized that transportation decisions have had significant
shaping influences upon Metro.

The conceptual emphasis on the "minimum

standard" framework in which development of Metro occurred perhaps
obscured the point that, although private interests may have been a part
of the decisions, nevertheless the commitment of federal, state and
local resources to expand the streets and highways within Metro not only
impacted upon internal development, but contributed to the phenomena and
issues of regional growth raised by Dan Grant in the remarks presented
in the final pages of Chapter II.

Again, the issues are complex, but

they need to be noted, even though the general conclusion is still
valid:

the potential for use of the U.S.D. service package and boundary

extension to influence development in Metro remained latent.
III.

URBAN SERVICES DISTRICT POTENTIAL

A unique opportunity currently exists to engage in some speculation
about the possible impact of U.S.D. service policies and boundary
extensions on future development in Metro.

As mentioned previously, the

Metropolitan Planning Commission, around 1970, began to undertake its
first truly comprehensive planning effort.

Although other planning

priorities have intervened on occasion and slowed the comprehensive
planning activity, the staff released, in July 1976, three "general plan
S
options!! for Metropolitan Nashville.
At the same time it was announced

Sproposed General Plan For Nashville: Economic Development
Alternative (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1976); Proposed
General Plan For Nashville: Residential Livability Alternative (Nashville:
Metropolitan Planning Commission, 1976); Proposed General Plan For
Nashville: Public Economies Alternative (Nashville: Metropolitan Planning
Commission, 1976); Proposed General Plan For Nashville.
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that the three plan options would be placed before citizens, groups,
organizations and institutions of Metropolitan Nashville for discussion
and refinement.

Following this period, it was suggested that there

would be a period of aggregation and incorporation of this public
discussion into the options.

The Planning Commission would then select

from or combine features of the options and officially adopt Metro's
first general, comprehensive plan. 6 As of this writing, no formal
action of plan adoption has occurred.

However, as a basis for

considering the potential roles U.S.D. policies may play in influencing
Metro development, the activities associated with this comprehensive
planning thrust offer at least two opportunities for speculating about
the future.

The first is provided by the technical discussions in each

of the plan options which assess potential U.S.D. service roles.

The

second is broader and probes at the heart of Metro's capacity to
influence its future development:

of the three options, two propose a

much greater public role in managing the sequence, timing, location and
quality of Metro'S physical development.

Using the terms introduced in

Chapter III, these two options, "Residential Livability" and "Public
Economies" clearly require a "partnership" between public and private
development interests as an ingredient in the environment which would
support their implementation.

The third option, "Economic Development,"

assumes an urban development environment not too different from that
found throughout Metro's history.

6Interview with Robert Paslay, Planning Director, Metropolitan
Planning Commission, September, 1977.
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It is beyond the purposes of this study to fully explore each of

these plan alternatives.

For the reasons stated above, however, it is

useful to briefly review the approach toward the urban servicedevelopment relationship taken in each alternative.

If one assumes that

the "economic development" alternative is basically an incremental
extension of Metro's past framework for development, then the contrast
between its treatment of the U.S.D. and that of the other two altematives offers some commentary on the range of potential relationships
between urban service policies and development in Metro's future.
The three alternatives were prepared from a common review of seven
problem areas found to be significant in examining Metro's history and
future need.

Two of these problems relate directly to issues developed

in this study and have already been mentioned:

"disruptive and

inefficient development processes," and lithe inability of local
government to provide adequate services." The other problem areas
include lack of housing opportunities, lack of a balanced transportation
system, adverse impact of transportation upon residential areas,
inadequate educational and recreational opportunities, and environmental
degradation.

7

Each of the alternatives addresses these problems--with

transportation, environmental, educational, and recreational policies
varying little among them.

The shape, quality, location, timing and

sequencing of urban physical development along with urban service
policies, however, vary considerably.

7proposed General Plan For Nashville, pp. 12-24.
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The "economic development" alternative seeks the "maximum
development of economic activities and employment opportunities" by
encouraging "sufficient flexibility in the development process to
enhance private investment opportunities and to stimulate growth."

8

Accordingly. "the overall pattern of residential development in Davidson
County under this plan will be continued decentralization. although most
growth is expected to occur in concentrations of development rather than
in a dispersed manner.

A residential development strategy is proposed

which is designed to accommodate the bulk of new growth stimulated by
economic development and to assure an adequate level of essential public
services in both existing and emerging residential areas.,,9

Although

recommendations are made. as in the other options. for more mixed
densities, more d:lverse low and middle income housing opportunities.
better development design standards and so on, the essential feature of
the

lI

economic development" option is the promotion of relatively

unrestrained residential development which will accommodate the growth
requirements of an expanding economy and not place significantly
increased financial demands upon the private sector.
Accordingly, the "economic development" alternative contains the
recommendation that U.S.D. expansion should occur "in areas which have
urbanized sufficiently to be serviced without requiring a major increase
in the U.S.D. taxes."l0

8

In addition. it is recommended that fire

ProEosed General Plan For Nashville. p. 27.

9proEosed General Plan For Nashville. p. 29.
10

ProEosed General Plan For Nashville, p. 80.
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,

protect~on

' b e exten de d COuntyw1'd e. 11
serV1ces

preceding chapter, has already taken place.

This, as discussed in the
In mapping out projected

U.S.D. expansion areas, those identified were already developed areas in
need of U.S.D. services, primarily Bellevue, Madison, Antioch and Old
Hickory-Hermitage. 12

The essence, therefore. of this alternative's

vision of the U.S.D.-development relationship is one of continued
"catching up" with the hope that "keeping up" may ultimately occur.

The

heart of the "economic development" approach to development planning is
the assumption that basic urban service planning (as embodied in the
U.S.D. package) should facilitate the implementation (albeit at a high
level of minimum standards) of development objectives determined by
private interests.
The "residential livability" and "public economies" alternatives
are based upon a different planning assumption.

They assume, in

differing degrees, that a public interest in urban development exists
beyond the simple establishment of minimum development standards, and
that some means must be established to reconcile this public interest
with sometimes competing private interests.

One way of conceptualizing

this process of reconciliation has been the transition from "minimum
standard" planning for urban development to "partnership planning." The
"residential livability" alternative assumes a public interest oriented
toward lithe achievement and maintenance of a highly desirable

11

Proposed General Plan For Nashville: Economic Development
Alternative, pp. 90-91.
12 Proposed General Plan For Nashville, p. 81.
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residenti~l environment. illS The flpublic economies" alternative is based
upon a more demanding sense of public interest:

"cost effectiveness in

the provision of public facilities and services (through) . . . .
defining

t~e

least expensive way of accommodating growth within the

communi ty while still maintaining acceptable levels of service. ,,14
Both of these options propose the use of the U.S.D. service package
as an important means for implementing development patterns consistent
with the public interest portion of Metro's future development goals.
The "residential livability" option recommends that. 'once the backlog of
servicing developed areas is met, the "full-range of services. including
U.S.D. expansion" should be provided "to desired

grow~h areas. illS The

areas programmed for U.S.D. extension are more extensive than in the
"economic development" alternative. including. eventually, all land
within Metro where residential growth is to occur. 16 Of crucial
importance is the timing of U.S.D. extension.

It is proposed that

extension of services will precede or accompany growth.

Although the

issue is now moot. the alternative proposes that fire protection not be
extended countywide since "it is felt that (this) would detract from the
service package incentive proposed by the plan strategy.

This would

weaken the directed growth incentive proposed by the alternative.,,17

lSproposed General Plan For Nashville, p. 27.
l4 Ibid .
IS

ProEosed General Plan For Nashvi lle, p. 87.
16
'
ProEosed General Plan For Nashville. p. 84.
17

ProEosed General Plan For Nashville. p. 87.
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Whereas the "residential livability" alternative assumes a greater
increase in the U.S.D. tax rate to finance its capacity to extend
desired residential services, the tlpublic economies" alternative assumes
that a desire to reduce public expenditures will modify demands for
desired residential patterns.

It, too, proposes tightly controlled

extension of the U.S.D. area together with the regulatory devices
necessary to prevent development where such services are not available.
Its mo.ti ve, however, is the containment of public expenditure.

"Further

expansion is tied to service capabilities and financial ability to
schedule expansion.

Areas held in reserve and not scheduled for

expansion have regulatory controls applied to discourage development
until extensive development becomes economical to serve. 1I18 The fiscal
evaluations of urban service extensions would become primary criteria in
decisions to "open up" certain areas for development.

Under this

alternative, development decision-making would fall near the line .,
between the Itpartnership" framework and that of "management," where the.
public sector is dominant.
Although these reviews of the development options currently before
Metro have been brief, they have suggested two basically different roles
for U.S.D. policies.

As a link between this study's review of the

history of these policies and the need to at least comment on the
potential for certain future policies, the real choices offered between
the alternatives are significant, particularly if a distinction is drawn

l8proposed General Plan For Nashville, p. 83.
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between the technical capacity for U.S.D. policies to influence
development and the political likelihood that the requisite U.S.D.
policies will be implemented.
There is little question that continuation of the U.S.D. service
package combined with guided boundary modification, perhaps even in
small, block-by-block increments, could influence the nature of urban
development in Metro.

Although the extension of fire protection

countywide has somewhat diminished the differences between U.S.D. and
non-U.S.D. areas in terms of services delivered and taxes due (which
impact market values and holding costs), the tight control of U.S.D.
services together with interrelated building codes, subidivision
regulations, zoning requirements and capital improvements scheduling of
other services could significantly impact development decision-making.
The real issue, however, is the extent to which there will be political
resol ve wi thin Metro to engage in any form of "partnership" planning
whatsoever.

That is the critical distinction between the "economic

development" alternative and the other two alternatives.

It's the same

distinction which has been raised throughout this study.

In 1952, as in

1978, planners, faced with Metro's problems, have had to weigh technical
judgments against political realities.

Where their insights, skills,

and sense of timing led to some form. of synthesis of these perspectives,
progress was achieved.

Where a critical mass for action did not exist,

problems simply accumulated.

In the current age of diminishing resources,

environmental consciousness and public outcry against perceived
governmental costliness, it may be easier to achieve consensus on a
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public-private partnership for Metro's development.

Both the

"residential li vabili ty!! and "public economies" al ternati ves are built
on this hope.

1£ one extends a trendline through the pages of this

study's particular'focus on Metro's experiences with the U.S.D.
howev~r~

concept~

the future of service extension and its impact on Metro's

development would appear to be more closely linked to the scenario
portrayed in the "economic development" alternative.

IV.

MESSAGES FOR PLANNERS

This study evolved from the issues surrounding the perceived need
to manage or guide development in many urban areas.
has drawn on Metropolitan
government~

urban service

Nashville's·experien~es
packaging~

In

particular~

it

with consolidated

and urban service boundaries to

develop a case study which might be of interest and utility to planners
and other interested persons struggling with the problem of urban
development.

It is appropriate J therefore J to conclude the study by

returning to the initial .concerns of the opening page,s!

the potential

for consolidated government and controlled urban service packages and
areas to become productive components in efforts to manage urban
development.
The Nashville story 'offers planners a complex message.

As a

response to the three questions about consolidated government posed in
the first

chapter~

the experiences of Metro suggest that:
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1.

The "political feasibility" of consolidation is dependent upon
a "critical mass" of consistent planning, consistent leadership, publicly perceived problems, public support, and
patience;

2.

The "metropolitan" problem is not solved by consolidation; and

3.

Consolidated government does not necessarily bring about
"efficiencies" in the deli very of urban services although many
economies do result.

The combined impact of these observations is that consolidated
government may conceptually exist as a means for better influencing
urban development, but the obstacles for bringing the concept into
reality are formidable.

The proper conditions for implementing

consolidated government finally fit together in Nashville only after 10
years of work by a remarkably consistent group of planners and community
leaders.

Still, it required a public reaction to the decision by the

City to proceed with annexation before consolidation was ratified.
.

-

number of events could easily have prevented Metro's birth.

A

If the

planners associated with the Advance Planning and Research Division had
left Nashville after the defeat of first referendum; if school
integration had been the issue it became only several years later; if
the allocation of federal funds had penalized metropolitan governments
as they now do; if any number of factors had changed, Metro might never
have come to exist.
Metro has never been a metropolitan government.

The scope of this

study has not permitted a full evaluation of the impact of the extensive
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suburban ring which exists beyond the Davidson County boundary.
Regardless of any future success in managing its own development, Metro
will be faced by the fact that only through the complex and difficult
procedures and politics of regional councils, state government, and
federal agencies will truly metropol1tan pr0b1ems be addressed.

On the

other hand, planners should not miss the fact that Metro has jurisdiction over a significantly greater portion of the metropolitan area than
would have been the case had Metro not been formed.

Regardless of how

Metro has used its own authority to influence development, it's
important to note that the countywide extension of the G.S.D. removed
school, transportation, health care, and other service issues from the
areas of inter-governmental combat.
Finally, planners need to recognize. that consolidated government
has not meant "coordinated" government in the case of Metro.

In this

study's examination of Metro's experiences in use of the U.S.D. to
influence development, it has been seen that service coordination within
the U.S.D. package was not generally achieved.

The absence of a strong

comprehensive planning effort coupled with at least one aggressive
service-providing Metro department contributed to the lack of coordinated
service delivery and extension.

This observation does not deny the

significant economies and levels of coordination which have been
achieved by Metro in many areas, as cited in earlier pages.

Is is

simply intended to show that consolidated governments are as subject to
internal conflicts and inconsistencies as are any other forms of
government.

Although in Metro, the conflicts have not been geographical
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and citizen support for Metro has been generally consistently high
across neighborhood areas, the arguments for "polycentric local
government" seem as valid as do those for "consolidated government."
Using Metropolitan Nashville as an example of consolidated government,
it could probably be argued that certain examples of federated local
governments have been more successful in achieving the efficiencies and
coordination of service delivery required for strategies aimed at
influencing development.

Planners need to pay attention as much to the

boundaries between departments, agencies and commissions as they do to
those between cities, towns and counties.
A second group of messages is,based upon the experiences of Metro
in packaging and extending urban services within the framework provided
by the Metro Charter.

The evolution of the Urban Services

Dist~ict

and

the General Services District can be summarized with the message that
the original ingredients hypothesized to be necessary in the effective
use of urban service policies remain valid.

Technical skill, financial

\

resources, the proper governmental framework. and political will are
required if urban services are to be used as a means for influencing
urban development.

From the initial Community Services Commission

report in 1952 until the present documents on Metro's comprehensive plan
options. there has been Ii ttle question of the technical competence of
Metro plans for service policies and extension.

There has been little

disagreement over the technical status of Metro services planning or of
the validity of forecasts for future need.

The issues in conflict have

emerged from differing goals toward which forecasts and'projections
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should be made.

On a relative basis, technical competency has not been

a Metro problem.
The tremendous cost of servicing the underserviced developed areas
has certainly limited the flexibility with which U.S.D. service
extension was planned, regardless of political considerations.

As

reflect·ed in earlier statements, the very thought of using U.S.D. service
extension to influence urban growth when significant areas of the
existing U.S.D. were not being fully serviced raised serious questions
of political and legal equity.

Even the ambitious Itresidential

livability" alternative for a comprehensive plan stresses the need to
\ service existing areas of development before engaging in a program of
selective U.S.D. expansion.

The reason is, and has been simple:

Metro

has been forced to spend valuable resources simply to catch up with
service demands.

Technical competence and money are important.

has had the former and lacked some of the latter.
is to discount neither.

Metro

The partial message

The full message, however, requires a look at

the final ingredients in a process of planning urban services and
development:

governmental arrangements and political will.

It has already been suggested that Metro's consolidated form of
government has not prevented the emergence of problems in attempting to
manage urban service delivery.

The regional issue and departmental

independence have been cited as problems.

The key feature in Metro's

governmental arrangement has been the division of urban services
between the U.S.D. and the G.S.D.

The initial wish of the designers of

Metro was that the two service packages would remain 'distinct until such
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time as the entire county became urbanized.

As discussed at various

points throughout this study, the reasoning was that a package of urban
services suited to highly urbanized areas and attached to an urban
services district together with its own revenue-raising authority would
not only solve problems of service equity, it would also provide a
coordinated means for extending urban services.

In their hearts, Metro

planners hoped that this packaging of services into an expandable
district might eventually become a tool for influencing urban develop,r--:,

ment.

(The "residential livability" and "public economies" alternatives

might also be considered "plans from the hearts of planners.")

The

message for planners is that the Metro test of the urban services
district model should bea warning that pressures can emerge which will
dilute the service package, both through assignment of services on a
coUntywide basis (like fire protection) or through placement of services
on a user fee basis permitting service extension beyond the district.
Allowing the existence and expansion of "special service districts" has
the same effect.

To be effective, the service package must be

distinctive, predictable and its absence from an area should be an
effective deterrent to development.
It is not just coinGident that the final message and comment of
this study deals with "political will. II

Regardless of the formal

arrangements for delivery of urban services, their capacity to influence
the nature of urban development will ultimately depend upon the mixture
of political willingness within the urban area to permit such an impact.
As a recent review of a series or urban growth management systems
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concluded, the "capacity to execute" a growth management plan is
meaningless unless that capacity includes a political capacity.19

In

many ways, the story of Metro is a story of "capacity-in-waiting."

In

the 1950's, planners, engineers, lawyers and others proposed a solution
to Nashville's service problems.
lucky.

They then both worked hard and were

Ultimately, only the politicians and the voters could give life

(to their plan for metropolitan government.
influence development didn't fare so well.
received little political support.
standard" was too pervasive.
its usefulness.

The use of the U.S. D. to
The potential was there, but

The environment of the "minimum

It may well be that the tool has now lost

Nevertheless, Metro planners, true to their predecessors,

have again put forward a plan.

\Vhether they will be as successful--and

lucky--as the earlier planners were, only some future study will be able
to say.

The message offered by this study is that only when the

citizens, interests and officials of an urban area are willing to accept
a greater role for local government in influencing the development of
their urban area will proposals to use urban service policies to such
an end be successful.

The extent to which planners can help bring this

political consensus into being obviously varies from city to city.

In

Metropolitan Nashville, even though the odds for success may not be
great, there exists a legacy for making the effort.

19Robert Einsweiler et al., Urban Growth Management Systems: An
Evaluation of Policy-Related Research (Chicago: American Society of
Planning Officials, 1976).
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